not make one of the causes which led to that calamity. It would be tedious to follow out the right and the wrong of the negotiation on this subject. It was one that afforded materials abundantly for the purposes of irritation, which the administration faithfully cherished.

4. Impressment. This is a difficult subject, arising from the similarity of language, manners, and appearance; and made still more so by the naturalization of British subjects in the United States, under the patronage of Mr. Jefferson. The English, in searching for their own subjects, had repeatedly and oppressively taken native Americans. Whether they did this, knowing that they took such natives, is doubtful; though they always pretended, at least, that they took only their own. The federalists contended, that this seizure of seamen was not a justifiable cause, certainly not a necessary cause of war at any time, until all hope of compromise or redress through negotiation had failed. The federalists maintained, that all nations engaged in war have a right, as the necessary consequence of allegiance, to the services of their own subjects and citizens. That this right had been asserted and maintained immemorially, by all the maritime nations of Europe. The personal appearance and language of Europeans divest this subject of all difficulties among them. It is a very different subject as between England and the United States. Descended from the English, Irish and Scotch, and the common language being the same; and some part of American seamen being British subjects by birth, but naturalized in the United States, it was not an easy matter to distinguish between the natives of the one country and the other. The British did not admit that their subjects could change their native allegiance, by assuming one to a foreign country. They never asserted a right to take native Americans, but they sometimes did take them in the exercise of the right which they did assert. The federalists also contended, that the impressment affected principally the middle and New England states, the latter in the proportion, probably, of three-fourths; and that the inhabitants of New England

were far from thinking this such a cause of complaint as to call for a war; that the right of taking native British subjects who had been naturalized, was not one in which the United States were so much interested, as to subject the whole country to the evil of war; that England had gone so far as to modify her pretensions in a manner that ought to be satisfactory to the United States; for that the British ministry had agreed with Mr. King, (minister in London, in 1802,) to renounce the right of searching American vessels for British seamen, on the high seas, and would exercise it only on the narrow seas, which wash the shores of British isles. (Over these seas England has asserted dominion for centuries.) That, in 1806, Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney made an arrangement on this subject, which they deemed to be "honorable and advantageous;" and, therefore, that this was, properly and from its own intrinsic difficulties, a subject of negotiation and not of war; and could be adjusted in the former mode, and never could be by the latter.

The principle for which Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison contended was, that the American flag should protect all who sailed under it. This extended not only to native citizens, but to naturalized ones, and also to any and all British subjects sailing in American merchantmen. The reasonableness of this requisition may be tested by the inquiry, whether a maritime power, which asserts the right to the services of its native subjects in time of war, could consent, that these subjects should find an asylum, tempting wages, and personal security in neutral vessels, when most wanted at home? And whether a declaration of war would not be a signal for all seamen to escape into neutral service? If this would be right and just for British sailors, so would it be for those of America. Should we consent, on the happening of a war with France for example, that our seamen should withdraw to the neutral service of England?

The federalists also insisted, that negotiation might, and that war could not devise modes of distinguishing natives of Britain from natives of America; that negotiation could, and war could

not settle, to what extent naturalization should protect, and what should be evidence, that this change of allegiance had occurred; that negotiation could, and war could not settle rights, in relation to British subjects sailing under the American flag, who had not been naturalized.

The considerations thus presented had no effect on Mr. Madison. He adopted all the theories of Mr. Jefferson, manifested in his first presidential speech concerning aliens; and courageously insisted, that the American flag should protect without qualification or exception; and that if England, in the midst of her struggle for existence, did not assent, she must number the United States among her enemies;-a principle which no nation will be more likely to contend against hereafter, than that of the United States.

Now, was this a wise, manly and patriotic policy on the part of Mr. Madison; or was it in furtherance of a long-meditated design, to find the most convenient opportunity to step into the pleasing occupation of overwhelming England, and of silencing the "disaffected and the worthless" at home? No reasonable being can doubt as to the motive of Jefferson and Madison, in using, as they did, this cause of complaint.

5. The Orders in Council were commercial edicts, or regulations, ordered by the King of England, with the advice and approbation of those persons who had been, (according to the usage of the English government,) selected to be his personal counsellors. It was well known to federalists and to Mr. Madison and his party, that these orders were passed to retaliate on France her own insolent and oppressive decrees; yet it was the persevering effort of Mr. Madison, to make it believed by the citizens of the United States, that England was the original aggressor.

Between the 4th of March, 1809, when Mr. Madison became President, and the 18th of June, 1812, when war was declared, England seems to have desired sincerely to compromise the controversies with this country, and to avoid conflict. Mr. Erskine, a very young man and not of much experience, was British

minister here, on the 4th of March. An arrangement was made with him. It was said at the time, that Mr. Madison knew, or might have known, that he had exceeded his authority. This arrangement was disavowed in England, and Erskine recalled. He was succeeded by Francis James Jackson, whom the administration found so much to be displeased with, that all communication was cut off with him, and as it was then thought, offensively and with the design to keep open the controversy. He was succeeded by Mr. Foster, who was equally unsuccessful. He remained here till war was declared.

This period was one of very deep interest. It exercised the talents and called forth the eloquence of the ablest men in the country, in and out of Congress, who desired to avoid the calamity of war with England, and the inevitable consequence, an alliance and colonial dependence on Napoleon, if nothing worse happened. Some very able speeches were made in Congress, and some searcing pamphlets were written. The legislature of Massachusetts did itself great credit in declaring its opinion on the state of the country. All these will come in as materials of history, and will demonstrate the most abject subserviency to France, and the most impolitic hostility to England.

As before remarked, it is not to be supposed, that Jefferson, or Madison, or any one of their political associates was acting under a corrupt influence of France, any more than that federalists were acting under the like influence of England. The Jeffersonian party believed, that they could best support themselves by adhering to France; and by charging their adversaries with being under British influence, and with plots to sever the Union and set up a northern kingdom, or, perhaps, subject the northern part again to Great Britain. The federalists could deny these charges, and could retaliate by charging the Jeffersonians with real despotism, and adduce devotion to the despot of continental Europe, as the proof. But unfortunately a majority of the American people honestly believed, that Napoleon was "the man of destiny" sent to liberate the world from political slavery; and so

some of Mr. Jefferson's admirers still maintain. In this warfare the Jeffersonians had the advantage, because they could make the majority believe as they thought best. The right and the wrong is now transferred to the tribunal of history; so let it go; but do not let the citizens of this day slide into despotism from the example and precepts of former times.

LETTER LIX.

DECEMBER 10, 1833.

NOTHING will better illustrate the sincerity of Mr. Madison's devotion to his party, than his twin effort in March, 1812, to inflame the excitement against England and his fellow-citizens at Boston. It is amusing, that Mr. Madison should have paid an ingenious Irishman fifty thousand dollars, for an attempt to render a service to the object of his hatred, England; still more amusing, that all he got for his money was a faithful picture of Jefferson and himself, drawn by a British painter.

On the 9th of March, 1812, Mr. Madison sent a message to Congress, in which he says: "I lay before Congress copies of certain documents, which remain in the department of state. They PROVE, that at a recent period, whilst the United States, notwithstanding the wrongs sustained by them, ceased not to observe the laws of peace and neutrality towards Great Britain, and in the midst of amicable professions and negotiations on the part of the British government through its public minister here, a secret agent of that government was employed, in certain states, more especially at the seat of government in Massachusetts, in fomenting disaffection to the constituted authorities of the nation; and in intrigues with the disaffected, for the purpose of bringing about resistance to the laws, and eventually, in concert with a