be taken to darken the evidence, and to perplex the proofs which make against it. My design is briefly to enumerate the several interpretations which have been given of this chapter, to remark upon them as far as is needful, and to establish the only true one. They are reducible to four; which I may call Sabellian, Socinian, Arian, and Catholic. I shall explain them in their order. To begin with the first.

1. Under the Sabellian interpretation I include all that belongs to men of Sabellian principles, whether before or after the times of Sabellius, who lived about the middle of the third century. The Sabellians deny the Aóyos, or WORD, whereof St. John speaks, to be any real or substantial thing, distinct from the Person of God the Father. They understand by the Word, either some attribute, power, or operation inherent and permanent in the Father; or else some transient voice, sound, and the like. How they came into these and the like fancies, I shall show presently, after I have premised a few things about the name of the Aóyos, or WORD, which St, John uses. I do not design any historical account of the use of the term among Jews or Gentiles; being happily prevented, in that part, by a late excellent sermon of a very worthy and learned Prelate a. But I must observe that the Greek Aóyos, which we render WORD, may signify either inward thought, or outward speech. And it has with good reason been supposed by the Catholic writers, that the design of this name was to intimate that the relation of Father and Son bears some resemblance and analogy to that of thought, or of speech to the mind b. For example: as thought is coeval with the mind; so the Son is coeval with the Father. As thought is closely united to, proceeds from, and yet remains in the mind; so also may

• Bishop of Litchfield and Coventry. Sermon before the King.

* Λόγος δὲ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὡς πρὸς νοῦν λόγος. οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ ἀπαθὲς τῆς γεννήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συναφὲς, καὶ τὸ ἐξαγγελτικὸν Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxvi. p. 590. Vid. etiam Basil. Hom. 15. Petav. de Trin. p. 743. e Vid. Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas. p. 259.

we understand that the Son is in the bosom of the Father, proceeding from him, yet never divided or separate, but remaining in him and with him. As to speech, it is properly the interpreter of the mind; and so, in this respect also, there is some resemblance and analogy, the Son being as it were interpreter and revealer of the unknown Father to the world d. Some of the ancient Catholic writers joining both these notions together, have considered them as applicable to the Son at different times, and in different capacities. Before the world was made, while he yet existed alone with the Father, (always including the Holy Ghost,) they supposed he might best be compared to silent thought resting in the mind,

d ob hoc Verbum nuncupatur, quia ex proprio divino ore processit, et nihil Pater sine eo aut jussit, aut fecit. Pseud. Ambros. de Fid. Orth. cap. vi. p. 353. ed. Bened.

Δύναται δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος υἱὸς εἶναι παρὰ τῷ ἀπαγγέλλειν τὰ κρύφια τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκείνου, ἀνάλογον τῷ καλουμένῳ υἱῷ, λόγῳ τοῦ τυγχάνοντος· ὡς γὰρ ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν λόγος Αγγελός ἐσι τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ὁρωμένων, οὕτως ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος ἐγνωκὼς τὸν πατέρα-αποκαλύπτει ὃν ἔγνω πατέρα. Orig. Comm. in Joh. p. 41. Vid. et Just. Mart. Dial. p. 358. Iren. lib. ii. cap. 30. p. 163.

Theophilus Bishop of Antioch, where he speaks of the ayos ivdiáderos and gopagixos (p. 129.) is thus to be understood. Tertullian, in his piece against Praxeas, has a great deal to the same purpose. Athenagoras, Tatian, and Hippolytus, though more obscurely, seem to have intended the same. And even Origen himself had adopted the like notion, as may appear from the following passages.

Ἐὰν ἐπιμελῶς ἐξετάζωμεν αὐτοῦ πάσας τὰς ἐπινοίας, μόνον κατὰ τὸ εἶναι σοφία ἀρχή ἐσι.—ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄν τινα τεθαῤῥηκότως πρεσβύτερον πάντων τῶν ἐπινοεμένων ταῖς ὀνομασίαις τοῦ πρωτοτόκου πάσης κτίσεως ἐσιν ἡ σοφία. Orig. in Joh. p. 19.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος—ἀρχὴ δὲ μετὰ μαρτυριῶν τῶν ἐκ τῶν παροιμιῶν ἀποδέδοται εἰρῆσθαι ἡ σοφία, καὶ ἔτι προεπινοεμένη ἡ σοφία τοῦ αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλοντος λόγε, νοητέον τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ, τουτέςι τῇ σοφίᾳ, αἰεὶ εἶναι. Orig. in Joh. p. 43. Compare P. 59.

Afterwards Origen uses an argument to prove that the yes has a real substance, and adds in conclusion: Ὁ λόγος—ἐν ἀρχῇ τῇ σοφίᾳ τὴν ὑπόφασιν xw, p. 44. Which words are remarkable, and worth comparing with Ter tullian's upon the same subject, where he says: Jam in usu est nostrorum, per simplicitatem interpretationis, sermonem dicere in primordio apud Deum fuisse, cum magis rationem competat antiquiorem haberi; quia non sermonalis a principio, sed rationalis Deus etiam ante principium, et quia ipse quoque sermo ratione consistens, priorem eam ut substantiam suam ostendat. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. v.

and which in Greek is called Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος. But when he afterwards came to create the world, and to reveal both himself and his Father, then he might more properly be compared to outward speech, or a word spoken forth, which the Greeks express by λόγος προφορικός. And thus it is, that the same writers sometimes speak of the Aóyos, or WORD, being both eternal, and in time: eternal in one capacity, not so in the other. For as thought must be considered previous to speech, so the Aoyos, or WORD, under one consideration might be conceived more ancient than under the other.

