ceeds on the ground that all certainty arises from a comparison of ideas, and the discovery of their unalterable relations, which are resemblance, proportions in quantity and number, degrees of quality and contrariety, and none of which is implied in the proposition above stated. All the objects of knowledge are impressions and ideas: the former are our more lively perceptions, when we hear or see, love or hate, or desire or will; the latter are the less lively perceptions of which we are conscious when we reflect on the former, and are copies of impressions. The existence of these perceptions as objects of consciousness cannot be denied; but to admit the existence of a percipient being, the I, is to assume that of mind, which is no more an object of knowledge than matter. There can, therefore, be no objective knowledge; and we are reduced to consciousness, the phenomena of which it takes cognizance, and their subjective relations. Hume's system of scepticism is not scepticism antecedent to study and philosophy, but consequent to science and inquiry, holding the absolute fallaciousness of the mental faculties, bringing the senses themselves into dispute, and thus sapping the foundations of all knowledge, and rejecting the existence of God, a providence, and a future state. At about the same time, Hartley (q. v.) attempted to account for all the phenomena of the mind, by the single principle of the association of ideas, and for this principle by vibrations and vibratiuncles in the medullary substance of the brain. In connexion with this plan of materialism, he defended the doctrine of necessity, representing God as the only cause of all natural effects and all human actions. To the Hartleian school belong Priestley (q.v.), Darwin, and Horne Tooke. The sceptical conclusions which Hume had irresist ibly shown to be the result of the ideal system of philosophy, which had been received since the time of Descartes and Locke, led Reid (Inquiry into the Human Mind, 1764; On the Intellectual Powers 1785) to the examination and refutation of that system itself. The Scotch school of philosophy, modest and perhaps timid in its pretensions, has the merit of having first strongly and largely inculcated the absolute necessity of admitting certain principles as the foundation of all reasoning, and as being the indispensable conditions of thought itself. The Kantian philosophy is only a modification of it. According to the Scotch philosophers, certain simple ideas are implied and involved in certain intuitive judgments of the mind; thus identity, cause, time, number, truth, certainty, probability, are ideas peculiar to a rational mind, and necessarily arise in the human understanding, when employed in the exercise of its different faculties. Reid, therefore, while he rejected the Cartesian theory of ideas or images in the mind being the only objects of thought, directed his inquiries to an analysis of the various powers and principles of our constitution, in order to discover the fundamental laws of belief, which form the ground-work of human knowledge. Though professing to build only on experience, he did not limit experience to the relations of sense and its objects. Without claiming for man more than a relative knowledge of existence, and restricting the science of mind to an observation of the fact of consciousness, he analyzed that fact into a greater number of more important elements than had been recognised in the sensualist school. He showed that phenomena are revealed in thought, which cannot be resolved into any modification of sense; that intelligence supposes principles, which, as the conditions of its activity, cannot be the result of its operations; and that the mind contains notions, which, as primitive, necessary and universal, are not to be explained as generalizations from the contingent and particular, about which alone our external experience is conversant. His enumeration of the faculties of the mind, which he does not, however, give as complete, comprises perception, memory, conception, abstraction, judgment, reason, taste, moral perception, consciousness. The representation of consciousness as a special faculty, when, in reality, it is the generic condition of all mental activity, was a pregnant error in Reid's philosophy;-while his doctrine of the immediate or intuitive knowledge of mind and matter, which involved the overthrow of the ideal system, and the scepticism (or rather nihilism) deduced from it, was an important step in the progress of philosophy. Stewart, with some deviations, followed in the track of his master; but Brown, while he adopted many of the principles of Reid, departed, in many points of fundamental importance, from his philosophy. He assumes the existence of primary intuitions of direct belief, which are not only necessary to reasoning, but to thought itself: all our conceptions imply the idea of form, which is derived from relation in space (coëxistence), and of power, which is derived from relation in time (successive exist ence); cause is only the invariable antecedent, effect the invariable consequent, power the invariable antecedence, in any sequence of phenomena. All feelings and thoughts are the mind itself existing in certain states; consciousness is not a distinct faculty, but a general term for all the states of the mind. Mental (personal) identity is an intuitive law of thought, it being impossible to conceive of successive states but as modifications of the permanent being the I. The different states are divided by Brown into the external states (sensations), produced by the presence of external objects, and the internal states, arising in consequence of preceding affections of the mind itself. The latter class is divided into intellectual states and emotions, which are all referrible to one generic susceptibility-suggestion (association of ideas). The laws of suggestion are resemblance, contrast, and nearness in time or place, which are all reducible to proximity. That capacity of suggestion which revives conceptions, Brown terms simple suggestion, and that which gives rise to feelings of relation, relative suggestion. To the former