Worcester, See of, stock and cash to be transferred, Worcester, Bishop of, two years' charge on See, due £4,606 90 3,570 17 0 £8,177 6 10 88 13 4 2,150 0 0 .*4,465 16 8 6,704 10 0 £14,881 16_10 LAW. [THE Editor has received the following letter, containing some observations on an article which appeared in the April number of this Magazine, on the subject of "Publication of Poor-rates." As it is desirable to place the argument on both sides before the reader, it seemed better to forward the letter of E. W. to the writer of the legal article in question; and that gentleman's remarks are here printed along with the letter.] SIR,-In a useful article, in your April number, on parochial law, you state, that unless notice of a poor-rate is affixed to the doors of every place of public worship of dissenters, as well as on the doors of all the churches and chapels within a parish, such rate is null and void, to all intents and purposes. Now, Sir, I do not think that you are warranted in making so strong an assertion. You ground your opinion upon what Lord Denman said in giving judgment in the case of Reg. v. Royds; but it should be remembered that his lordship only expressed a doubt, and confessedly abstained from giving a decided opinion, as the question was not directly raised in that case. It may, indeed, be courteous, and in some cases right, to affix notices of a rate on the doors of the principal places of dissenting worship in a parish; but an obligation to do so would lead to endless trouble, and vexatious litigation. A rate, for instance, might be invalid from notice of it not having been affixed on the door of some obscure cottage, which no half dozen persons in the parish may have known to be licensed. Fortunately, however, such an obligation cannot be shown to exist, unless it can be first shown that every "place," or "building," licensed for religious worship is, in legal phraseology, a chapel; for the statute only requires that notices shall be affixed on "the doors of all the churches and chapels within the parish." That this is not the case, any law dictionary will inform you; and the statutes of the realm will confirm what they say. In them the word "chapel" is exclusively applied to chapels belonging to the established church, whilst the meeting-houses of dissenters are always designated as "places," or "buildings," licensed for religious worship. I find that the opinion I have ventured to offer is fully borne out by the Poor-law Commissioners, who, in reply to the question whether it is necessary to affix notices of rates on the doors of all places of dissenting worship, state that, "having regard to the ordinary legal meaning of the word 'chapel,' as well as what appears to be the general tenour of the 1st Vic. c. 45, the commissioners consider that the chapels referred to in that statute are chapels belonging to the established church, and that, consequently, it is not necessary, in order to give publicity to a poor-rate, that notice of such rate should be affixed on places of worship used by dissenting congregations." In the hope, Sir, that you will see cause to retract the decided opinion you have given, and which has led to no little annoyance, I am, Sir, your obedient servant, E. W. That WITH great deference to the opinions of E. W., and of the Poorlaw Commissioners, the writer of the article upon the "Publication of Poor-rates," must, even after reconsideration of the subject, adhere to his opinion. He thinks that the words, "all the churches and chapels within such parish or place," in the statute of 1st Victoria, chap. 45, embrace other public places of worship than those exclusively of the established church. These words occur in the 37th section of the Reform Act of the 2nd of William IV., chap. 45; and if the writer is not greatly mistaken, they have received the construction for which he now contends. The legislature, too, evidently intended that this interpretation should be given to them, as appears by the 23rd section of the 6th of Victoria, chap. 18, the recent Act for the Amendment of the Law for the Registration of Voters. The notices which that Act requires to be published, are directed to be fixed on the "door of every church and public chapel in the parish or township, including places of public worship which do not belong to the established church." But the case of Regina v. Royds, 1 New Sessions Cases, p. 456, seems conclusive upon the subject. What was the significant remark of Mr. Justice Coleridge in that case? learned judge observed, "Yet Dissenters pay the rates as well as others." And the counsel, arguing in support of the limitation of publication, at once admitted that "that was the reason why the word 'chapel' was inserted in the Act," and further, that the Act "intends any public place where divine service is regularly performed, but would not apply to a chapel in a cemetery." Here, then, we have the view of the law, though thrown out incidentally, taken by Mr. Justice Coleridge, broadly admitted by counsel. And now let us recur to the language of Lord Denman, which we think, at all events, disposes of the matter. His lordship's emphatic words are, "I should be exceedingly unwilling to narrow the publicity to be given to them. I entertain a doubt whether, under the statute, every place of public worship is not intended." And, for the purpose of more strongly indicating the inclination of his opinion, his lordship even travelled out of his way, to instruct parish officers as to what was really their duty, in such cases, by observing, "I throw this out to intimate to parish officers my opinion, that the fullest means should be adopted to make the publication as general as the statute seems to require." THE RIGHT OF THE DISSENTING MINISTERS TO PERFORM THE BURIAL SERVICE IN THE CHURCH-YARDS. CASE SUBMITTED TO DR. LUSHINGTON. "WHAT is the law as it now stands relating to the interment of