to prove,

that benevolence, that compaffion, SERM. or even SELF-LOVE, are natural?

IF it be faid, that many act in direct oppofition to what Confcience is thought so ftrongly and univerfally to intimate; I anfwer, that there are many likewise, who act in a manner as plainly repugnant to what true felf-love and felf-prefervation dictate.

Ir it be faid farther, that multitudes have fuppreffed, and in a manner extinguished, natural Confcience-There are alfo multitudes who have fupprefs'd, and in a manner extinguish'd, the tender motions of a pitiful and sympathifing heart; and have lost the natural and proper esteem and love of themselves. For felf-love is not merely a propenfion to prefent pleasure, and an averfion to prefent pain; because this very principle has led men, when nothing elfe could determine their refolution, to forego prefent pleasure, and fubmit to prefent pain, for the fake of future good, even in this life. Confider'd therefore, as a regular natural principle that deferves to be cherished, it can only prompt to the pursuit of true happiness, and the avoiding real and fubftantial mifery. But, in this view of it,

III.

SERM. 'tis undeniable, that it is too generally ex

III. tinguish'd.

THIS, it may be pretended, is owing to the want of attention. In like manner,

the little authority and influence of Conscience is always owing to the fame caufe. And these two remarks, added to what has been already fuggefted, are fufficient to perfuade us, that it is a natural and univerfal faculty: (1ft,) That in the worst and moft diftemper'd minds, when paffion is fatiated and fubfides, and particular occurrences occafion a gravity of temper, and force reflection, Confcience ufually revives, whatever violence may been offer'd to it. And, (2dly,) That the voice of Confcience is scarce ever unheard with refpect to the general obligations of religion and morality, and in the flagrant and notorious distinctions of good and evil; but only in particular cafes, which are not so easily feen to be included in general rules, as the folid foundation of the rules themselves is immediately and diftinctly perceived. Befides, Mens feeming indolence and unconcernedness in vicious courfes may be owing rather to shifts and evafions, which they

have contrived to remove a present terror, SERM. than to an entire difowning the authority III. of Confcience. Nay, if they professed to believe firmly that Confcience is only a fiction, a dream of the frighted Enthufaft, or a device of the fubtil Politician, to which nothing but credulity, and custom, and the influence of power, have given a real character; we could have no reason to convince us that this profeffion was fincere, unless we knew what they FELT: Because their inward fenfe of things may differ very much from the outward appearance which they think it proper to affune, as a mark of diftinction, though it be but in infamy, or from imaginary notions of politeness, or as a plaufable excufe for their immoralities; but chiefly, because those who entirely renounce and difcard Confcience can acknowledge no obligation to TRUTH. Why then should they be credited against the common experience of Mankind, and what it is highly probable, is their own fecret experience? - But after all, what does their belief amount to in point of argument? If a few fingular and extravagant Infidels are extremely confident that a thing VOL. II. does

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SERM. does not exist, is that a proof, in reason, III. that it does not? Or is their being confident

that it is not a natural principle — evidence that it is not a natural principle? If so, it must be true, that no man can believe a notorious and palpable abfurdity; though this is contradicted by our daily obfervation. Moral principles, however certain their foundation be in Nature, do not operate neceffarily, like those which are merely Animal. And though the appetites of hunger and thirst will be felt; Confcience, though a principle inherent in the mind, may be for a long time ftifled, for want of reflection, which is, in moft cafes, entirely voluntary.

AND fince it appears, upon the whole, from our reafonings, fenfations, and experience, the only principles and mediums of knowledge befides what are of an extraordinary kind, that Confcience is a part of the primitive moral conftitution of Human nature; from hence may fairly be deduced its fupremacy, and office of jurifdiction, and government. If there be such a principle exifting at all by the law of our creation, and, confequently, by Divine ordination

and appointment, it must be its place to SERM. dictate and command. For nothing is more III. plain, from the permanent and unchangeable nature of things, than these two propofitions are; (ft) That Paffion cannot rightly command, but may be fubject: And on the contrary, that moral judgment and reflection cannot with any face of propriety or order, be fubject; but wherever it refides clear and unclouded, it may, and muft, command. Senfe and paffion are not fit to command, because they are blind, and incapable of directing and regulating themselves, even in fuch a manner as is neceffary for their more perfect gratification; and much more of guiding and steering other principles: But fenfe and paffion want to be govern'd, to prevent fcandalous and hurtful exceffes; and this government can only be the office of the fuperior principle ftiled Confeience. On the other hand, if Confcience be enflaved to appetite, it becomes entirely ufelefs, and can answer no one purpose in Human nature. To affert, that wild and lawless paffions have the right of authority, and that all our rational and moral faculties were intended to minifter to their exorbitant

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