are reducible those mental states commonly called the faculties of conception, memory, imagination, and habit; to the latter, those of judgment, reasoning, and abstraction. But Brown's philosophy involves many radical inconsistencies, and would hardly deserve to be mentioned in so general a sketch, were it not remarkable as an open revolt against the Scotch system, at the moment the latter seemed to be developed with new power, and to acquire new authority on the European continent; and for the temporary popularity it possessed in Great Britain, and particularly in this country. While France and Germany have in recent times imbibed a new spirit of metaphysical inquiry, the science of mind has been entirely neglected in Great Britain, and all interest in psychological researches seems to be extinct in that country. German Philosophy. To the remark already made, of the impracticability of giving a satisfactory view of German philosophy within the limits to which we are confined, we must add, that if any science requires to be studied in a spirit of candor, and with a sincere desire to understand its real merits (and what science can be properly studied without such a spirit?), it is intellectual philosophy, particularly German philosophy. Nothing is easier than to take a phrase or a passage relating to subjects beyond the reach of the senses (whether of a philosophical, religious, or poetical character), and turn it into ridicule. We would also remark, that, since German philosophy has of late years diverged with unprecedented rapidity in all directions, and system after system has been raised and overthrown, it has been often asked, What has been gained by it? Have the philosophers settled any of the mysteries which have always perplexed the mind of man; or have they acquired any clearer and deeper knowledge respecting the most important interests of human society, government, law, and the civil ties in general, on which they write so much? We answer, that the Germans have acquired, by their philosophy, a spirit of scientific liberty, unknown in other nations. Every nation and age has its task and condition. As yet it has not been the lot of Germany to enjoy the blessings of civil freedom, and the manly spirit which it generates; but the spirit which pervades the best German works on religion, on literature, on natural philosophy, may well challenge comparison. The spirit of system and independent thought, which German philosophy has infused into German literature, sometimes leads, indeed, to prolixity of exposition, and sometimes to extravagance of speculation; but these are small disadvantages compared with the benefit which it has conferred; and the whole tone of the literature proves, what we have had occasion to remark more than once already, that civil liberty alone is wanting to hold the Germans up to the world as a noble and manly nation. While we dwell on the good consequences which German philosophy has had on the spirit of inquiry, we are far from pretending that it has been productive of unmixed good, or that every system of German philosophy which has acquired distinction in its time, deserves its reputation. How often has a figurative expression been taken for a profound truth, and served as the basis of arguments and systems, which sink into nothing before a critical investigation, and to which nothing but the imagination of Germans could have given a short-lived existence! This unsoundness, which is found in many German systems, is owing, in a great degree, to the predominance of the speculative over the active life in that country. Free institutions would soon enable them to shake off the dreaminess of the closet, by rousing them to vigorous action on practical subjects. The ill repute in delssohn, the works of Platner and Abbt, together with the revived interest for art and criticism, and not less the sentimentality which reigned in poetry as well as in religion, excited and directed the attention of the whole thinking world to the nature of their own souls, and prepared the way for the system of Immanuel Kant. (q.v.) With him begins the second period of German philosophy. He showed that, instead of inquiring what the world was in itself, we ought first to inquire how we perceive it. Thus he began to examine all the means which man possesses for the perception of the external world, and determined the laws according to which every organ operates, and the sphere to which it is limited. His criticism denied to reason the possibility of finding and proving any truth, without the sphere of consciousness and of physical phenomena. The theory of Kant was extended by his followers in many directions, yet not with the harmony and comprehensive judiciousness with which he united and arranged all the different kinds and objects of mental activity. The human mind, however, was not satisfied with learning only its own limits. The relation between its own notions and realities, was again endeavored to be determined in different ways. Fichte rejected the idea of any such relation, by admitting the absolute existence only of the thinking individual, by which he considered even the objects of thought to be produced; he denied the reality of an exterior world. This system atoned for its exclusive character by the high standard to which this vigorous spirit raised the moral dignity of man. Between him and Kant stands Fries, in his Neue Kritic der Vernunft ; he likewise was distinguished for the moral tendency of his philosophy. In opposition to Fichte, Schelling proceeds from the idea of the objective absolute (see Objective), and arrives at length at the idea of individual existence (the I), from which Fichte sets out. He begins a third period in the German philosophy with his doctrine of identity, in which he determines the relation between subject and object. To him, mind and nature are only manifestations of the Divine principle, and the knowledge of this identity between thought and outward existence rests on intellectual intuition. Oken has founded a natural philosophy on this system. Hegel (q. v.) has sought to establish a which German philosophy long stood with