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with St. Athanasius (quoted in N. 9), attest. The same answer will apply to the quotation of St. Maximus, especially as the learned Petavius remarks (6), as the word principle, or principium," among the Greeks means the first fountain, or first origin, which applies to the Father alone.

17. We can reply to the argument adduced from the quotation from St. John of Damascus, by remarking that the Saint here speaks guardedly, to oppose the Macedonians, who taught that the Holy Ghost was a creature of the Son, as he uses the same caution in not allowing that the Blessed Virgin should be called the Mother of Christ-Christiparam Virginem Sanctam non dicimus—to avoid the error of Nestorius, who called her the Mother of Christ, to argue that there were two persons in Christ. Cardinal Bessarion, however, in the Council of Florence (7), answered this objection most clearly. The Saint, he says, used the preposition ex to denote the principle without a beginning, as is the Father alone. St. John of Damascus himself, however, teaches the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, both in the place quoted, where he calls him the Spirit of the Son, as also in the subsequent part of the same chapter, in which he compares the Father to the sun, the. Son to the rays, and the Holy Ghost to the light, thus showing that as the light or splendour proceeds from the sun and the rays, so the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son: "Quemadmodum videlicet ex sole est radius, et splendor; ipse enim (Pater), et radii, et splendoris fons est; per radium autem splendor nobis communicatur, atque ipse est, qui nos collustrat, et a nobis percipitur."

18. To the objection from Theodoret we answer, that the authority of Theodoret on this point is of no weight, because here he is opposed to St. Cyril, or we may suppose also that he was opposing the Macedonians, who taught that the Holy Ghost was a creature of the Son. Finally, as to the fact related of Leo III., we answer, that the Holy Father did not disapprove of the Catholic dogma of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, since he agreed on this point with the Legates of the Gallican Church, and of Charlemagne, as we see by the acts of the Legation (Vol. II.); but he disapproved of the addition of the word Filioque to the Symbol, without absolute necessity, and without the authority of the whole Church, and this addition was afterwards made by subsequent General Councils, when it was found necessary to do so, on account of the Greeks, who so frequently relapsed, and it was thus confirmed by the authority of the universal Church.

19. The last objection made by the Greeks is founded on these reasons: If the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father and the Son, he would proceed not from one, but from two principles, for he would be produced by two Persons. We have already answered

(6) Petavius, l. 7, de Trin. c. 17, n. 12.

(7) Bessar. Orat. pro. Unit.

this in proving the dogma (N. 6), but we will explain it more clearly. Although the Father and the Son are two Persons, really distinct, still they neither are, nor can be, called two principles of the Holy Ghost, but only one principle, for the power by which the Holy Ghost is produced is but one alone, and is the same in the Father as in the Son. Neither is the Father the principle of the Holy Ghost by paternity, nor the Son by filiation, so that they might be two principles; but the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Ghost by active spiration, which, as it is one alone, and is common to both, and undivided in the Father and the Son, therefore the Father and the Son cannot be called two principles, or two spirators, because they are but one spirator of the Holy Ghost, and although both Persons spirate, still the spiration is but one. All this has been expressly laid down in the Definition of the Council of Florence.

REFUTATION V.

REFUTATION OF THE HERESY OF PELAGIUS.

1. Ir is not my intention here to refute all the errors of Pelagius concerning Original Sin and Free Will, but only those concerning grace. In the historical part of the work (Chap. v. art. ii. n. 5), I have said that the principal heresy of Pelagius was, that he denied the necessity of grace to avoid evil, or to do good, and I there men. tioned the various subterfuges he had recourse to, to avoid the brand of heresy, at one time saying that grace and free-will itself was given us by God; again, that it is the law teaching us how to live; now, that it is the good example of Jesus Christ; now, that it is the pardon of sins; again, that it is an internal illustration, but on the part of the intellect alone, in knowing good and evil, though Julian, his disciple, admitted grace of the will also; but neither Pelagius nor his followers ever admitted the necessity of grace, and have even scarcely allowed that grace was necessary to do what is right more easily, and they always denied that this grace was gratuitous, but said it was given us according to our natural merits. We have, therefore, two points to establish; first, the necessity, and next, the gratuity of grace.

SECT. 1.-OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE.

