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LETTER LIV.

NOVEMBER 16, 1833.

MR. JEFFERSON's political life and his embargo system terminated about the same time, the former on the fourth, the latter on the fifteenth of March, 1809. The American people resumed their industry as well as they could, under the remaining embarrassments of non-intercourse with England, which was a serious one, and with France, which was believed to be a mere show of impartiality, and of little real importance. Mr. Jefferson retired to Monticello. In what manner Mr. Jefferson disposed of himself, during the seventeen years through which his life was prolonged, he has permitted the world to know from his volumes. With the help of these it may be proper to inquire into his real motives for proposing and insisting on the continuance of the embargo, because in the sweeping demand of his idolizers for gratitude and admiration, this measure makes a prominent figure in the acts on which that demand must be founded.

The declared motive for this measure, (unprecedented anywhere in the world, unless in China,) as expressed in the message proposing it, was to protect "our vessels, our seamen and merchandise from the belligerents." No one can know the real motive of Mr. Jefferson so well as himself; and he says, that the motive assigned in his message was not the real one.

On the 25th of December, 1825, he wrote a letter to his faithful friend, William B. Giles, (vol. iv. p. 519,) in which he gives an account of an interview with Mr. John Quincy Adams. He therein sets forth, that Mr. Adams "spoke of the dissatisfaction of the Eastern portion of our confederacy with the restraints of the embargo then existing, and their restlessness under it. That there was nothing which might not be attempted to rid themselves of it: that he had information, of the most unquestionable cer

tainty, that certain citizens of the Eastern states, (I think he named Massachusetts particularly,) were in negotiation with agents of the British government, the object of which was an agreement, that New England should take no farther part in the war then going on," &c. [Mr. Jefferson then goes on about the war, which had not yet happened; and perhaps alludes to some other patriotic communication of Mr. Adams about his fellowcitizens of Massachusetts.] "I expressed," (says Mr. Jefferson,)

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a just sense of the merit of this information, and of the importance of this disclosure to the safety, and even the salvation of our country; and, however reluctant I was to abandon the measure, (a measure, which, persevered in a little longer, we had subsequent and satisfactory assurance, would have effected its object completely,) from that moment, and influenced by that information, I saw the necessity of abandoning it; and instead of effecting our purpose by this peaceful weapon, we must fight it out, or break the Union."

What was the object to be completely effected? Certainly not the preservation of vessels, seamen and merchandise, for that was effected when the embargo was imposed. Was it to compel England to renounce her blockades, and to cease to violate our neutral rights? These objects were obtained by the treaty of 1806, which Mr. Jefferson rejected. Was it to prevent impressment? How would the continuance of the embargo "a little longer" have effected that object? This matter had been arranged with Pinckney and Monroe, in London, to their satisfaction, but not to that of Mr. Jefferson. There is some ground to believe, then, that Mr. Jefferson confesses he misrepresented his motive in proposing the embargo to Congress, in December, 1807; and that he admits the embargo to have been a hostile measure to England; or, in other words, a part of the continental system. The sum of Mr. Jefferson's political wisdom in this matter comes to this: He was willing to impose an annual loss of fifty millions on his own countrymen, and enforce his system of restriction at the point of the bayonet, to aid Napoleon in humbling England. This

it would doubtless have pleased him to do, even at that cost, with all its consequences. It is surprising, that this wise statesman was the last man in the nation to perceive, that his costly, oppressive and ruinous measure had no tendency to effect his object.

In another part of the same volume, (iv. p. 125,) Mr. Jefferson gives a different version of his embargo policy, in a letter to Dupont de Nemours. He therein contradicts his resolution formed on Mr. Adams' statement of the restlessness and plots of the East and North. He says: "The edicts of the two belligerents, forbidding us to be seen on the ocean, we met by an embargo. This gave us time to call home our seamen, ships and property; to levy men, and put our seaports into a certain state of defence," (by building gun-boats?) "We have now taken off the embargo, except as to France and England and their territories, because fifty millions of exports annually sacrificed are the treble of what war would cost us; besides, that by war we should gain something, and lose less than at present."