foreigners, is owing, partly, to the reckless independence with which most of the German philosophers have created and shaped their language according to their systems, so as to render its study particularly difficult for strangers; partly to the premature and partial applications which inferior talents have made of those systems to other branches of literature, and which have mostly been known sooner than the original system; partly to real extravagances; but greatly, also, to the difficulty of justly estimating so large and so new a department of literature. A German philosophy, properly so called, could not appear until German prose had received a certain degree of cultivation. As long as the German philosophers wrote chiefly in Latin, they confined themselves principally to the defence of the predominating philosophy of the time-e. g. the scholastic philosophy-or else attacked it (after the fifteenth century), but without establishing new systems. The proper German philosophy is distinguished by an incessant striving for a systematic character, and the deduction of scientific conclusions from the simplest and most comprehensive principles. It must be considered to begin with Leibnitz (q. v.), towards the end of the seventeenth century. Leibnitz (q. v.) endeavored to deduce philosophical truth from necessary and innate ideas of reason, by the way of mathematical demonstration. This system he opposed to the sensualism of Locke. His doctrine of innate ideas, of the monads, of the preëstablished harmony of the universe, his theodicea, furnished subjects of thought to the most thinking men of his time. His followers, in particular Wolf and Baumgarten, extended his system, about the time of Frederic the Great; and, by their endeavors to reduce philosophy to one principle, and by the precise formulas in which they carried on their demonstrations, the formal side of philosophical science gained very much. The fault of this system was, that it sought truth merely by the way of definitions and demonstrations, as in mathematics. Wolf's disciples carried this system almost to absurdity. Lambert, Ploucquet, Reimarus, and others, his followers, cultivated logic with great success. This school was followed by a period of eclectic philosophy, in which, however, the scepticism of Hume, the examination of the understanding by Locke, the psychological investigations of Feder, Garve, Men- of the cholera. * He died in Berlin, in the winter of 1831-2, strict idealism, on Schelling's principles, by considering the absolute as the understanding conceiving of itself, and makes three divisions in his philosophy, logic, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of mind. Each of these systems has, at different periods, found many followers, who, with more or less success, have labored to extend them in different directions. Krug has united all the principal doctrines of Kant systematically in his Transcendental Synthetics. Bardili considered all philosophy as resting on the idea of the absolute, which he found in the act of thinking; he, therefore, treated logic as a source of real knowledge. Wagner and Eschenmayer endeavored to correct or to extend the doctrine of Schelling. Jacobi's doctrine on feeling and faith is of an original characSchulze distinguished himself as an opponent of Reinhold by a limited scepticism, Platner by his aphorisms, and Herbart by his metaphysical fragments. In considering the many changes German philosophy has undergone in so short a time, we shall naturally feel inclined to reproach this mania for new systems; but the truth or error of any comprehensive view cannot be appreciated justly, until it is developed in a consistent form, and the more different systems can be compared, the more comprehensive and impartial will be our knowledge. ter. French Philosophy. Totally opposite to German philosophy is the modern French philosophy. While the former strives to explore the abysses of existence, and to comprehend the mysteries of human nature, and thus often loses itself in flights of imagination, the French, of late, have understood by philosophy little more than the critical investigation of those subjects which are comprehensible at first view, and have banished from philosophy all that cannot be grasped by the plainest common sense; and so far have they carried this system, that at one time it proved most dangerous to morality, the original principles of which are by no means susceptible of such plain and simple demonstration as was required by the French school; and we have little doubt that, to this day, sensualism, or the French philosophy, founded on Condillac's system, produces fatal effects. So much, indeed, do the French and Germans differ, that what the former call philosophy and metaphysics is, in fact, totally different from that which the latter designate by the same terms. It is also very characteristic of the French people, that their modern philosophy may be said to have unfolded itself in fashionable society. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, a tone of light philosophy was introduced into polite circles, in opposition to the affected morality then in vogue, which, however, had some connexion with the old romantic spirit. Both systems had adherents in the world of fashion, under the patronage of ladies: at the head of one party was the spirituel Ninon de l'Enclos, with her philosophizing friend St. Evremond; at the head of the other, the amiable marchioness de Sevigné. Both the circles acquired literary celebrity; language attained the highest refinement, and conversation its greatest perfection; but the consequence was, that a conversational tone was given to literature. Descartes (q. v.), Arnauld (q. v.), (to whom is ascribed the Art de Penser, Nicole, De la Forge, and the deep-thinking Malebranche (q. v.), belong to another time. The direction which modern French philosophy has taken originated from the English philosopher Locke. (q.v.) On the doctrines of this acute reasoner a system of sensualism was founded by Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (born 1715, died 1780). He taught that the basis, the principle of