explanation. The term prejudice is equivocal.Sometimes it is employed to signify a proof, which hath not a full evidence, but which, however, hath some weight so that a great number of prejudices, which, taken separately, could not form a demonstration, taken together ought to obtain an assent. But, sometimes the word prejudice hath an odious meaning, it is put for that impression, which a circumstance, foreign from the proposition, makes on the mind of him, who is to determine, whether the proposition ought to be received or rejected. In this sense we use the word, when we say a man is full of prejudice, in order to describe that disposition, which makes him give that attention and authority to false reasonings, which are due only to solid arguments.

Our fourth precept is to be taken in a different sense, according to the different meaning, which is given to this term. If the word prejudice be taken in the first sense, when we require you to make prejudice yield to reason, we mean, that you should give that attention, and authority, to a presumption, or a probability, which presumptive or probable evidence requires. We mean, that demonstrative evidence should always prevail over appearances. The equity of this precept is self-evident; yet, perhaps, it may not be improper to shew the necessity of obeying it, in order to engage our conduct the more closely to it. I said just now, that men were enemies to that labor, which the finding out of truth requires. Yet men love knowledge. From the combination of these two dispositions ariseth their propensity to prejudice. A man, who yields to prejudice, frees himself from that labor, which a search after truth would require; and thus gratifies his indolence. He flatters himself he hath obtained truth, and so he satisfies his desire of knowledge. We

mustguard against this temptation. This is the first sense of the precept, Let prejudice yield to reason.

When, in the second sense, which we have given to the word prejudice, we require him, who would be a disciple of truth, to make prejudice yield to reason, we mean, that whenever he examines a question, he should remove every thing that is not connected with it. Prejudice, in our first sense, sometimes conducts to truth: but prejudice, of the second kind, always leads us from it. What idea would you form of a man, who, in examining this question, Is there a part of the world called America? should place among the arguments, which determine him to affirm, or to deny the question, this consideration; The sun shines to day in all its splendor; or this, The sun is concealed behind thick clouds? Who does not see, that these middle terms, by which the disputant endeavors to decide the point, have no concern with the solution of the question? This example I use only for the sake of conveying my meaning, and I do not design by it to guard you against this particular error. None of you, in examining the question which we just now mentioned, hath ever regarded, either as proofs, or as objections, these considerations, The sun shines to day in all its splendor, The sun is hidden to day behind the clouds. However, it is too true, that in questions of far greater importance, we often determine our opinions by reasons, which are as foreign from the matter as those just now mentioned. For example, it is a question, either whether such a man be an accurate reasoner, or whether he express a matter clearly, or whether his evidence deserve to be received, or rejected. What can be more foreign from any of these questions, than the habit he wears, the number of servants that wait on him, the equipage he keeps, the

tone, in which he reasons, the dogmatical air, with which he decides? And, yet, how often does a dogmatical decision, a peculiar tone, a pompous equipage, a numerous retinue, a certain habit, how often does each of these become a motive to mankind to receive the testimony of such a man, and to engage them to resign their reason to him? In like manner, a man may understand all history, ancient and modern, he may possess all the oriental languages, he may know the customs of the most remote and barbarous nations, and he may be, all the time, a bad logician: for what relation is there between the knowledge of customs, tongues, and histories, ancient and modern, and an accurate habit of reasoning? And, yet, how often does the idea of a man bustling with science of this kind impose on our minds? How often have we imagined that a man, who knew what the soul was called in thirty or forty different languages, knew its nature, its properties, and its duration, better than he who knew only what it was called in his own mother tongue? The term prejudice, (we repeat it again) which sometimes signifies a probability, is sometimes put for that impression, which a circumstance, foreign from the question under examination, makes on the mind. When we demand the sacrifice of prejudice, in this latter sense, we mean to induce you to avoid all motives of credibility, except those which have some relation, near, or remote, to the subject in hand.

This precept will appear more important to you, if you apply it to a particular subject. We will mention a famous example, that will prove the necessity of sacrificing prejudice, in both the senses we have mentioned. There is a case, in which the great number of those who adhere to a communion forms a prejudice in its favor. One communion is

embraced by a multitude of scholars, philosophers, and fine geniusses: another communion hath but few partizans of these kinds: hence ariseth a probability, a presumption, a prejudice, in favor of the first, and against the last of these communities. It is probable that the community, which hath the greatest number of fine geniusses, philosophers, and scholars, is more rational than that which hath the least. However, this is only a probability, this is not a demonstration. The most elevated minds are capable of the greatest extravagances, as the highest saints are subject to the lowest falls. If you can demonstrate the truth of that religion which the multitude of great men condemn, the probability which ariseth from the multitude, ought to yield to demonstration. Sacrifice prejudice in this first

sense.

But there is a case, in which a great number of partizans do not form even a probability in favor of the doctrine they espouse. For example, the church of Rome perpetually urges the sufferage of the multitude in its favor; and we reply, that the multitude of those who adhere to the Roman church, does not form even a presumption in their favor, and we prove it.

If you affirm that a multitude forms a probability in favor of any doctrine, it must be supposed that this multitude have examined the doctrine which they profess, and profess only what they believe. But we must first object against that part of the multitude which the church of Rome boasts of, which is composed of indolent members, who continue in the profession of their ancestors by chance, as it were, and without knowing why. We must object next, against an infinite number of ignorant people in that community, who actually know nothing about the matter. We must object against

whole provinces and kingdoms, where it is hardly known that there is a divine book, on which the faith of the church is founded. We must object against that army of ecclesiastics, who are not wiser than the common people, on account of their being distinguished from them by a particular habit, and who waste their lives in eternal idleness, at least in exercises which have no relation to an enquiry after truth. We must object further, against all those zealous defenders of the church, who are retained in it by the immense riches they possess there, who judge of the weight of an argument by the advantages which it procures them, and who actually reason thus: The church, in which the ministers are poor, is a bad church; that which enriches them is a good church: but this church enriches its ministers, and that suffers them to be poor; the latter, therefore, is a bad church, and the former is the only good one. We must object finally, against all those callous souls, who hold the truth in unrighteousness, Rom. i. 18. and who oppose it only in a party spirit. If you pursue this method, you will perceive, that the multitude which alarmed you, will be quickly diminished, and that this argument, so often repeated by the members of the church of Rome, doth not form even a probability in favor of that communion.

5. The fifth sacrifice, which truth demands, is that of obstinacy; and the fifth precept which you must obey, if you mean to attain it, is this: Be teachable. This maxim is self-evident. What can be more irrational than a disposition to defend a proposition, only because we have had the rashness to advance it, and to choose to heap up a number of absurdities rather than to relinquish one, which had escaped without reflection or design? What can be more absurd, than that disposition of mind, which