heart, which fays there is no God. And though I am far from thinking that there are many Atheists in the world, yet there is in many an heart a fecret lurking infidelity, or rather a want of a due belief and persuasion of the reality of the things invisible; which makes religion appear fo cold and formal, so void of life and activity. Where this is the case, there wants a juft conception of God; and no wonder there should want also a due sense of the fear of the Lord. But let us proceed to the second thing, which was to fhew,

That this juft conception of God is the right rule to form our judgments by in matters of religion, and the only thing that can fecure us from either atheifm or fuperftition.

Hitherto we have confidered the true meaning of the fear of God. We are now to confider what is affirmed of it: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom; taking wisdom here to mean true religion, as it often does in the books of Solomon, and in the Pfalms of David. When it is faid that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, you are not to understand merely that the notion of God is, in point of time, or order of nature, prior to religion; which, though it be true, yet is it not the whole of what is taught concerning the fear of God. All religion, indeed, has a relation to God; and therefore without the sense and notion of a Deity there can be no religion: but there is religion which is folly and fuperftition, that better fuits with any name than that of wisdom: and therefore, if the fear of God does only in general fhew us the neceffity of religion, and does then leave us to take our chance in

the great variety of forms and inftitutions that are to be found in the world, it may be our hap to learn folly as well as wifdom, upon the inftigation of this principle. But, in truth, the fear of God does not only fhew us the neceffity of religion, but likewife teaches us wherein true religion, which is indeed wisdom, does confift; and enables us to judge of our offering, whether it be fit to be laid before the Almighty.

In natural religion this is evidently the cafe; because in that state there is no pretence to any other rule that can come in competition with this. It is from the notion of a God that men come to have any fense of religion; and it is by the fame principle only that they determine this to be a proper part of religion, that to be otherwise. When we confider God as Lord and Governor of the world, we foon perceive ourselves to be in fubjection, and that we stand obliged, both in intereft and duty, to pay obedience to the Supreme. But what is this obedience? and in what acts does it confift? For this we muft recur to our natural notion of God. If we conceive him to be holy, pure, and just, we must neceffarily judge that he will be pleafed with no fervice but what is agreeable to holinefs, purity, and juftice: if we conceive him to be a Being good and merciful, a common Father to mankind, whofe love is without partiality, and equal to all his creatures, we muft, upon this view, conclude, that religion binds us not to be hurtful or injurious to any of the fons of men; because it is a contradiction to think that we are bound to ferve and obey God, and yet at liberty to injure and abuse those whom he most affec

tionately loves. Mutual love and benevolence may be a moral duty, arifing from the relation of man to man, upon mere principles of reafon, exclufive of religion; but it becomes part of our religion from fuch confideration of God's nature as I have juft now mentioned. Take from the notion of God any of the moral perfections that belong to it, and you will find fuch alteration muft influence religion likewise, which will degenerate in the fame proportion as the notion of God is corrupted. The fuperftitious man, viewing God through the falfe perspectives of fear and fufpicion, lofes fight of his goodness, and fees only a dreadful fpectre made up of anger and revenge hence religion becomes his torment, and he thinks, the worse he ufes himself, the more he shall please God; and the beft fervice he can pay, is that which renders him moft miferable.

There are other kinds of fuperftition, which, though they have lefs of torment and anguifh, have not more of reafon or religion: fuch are they which have turned religion into a trade, and found something to offer God in exchange for virtue and holinefs. In all these cafes the fpring is corrupted, the notion of God is loft, or not attended to: what notion has that man of God, who thinks that washing his hands three or four times a day is part of religion; who imagines that penances and pilgrimages, or any thing elfe, is equivalent to virtue and holiness? Search your notion of God: confider his holiness and purity, and fee what you can find to make you think that beating yourself, or washing yourself, or parting with your money, will please him like virtue and holinefs. Thefe muft appear to

be abfurd follies to any man who will attend to this principle. In the heathen world, fome happily discovered fome glimmerings of the true holiness and perfections of God, and were to maintain virtue upon the foot of religion: others perhaps were much better men than their principles of religion led them to be. The natural fenfe of good and evil, and the relation of man to man, led fome generous fpirits into the right way. But in this cafe goodnefs was not the effect of religion, but of a rational nature it was a political or fociable virtue, but not a religious one.

It is plain then, both from reason and fact, that a juft conception and fenfe of God is the beginning of wisdom, the fountain from which true religion flows: by this it is that you may distinguish between true and false religion, fince that only is true religion which is agreeable to the nature of God. God is a fpirit, lays our bleffed Lord, and they that worship him must worship him in fpirit and in truth. Here you are referred to the fame principle, and by the best authority: you fee here our Lord himself inferring the nature of worship from the nature of God.

This may be true, perhaps you will fay, upon the foot of natural religion, where we have nothing but natural notions to direct us: but what is it to us, who have the furer word of prophecy to guide and inftruct us? In anfwer to this I would obferve, that natural religion is the foundation upon which revelation ftands; and therefore revelation can never fuperfede natural religion without deftroying itself. The knowledge of God is, in the nature of things,

antecedent to revelation; for there can be no reason for attending to the voice of God till we know who God is. The natural notion of God then is the foundation of revelation, as well as of natural religion; and, confequently, nothing contrary to this notion can be admitted for revelation, any more than for natural religion.

There is indeed a difference, which ought always to be remembered, and for want of which fome have imagined they have discovered great oppofition between natural religion and revelation, where in truth there is none. The difference is this: In natural religion nothing can be admitted that may not be proved and deduced from our natural notions; for every thing muft be admitted for fome reafon; and in natural religion no reason can take place, but this agreeableness of the thing to our natural fenfe: but in revelation it is otherwife; for revelation introduces a new reason, the will of God, which has, and ought to have, the authority of a law with us. Nor is it plain, from any natural principle, that God cannot enlarge our duty, or oblige us to any thing but what nature has already obliged us to it is certain he cannot contradict his own nature; and therefore he can teach us nothing contrary to the natural fense he has given us of himself: but, as he has authority to give us laws, he may add to our duty and obligations as he fees fit. And therefore it is not neceffary all parts of revelation fhould be fuch as may be proved by natural reason it is fufficient that they do not contradict it; for the will of God is a fufficient reafon for our fubmiffion.

But, however, the effentials of religion, even un