It requires all Mr. Jefferson's ingenuity to reconcile this with his remarks found in vol. iv., p. 148, in a letter to General Dearborn, and also with his opinion on Mr. Adams' disclosures: "The federalists, during their short-lived ascendency, have, nevertheless, by forcing us from the embargo, inflicted a wound on our interests, which can never be cured; and on our affections, which will require time to cicatrize. I ascribe all this to one pseudorepublican STORY. He came on, and staid only a few days; long enough, however, to get complete hold of Bacon,* who giving in to his representations, became panic-struck, and communicated his panic to his colleagues; and they to a majority of the sound members of Congress."

The comparison of these various accounts of the matter leaves one in no doubt, that Mr. Jefferson really intended to promote the views of Napoleon by the embargo, and that the "preservation," set forth in his message, was only the mask of the true purpose.

*A member of the House of Representatives from Massachusetts

By keeping the vessels of the United States at home, he prevented the products of the United States from reaching England, and the products of England from coming to the United States. This was one step beyond Napoleon. It looks as though Mr. Jefferson had, in this matter, suggested what was false, and suppressed what was true. But then it should be remembered, that he thought it was right to do so. That is, it was right, by any means, and at any cost and oppression to his own countrymen, to strengthen France in her war of destruction against England; and at the same time to break down monarchists and Anglomen. Nevertheless, on this "calm revisal," the embargo system is not a ground on which the admirers of Mr. Jefferson can safely rest his fame for wisdom and virtue, in days to come.

It may be asked, what a wise and honest President would have done in this state of the country? He would have waited for the result of the negotiations in England. When the treaty came, as it provided effectually for every subject of controversy but that of impressment; as there were assurances on that subject as satisfactory as can ever be expected from a maritime nation, he would have ratified the treaty. If he did not dare to recommend a defensive war against France, he would have left it to the good sense of merchants to regulate their own affairs, and to have taken their chance upon the ocean. The marine of France was little to be feared. Mercantile ingenuity would have discerned modes of profitable commerce; and the gain of successful enterprise would have far exceeded occasional loss. If Mr. Jefferson really intended to protect seamen, ships and commerce, he was not statesman enough to know how this could be effected. It is most consistent with his own declarations to believe, that these objects were sacrificed to promote his own purposes.

LETTER LV.

NOVEMBER 20, 1833.

MR. JEFFERSON may be considered under two aspects: First, as a witness against a large portion of his fellow-citizens. Secondly, as a citizen and statesman, who confidently claims the respect and gratitude of his country and of posterity, for eminent public services; services which, he says, no other man but himself could have performed. Under the first aspect, he presents himself in a character which seriously affects the memory of the dead, the feelings of the living, the honor of his country, and the interests of mankind. If Mr. Jefferson is a credible witness, the men who conducted the American revolution, who founded the national government, and who administered our national affairs for the first twelve years, were the most unprincipled, profligate and wicked body of men who are known in history. They are worse than the Roman triumvirates and their associates, for these did not conceal their purposes, but did their work openly. If Mr. Jefferson is a credible witness, he casts a deep and discouraging shade on the hopes of mankind, that there are honor, intelligence and virtue enough in the world, to assert and maintain the right to rational self-government. In the second aspect: if Mr. Jefferson did not render such services to his country; if he rendered to it no service, which entitles his memory to respect and gratitude; if he misapplied his trust; if he established theories tending to destroy republican government; if he oppressed and afflicted his country more than any man who has lived in it; if he established a party dominion, unknown and repugnant to the constitution; if such dominion is seen to be here, as elsewhere in the history of nations, the precursor of popular despotism, and that, the precursor of military despotism, it is time that Mr. Jefferson's example and doctrines should be understood in this land;

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