dissenters"Where-1st. There is no burial ground attached to the dissenting place of worship: "2nd. Where the friends of the deceased think proper to dispense with the services of the clergyman and the dissenting minister is desired to perform the ceremony? "Can the dissenting minister claim the right of preceding the corpse to the grave in the church-yard, seeing it deposited, and singing a hymn over the remains, though afterwards he retires outside of the walls to offer up a prayer, and deliver his address? "Is not the church-yard the freehold of the clergyman, and is any one authorized, unless episcopally ordained, to perform any ceremony on consecrated ground? "T. S. GRIMSHAWE, Rector of Burton Latimer, Northamptonshire." CASE SUBMITTED BY THE DISSENTING MINISTER. "There is at Burton Latimer a congregation of dissenters of the Baptist denomination-many of this congregation die unbaptised, to whom the episcopal minister is not allowed by law to extend the right of burial. Having no burial-ground connected with their own place of worship, the dissenting minister has been accustomed to perform the funeral rites in the following manner-He walks before the corpse into the church yard, gives out a hymn at the grave and then retires beyond the limits of the church-yard, and performs the other parts of the funeral service outside the wall of the consecrated ground, which consists of a short address and the offering up of a prayer. "He has also been informed that the law does not prohibit his reading a portion of the Scriptures and praying in the church-yard, such duties being not strictly official or ministerial; this he has not been accustomed to do. "Now we wish to know "1st. Whether a dissenting minister (not episcopally ordained) has a right to walk before a corpse into the church-yard? "2nd. Has he a right to perform all or any of the following duties on the consecrated ground, viz.-to give out a hymn, to read a portion of the Scriptures, and to offer up a prayer?" DR. LUSHINGTON'S OPINION. "I am of opinion that the law recognises no distinction as to the burial of dissenters. Unless the person to be buried falls within the prohibition of the rubric, as unbaptized, the duty of the incumbent is to bury the corpse with the usual funeral service, without regard to whether the person when alive was a dissenter or not. I think when the friends of the deceased apply to the clergyman, to abstain from performing the funeral service on the ground that the deceased when alive was a dissenter, the clergyman may comply with such request; but I am of opinion that the dissenting minister cannot claim a right to precede the corpse to the grave in the church-yard, and sing a hymn over the remains, though he afterwards retire outside the walls, and there offers up a prayer and delivers an address. 2nd. It is true that the freehold of the church-yard is generally, but not always, in the incumbent, but the law does not rest particularly on that foundation. The principle is that the ground is consecrated for divine offices according to the rites of the church of England, and that the incumbent has the sole and exclusive right, as well as duty, of performing such offices. Even a clergyman episcopally ordained could not perform any ceremony within the church-yard without the leave of the incumbent, nor even then, except according to the form of the church. "I have read the statement drawn by the Baptist minister; it does not alter my opinion, that opinion being that no person save the incumbent or other clergyman of the church of England, by his permission, can perform any description of funeral rite in the church-yard, and only such a rite as the church sanctions. "STEPHEN LUSHINGTON." court of Queen's Bench, MAY 7. THE QUEEN V. THE CHANCELLOR, MASTERS, AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. MR. KELLY (with whom was Mr. Baddeley) applied to the Court, upon the part of the Rev. William George Ward, for a rule calling upon the defendants to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, commanding them to restore Mr. Ward to the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts, of both which degrees he had been deprived by two resolutions of the Convocation of the University, on the 13th of February in the present year. Although the facts of the case are already sufficiently notorious to the public, it will be desirable to state upon the present occasion all the principal circumstances of the case. It appears that Mr. Ward was matriculated at the University in 1830, and that he took his degree of B.A. in 1834, and that of M.A. in 1837, and that upon each of these occasions he signed, in the usual manner, the Thirty-nine Articles contained in the Book of Common Prayer, and also the three other articles included in the Thirty-sixth canon. In the year 1844 he published a work, called "The Ideal of a Christian Church" containing certain descriptions and statements respecting the character and doctrines of the Church of Rome, as well as respecting the English Reformation and the Church of England, and until the 13th of February in the present year he continued to enjoy all the rights annexed to his situation in all respects as a graduate and a fellow of Balliol College. Upon the publication of the work already mentioned, the attention of the authorities of the University was directed to certain opinions which it expressed, and which were supposed to be in opposition to the doctrines enunciated in the Thirty-nine Articles, which had been subscribed by Mr. Ward upon the taking of each of his degrees. After some preliminary proceedings, including a reference to a committee called the Hebdomadal Board, the Convocation proceeded, upon the 13th of February, to deprive Mr. Ward of both his degrees, upon the ground that certain passages in the work appeared to be inconsistent with the meaning of the articles, and with the good faith of