all that is developed in our mind, is sensation (la faculté de sentir). All ideas, knowledge, faculties, even reflection, actions and customs, are successive transformations of this principle. "The sensation only changes its form, as the ice when it is dissolved into water, and evaporated in vapor." (See Condillac.) The simplicity of his niethod, and the clearness of his exposition, awakened the greatest interest. He became the leader of a school still predominating in France. The Encyclopædists (see Encyclopédie, the French) contributed most to its propagation, particularly Diderot, D'Alembert and Helvetius. The effect was striking: the most difficult of all sciences, which requires the deepest study and the most persevering reflection, was brought within the reach of the multitude; every one could talk about metaphysics. But it was overlooked that this system did not lead men a step nearer to the solution of the highest and most important problems. The system was carried farther and farther, not always in accordance with the views of the author, but according to the direction given by him. Sensation (the lowest degree of intellectual action, and that in which we are most dependent upon the external world) being now considered the essential principle in all the operations of the mind, the distinction between sensation and perception which Locke had made being rejected, and man being regarded only as an animal of a somewhat finer organization than the others, but moved only by sensual impulses (as in the system of Helvetius), the consequence was, that the material world was considered as the only form of existence, mind as only a connexion of atoms, the basis of its actions egotism, and the end of these actions a refined sensuality; thence the belief in moral freedom, virtue, God, providence and immortality, was looked upon as a folly unworthy of a reflecting mind, and a complete materialism became predominant. We have said that Condillac's system continues to predominate in France; still, however, several distinguished philosophers follow another path, and we are far from asserting that the consequences which we have ascribed to the system still exist in their full extent. It may be safely said, that there prevails in France, at present, a deep-felt want of the belief in a God, which not being able to find satisfaction in the dogmas of the Catholic church, the religion of the overwhelming majority is in an unsettled state. Of this want, even the propagation of the extravagant doctrines of the St. Simonians, which would be otherwise inconceivable, is a strong proof. But there are still more persons in France whose minds are unillumined by a belief in immortality, than in any other civilized nation. The acute understanding and inexhaustible wit of Voltaire, the clear intellect of D'Alembert, at the head of the Encyclopædists, spread through society the dangerous doctrines just mentioned. Rousseau's enthusiasm stands alone in the French literature of that time. The revolution, which produced so great a change in the character of the French, and made them more acquainted with foreign nations than their rational pride had allowed, especially with the Germans, had also considerable influence upon their philosophy. The want of a deeper, more earnest philosophy, is apparent even in Rousseau's works; still more in those of St. Pierre, Châteaubriand, Claude St. Martin, and the marquis Bonald; also Prosper de Barante, in his work on the literature of France in the eighteenth century, was actuated by this idea; and De Gerando, Villers, and the baroness de Staël-Holstein, from the same feeling, have directed attention to German philosophy. Among those who have at tempted to give philosophy a better character, Laromiguière is distinguished. His Leçons de Philosophie, ou Essai sur les Facultés de l'Ame (2d ed., Paris, 1820, 2 vols.), is valuable. He opposes the doctrine of Condillac, as to the first and sole principle. He stands nearer to Locke than to Condillac. Count Destutt de Tracy has become well known by his Idéologie (3d edit., Paris, 1817). Locke and Condillac are his idols. He extends somewhat the principle of Condillac, and considers sensations as predicable not only of the objects of the external world, but also of those of the inner. Ch. Vict. de Bonstetten's Etudes de l'Homme (Geneva, 1821, 2 vols.) is a valuable work, written in the spirit of the higher psychology, but more in the shape of sketches and hints than of a methodical system. Bonstetten strives particularly to defend the emotions of the heart, the feelings, against the coldness of logicians, who derive all the operations of the mind from ideas only. We must mention also Degerando, whose Hist. comparée des Systèmes de la Philosophie (Paris, 1804, 3 vols.) lately appeared in a new edition. Victor Cousin has opened a new path. He approaches the German philosophy. (See his article.) His introductory Cours de Philosophie has lately been very well translated into English by Mr. Linberg (Boston, 1832, 1 vol.). We ought to mention, also, the works of St. Simon, as among the modern works which have attracted most attention. (See St. Simon.) We shall conclude our remarks with a passage of the article Philosophie, from the Encyclopédie Moderne: "France cannot be said, at present, to have any system of intellectual philosophy properly its own. Fluctuating between the spiritualism of Germany, which rejects empiricism, and the views of the Scotch school, which admits the authority of experience, it adopts some views from each, whence results a sort of eclecticism, favorable at least to investigation, even if it is not, in all its parts, conformable to truth." For the Italian philosophers of the middle ages, see Italy, division Italian Literature. There is no school of modern Italian philosophy. For a complete history of philosophy, we refer to Tennemann's History of Philosophy (in German; Leipsic, 1798-1810, 18 vols., in large octavo), of which a synopsis has been also published, and a translation of the latter, by Vict. Cousin (Paris, 1829, 2 vols., 8vo.); also to Ritter's History of Philosophy (in German), not yet finished. |
