That which we learn by the senses, that which we have felt, seen or heard, can still less be affected by it; all the ridicule in the world cannot laugh a man out of the persuasion, that hot iron will burn, that a house stands in the place in which he sees it, or that the music exists which he hears.

In Historical Evidence, plain facts, supported by plain reasons, are sufficient for our satisfaction.

In moral conduct, common and indifferent actions are to be regulated by the customs of the country in which we live, political by the laws of our society, and moral and relative duties by the laws of God.

It seems then, that wit in general, and particularly that species of it called ridicule, is merely an ornament, or pleasant mode of speech, a sort of seasoning,* to quicken or awaken the appetite; and, when we are thus excited, reason, as in every thing else, is to determine for us how far we may indulge, how far what is objected to us; is conformable to truth; and there we must leave it. Thus, in the appetites of hunger and thirst, they serve to awaken, to rouse us to exertion, and to bring us to our nourishment

* Note A.

for the conservation of the body; but when they have discharged that office, reason must take her turn to rule, and guard against excess, lest that, which was intended for our good, should prove pernicious, lest "our table be made a snare to take ourselves withal, and the things that should be for our wealth, be unto us an occasion of falling." (Psalm lxix. 23.) We have before seen, that wit and judgment, or reason, are two opposite qualities, and are seldom, therefore, blended together, in their due proportions, in the same person. Of this consideration we should never lose sight; and persons of wit should learn to improve their judgment, and persons of judgment might find it useful in some measure to cultivate wit.

The real uses, then, to which it may be applied, seem to be in assisting truth, by exciting attention, in a striking and lively manner, to the follies of mankind; by preventing pedantry, and that affectation of mystery and pomp, which has so much impeded the progress of useful science: it can make highsounding terms lose all their virtue, and set the practical knowledge of the common people on a rank equally high with the fine-spun theories of fanciful Philosophers. It is too great veneration for notions and persons, which

is apt to make error too lasting; and veneration may be lessened by ridicule."

"To virtue ridicule is useful, by curing smaller follies and foibles, and by hindering men from carrying the nobler passions to excess. These, when indulged too seriously, generate caprices and singularities: the worst excite abhorrence. Fortitude may make a man a Quixote:-Justice may run into misanthropy or scrupulousness; Patriotism may form a chimerical politician; Piety an enthusiast; and so on:—but a man disposed to moderate ridicule, will run into none of these follies; he will be unaffectedly and rationally brave, just, publicspirited, devout. And, at the same time, he will keep clear of being effeminate, proud, vain, selfish, sensual, peevish, dejected, anxious, cunning, hypocritical, &c.—that is, ridicule may be made useful to virtue, by its influence both on the virtuous and vicious passions." (Dr. Hey, p. 428.)

It may be made useful, likewise, in correcting the extravagant passions and follies of the dissipated part of the world, by setting them in that light in which they ought to be seen.*

* Note B.

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It may here be proper to consider, in what it is that ridicule acts, and how it comes to have so strong an effect upon the mind. It appears to be owing to that anxious desire, (a desire good in itself, if not carried to too great an extent,) which men have of standing fair in the good estimation of the world, or of those immediately about them. Now, ridicule implies something which is objected to,—some little mixture of contempt (as we have observed) in its best state, and great contempt or dislike, in other cases. This, therefore, distresses the person, in proportion to the extent of the folly or vice (either supposed or actual) which is the object of it, or to the degree of dislike evinced in the manner of exposing it. If, therefore, the person addressed hath not a proper sense of right and wrong, a high sense of religion to carry him through, if the laugh be ill-founded, he gives way to the world, and does that which is wrong. The man of judgment and religion, on the other hand, hears the ridicule, considers the matter, gives way and corrects it, if the ridicule be just; but, if it be wrong, he rejects and despises it. One of the greatest benefits which could be rendered to a young man on his setting out in life, would be to teach him duly to estimate the force and the effects of ridicule; whereby perhaps he may be preserved

from being laughed out of many virtues, which are of infinite concern to his happiness both here and hereafter.

"In private life, however, ridicule is sometimes employed not as amongst the licentious, but by the most virtuous and religious persons, with cheerfulness and kindness; with frankness, but with delicacy and respect; mutually offered and received. Such ridicule is rather flattering than wounding, as it implies great candour and sweetness in those to whom it is addressed." (Dr. Hey, p. 453.)

And, it may be observed, that "Men are often thought to be more offended by raillery than they really are; they shew some confusion, and that is thought to be merely anger, when really it springs from various causes. Sometimes even the fear of seeming offended will occasion it; sometimes, mortification at discovering an unknown fault, or vexation at the misrepresentations of the world. This kind of confusion often interrupts mutual raillery, when the person, who is confused, would, after a very short interval, shew an earnest desire to continue it." (Ditto, p. 452.)

These appear to be the principal uses of wit and ridicule: We come now to consider,