Mr. Ward. These resolutions were contended by Mr. Kelly to be totally void upon the following grounds :-first, that the publication of the book in question was no offence at all against the laws of England, or against any of the particular statutes of the University of Oxford; secondly, that supposing it to be an offence, the Convocation had no original jurisdiction to entertain any charge upon the subject; thirdly, that supposing the publication to be an offence, and the Convocation to have the power to try and to punish, they possessed no power to inflict the particular punishment of degradation; and, fourthly, supposing the Convocation to possess the jurisdiction to try and to inflict that particular punishment, they had, in fact, proceeded in such a manner as to render their adjudication upon the subject altogether a nullity. With regard to the first position, the learned counsel observed, that he had in vain searched the statutes of the University for any trace of any such offence as that which was charged against Mr. Ward. In support of this view, he referred to, and read several portions of the statutes, in which the present offence might be expected to be found, if such an offence were to be found in the statutes at all. If, however, it should turn out to be an offence, yet the punishment of degradation could not be inflicted in respect of it, as the statutes themselves expressly defined the offences for which that punishment could be awarded. These offences were the following:-first, if, being appointed an examiner, he refuses to serve, or misconducts himself therein, and is contumacious in his offence; secondly, if, having taken the oath as inceptor, he omits, without dispensation, to perform the proper exercise within a year; thirdly, if he refuse to surrender to an officer producing the Vice-Chancellor's warrant for his arrest, or, being arrested, endeavours to escape; fourthly, if in any suit within the University, in which there is a right of appeal, he does not observe the order of appeal, directed by the statutes. The learned counsel contended further, upon this point, that in the whole collection of the laws by which the University was governed there was no single statute which makes any graduate liable to degradation for any deviation in his private sentiments or public writings from the doctrines or formularies of the Church of England, or for any other theological cause; nor any which provides that the subscription to the articles is regarded or intended as a promise or prospective engagement on the part of the graduate to continue while he shall hold his degree in the belief or opinions which the University may understand or interpret to be signified by such subscription, or that such degree is conferred upon any such condition as that any subsequent departure from them shall be a forfeiture of the degree; but that, on the contrary, the statutes show by necessary implication, that such subscription is not so intended or regarded, inasmuch as power is given by the statutes to the Vice-Chancellor to banish beyond the precincts of the University, all heretics, schismatics, and persons holding erroneous opinions concerning the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England, and all persons in holy orders who shall refuse to sign the articles aforesaid; but do not provide that for any fault or omission in respect to either of these subjects any party shall be deprived of any degree. It was competent to the authorities to call upon Mr. Ward to subscribe the articles, and, upon his refusing three times, to punish him by exile beyond the bounds of the University. This course, however, had not been adopted, but the Convocation proceeded in a manner which was altogether illegal in every respect. With regard to the subject of jurisdiction, the learned counsel proceeded to argue under one of the remaining heads of his distribution that the University was a corporation by prescription, and that for all time, as far as was known, there existed in the University a court called sometimes the Chancellor's Court, and sometimes the Court of the Vice-Chancellor, and which always had exclusive cognizance to hear and determine all causes of moment within the University, both criminal and civil, except felony, mayhem, and cases involving the right to a freehold. Before that court the case of Mr. Ward ought to have been brought in the first instance, whence it could be carried by appeal to the Court of Congregation, and from the latter body to the Convocation, and perhaps from the Convocation itself to the Queen in council. Whether the latter appeal, however, might be made or not, he (Mr. Kelly) contended that the Convocation had no original jurisdiction to take any cognizance of any cause, and, like the House of Lords, could only do so upon appeal. The Convocation did possess original powers, but not for the administration of justice. They possessed a legislative authority with regard to the University, and might make new laws for the government of the universities, or expound old ones; but they had no original power of adjudication at all, much less any power to proceed as they had done upon the present occasion, to inflict the punishment of degradation without charge, trial, or conviction of any legal offence. The proceedings of the Hebdomadal Board were secret and ex parte, and the only reasons assigned in the resolutions of the Convocation for the punishment inflicted upon Mr. Ward were, that certain passages in his book appeared to be inconsistent with the articles which he had subscribed, and with good faith in Mr. Ward himself. He (Mr. Kelly) could not conceive how an opinion expressed in 1844 must be in opposition to the good faith of the party expressing it, merely because it appeared to be inconsistent with something which he had subscribed in 1837. The learned counsel then referred to the proceedings of |