Thus far the Catholics, sober men, carried on the parallel; and there was no harm in it, while they kept close to the rule of faith, and within the bounds of sobriety. But the Sabellian heretics did not stop there. They pursued the parallel still farther, till they left the Aóyos, or WORD, no distinct personality. They observed that inward thought was no real substantial thing, distinct from the mind itself; and that outward speech was but a voice or sound, nothing fixed, real, and permanent: and from hence they took occasion to misinterpret the Apostle very widely; as if the WORD, which he speaks of, were nothing really distinct from the Father, not a second Person, any more than a man's thought, or word, is another person from the man. This kind of construction was openly received and propagated by f Photinus, about the middle of the fourth century; by Paul of 8 Samosata, almost a century before him; by h Sabellius and Noëtus earlier than he; and by i Praxeas still higher up, about the end of the second century; and probably by some other here

f Hilar. p. 789, 1048, 1179. Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 8. Epiphan. Hæres. lxv. p. 608, 609.

h Epiphan. Hæres. lxv. p. 608.

i Tertull. contr. Prax. c. vii. viii.

k Vld. Clem. Alexandr. Strom. p. 646. Iren. p. 130, 132, 157, 158.

N. B. The notion of a λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός, in this heretical sense, is justly condemned by all the Fathers. Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Ambrose, and other Catholics censured it as smartly as the Council of Sirmium, Euse

tics before him. What remains of it at this day is to be met with chiefly among the Socinians; those of them, I mean, who have refined upon their master Socinus, in this particular; and are more properly Photinians, or Sabellians. A celebrated writer abroad has openly espoused this Photinian notion in part; disguising it a little under the name reason, answering pretty nearly to the heretical sense of the xóyos évdiádetos, or inward thought: so that now the Sabellian interpretation, after the latest improvements, runs thus.

"In the beginning was Reason, and Reason was in God, "and Reason was God himself. It was in God from the "beginning, before the world was: for whatever is in na"ture was made with the highest Reason, neither is there "that single thing that was made without Reason."

But against this, or any other the like Sabellian construction of the first chapter of St. John, many unanswerable reasons have been urged both by ancients and moderns.

1. As first, St. John does not say that the WORD was Oos, a divine Word, which might have favoured the Sabellian sense, but Oss, God; thereby strongly denoting a real Person. A man's word, or thought, is not called man; nor would the Word or Wisdom of God be called God, if a mere attribute or operation only was intended, and not a real Person. Or if it be said, that it does denote a Person, the same Person that was before spoken of as God, in the same verse; then how can the other words

bius, or the Arians. Vid. Orig. in Joh. p. 24. in Jerem. p. 184. Euseb. contr. Marc. p. 120. de Laud. Const. c. 12. Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. iv. c. 5. p. 50. Athanas. Expos. Fid. p. 99. Orat. ii. p. 503. Basil. Hom. xxvii. p. 602. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 7. Ignat. Epist. Interpolat. ad Magnes. c. 8. Some even of the Arians, after they came to make a distinction of a twofold λóyes, adopted, in part, this very Sabellian notion. Vid. Athanas. p. 503, 282, 260. Cyril. Alex. in Joh. lib. i. p. 30. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. c. 7.

k Le Clerc. Comment. in Joh. i. 1.

1 Vid. Euseb. contr. Marcel. p. 83. Tertull. contr. Prax. p. 504. Epiph. Hæres. lxv. p. 609. Deus erat Verbum cessat Sonus vocis-Res est, non Sonus; natura, non Sermo; Deus, non inanitas est. Hilar. p. 796.

stand, that he was with God? He cannot be supposed the self-same Person with whom he was. m With God, plainly signifies the same as with the Father, (see 1 Joh. i. 2.) who is God. The Apostle can never be supposed to mean that the Father was with the Father; the Word therefore, if it denotes a Person at all, must be understood of another Person. But that it denotes a Person will appear farther.

2. For it is not said that the WORD, or REASON, was in God, as might be proper of an attribute, &c. but with God; which is another personal character ".

3. It is said that all things were made by the Word: which (as appears from other texts) comes to the same as to say, that the WORD made all things: which is a farther confirmation that a real thing is intended by the WORD, not an attribute only o.

4. The Apostle observes (v. 8.) of John the Baptist, that he (xevos) was not that Light, intimating thereby that he had been speaking of a Person before, who really was; and therefore from hence also it appears that the WORD is something real.

5. It is said (ver. 11.) of the WORD, that " he came "unto his own, and his own received him not." This is good sense, and sounds well. But to say that Reason, the attribute, came unto its own, and its own received it not, has hardly either sense or propriety.

6. The WORD is represented (ver. 14.) as the only-begotten of the Father; which again is personal. For if begotten may be a proper expression, concerning an attribute or property; yet only-begotten is not, unless God has no more attributes than one. The characters therefore being

* Εἰ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, οὐχ ὁ λόγος ἐςὶ πρὸς ὃν ἦν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἐσι Aéyes. Epiphan. Hæres. lxv. p. 609.

■ Verbum erat apud Deum. Nunquid audieras in Deo, ut Sermonem reconditæ cogitationis acciperes?—non in altero esse, sed cum altero prædicatur. Hilar. p. 796.

• Fecit enim et ipse, quæ facta sunt per illum. Quale est ut nihil sit ipse sine quo nihil factum est? Ut inanis solida, et vacuus plena, et incorporalis corporalia sit operatus? Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 7. Comp. Phœbad. p. 304.