2. Ir is first proved from that saying of Jesus Christ: "No man can come to me, except the Father who hath sent me draw him" (John, vi. 44). From these words alone it is clear that no one can perform any good action in order to eternal life without internal grace. That is confirmed by another text: "I am the vine, you

the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit; for without me you can do nothing" (John, xv. 5). Therefore, Jesus Christ teaches that of ourselves we can do nothing available to salvation, and, therefore, grace is absolutely necessary for every good work, for otherwise, as St. Augustin says, we can acquire no merit for eternal life: "Ne quisquam putaret parvum aliquem fructum posse a semetipso palmitem ferre, cum dixisset hic, fert fructum multum, non ait, sine me parum, potestis facere: sed, nihil potestis facere: sive ergo parum, sive multum, sine illo fieri non potest, sine quo nihil fieri potest." It is proved, secondly, from St. Paul (called by the Fathers the Preacher of grace), who says, writing to the Philippians: "With fear and trembling work out your salvation, for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish according to his good-will” (Phil. ii. 12, 13). In the previous part of the same chapter he exhorts them to humility: "In humility let each esteem others better than themselves," as Christ, who, he says, "humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death;" and then he tells them that it is God who works all good in them. He confirms in that what St. Peter says: "God resisteth the proud, but to the humble he giveth grace” (1 Peter, v. 5). In fine, St. Paul wishes to show us the necessity of grace to desire or to put in practice every good action, and shows that for that we should be humble, otherwise we render ourselves unworthy of it. And lest the Pelagians may reply, that here the Apostle does not speak of the absolute necessity of grace, but of the necessity of having it to do good more easily, which is all the necessity they would admit, see what he says in another text: "No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost" (1 Cor. xii. 3). If, therefore, we cannot even mention the name of Jesus with profit to our souls, without the grace of the Holy Ghost, much less can we hope to work out our salvation without grace.

3. Secondly.-St. Paul teaches us that the grace alone of the law given to us is not, as Pelagius said, sufficient, for actual grace is absolutely necessary to observe the law effectually: "For if justice be by the law, then Christ died in vain" (Gal. ii. 21). By justice is understood the observance of the Commandments, as St. John tells us: "He that doth justice is just" (1 John, iii. 7). The meaning of the Apostle, therefore, is this: If man, by the aid of the law alone, could observe the law, then Jesus Christ died in vain; but such is not the case. We stand in need of grace, which Christ procured for us by his death. Nay, so far is the law alone sufficient for the observance of the commandments, that, as the Apostle says, the very law itself is the cause of our transgressing the law, because it is by sin that concupiscence enters into us: "But sin taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. For without the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the law, but when the commandment came, sin

revived" (Rom. vii. 8, 9). St. Augustin, explaining how it is that the knowledge of the law sooner renders us guilty than innocent, says that this happens (1), because such is the condition of our corrupt will, that, loving liberty, it is carried on with more vehemence to what is prohibited than to what is permitted. Grace is, therefore, that which causes us to love and to do what we know we ought to do, as the second Council of Carthage declares: "Ut quod faciendum cognovimus, per gratiam præstatur, etiam facere dirigamus, atque valeamus." Who, without grace, could fulfil the first and most important of all precepts, to love God? "Charity is from God" (1 John, iv. 9). "The charity of God is poured forth into our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us" (Rom. v. 5). Holy charity is a pure gift of God, and we cannot obtain it by our own strength. "Amor Dei, quo pervenitur ad Deum, non est nisi a Deo," as St. Augustin says (2). Without grace how could we conquer temptations, especially grievous ones? Hear what David says: Being pushed, I was overturned, that I might fall, but the Lord supported me" (Psalms, cxvii. 13). And Solomon says: "No one can be continent (that is, resist temptations to concupiscence), except God gave it" (Wisdom, viii. 21). Hence, the Apostle, speaking of the temptations which assault us, says: "But in all these things we overcome, because of him that hath loved us" (Rom. viii. 37). And again, "Thanks be to God, who always maketh us to triumph in Christ" (2 Cor. ii. 14). St. Paul, therefore, thanks God for the victory over temptations, acknowledging that he conquers them by the power of grace. St. Augustin (3) says, that this gratitude would be in vain if the victory was not a gift of God: "Irrisoria est enim illa actio gratiarum, si ob hoc gratiæ aguntur Deo, quod non donavit ipse, nec fecit." All this proves how necessary grace is to us, either to do good or avoid evil.

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4. Let us consider the theological reason for the necessity of grace. The means should always be proportioned to the end. Now, our eternal salvation consists in enjoying God face to face, which is, without doubt, a supernatural end; therefore, the means which conduce to this end should be of a supernatural order, likewise. Now, everything which conduces to salvation is a means of salvation; and, consequently, our natural strength is not sufficient to make us do anything, in order to eternal salvation, unless it is elevated by grace, for nature cannot do what is beyond its strength, and an action of a supernatural order is so. Besides our weak natural powers, which are not able to accomplish supernatural acts, we have the corruption of our nature, occasioned by sin, which even is a stronger proof to us of the necessity of

grace.

(1) St. Augus. 7. de Spir. S. et litt. (2) St. Augus. l. 4, con. Julian. c. 3. Augus. loc. cit. ad Corinth.

(4) St.

SEC. II. OF THE GRATUITY OF GRACE.

5. THE Apostle shows in several places that the Divine grace is, in everything, gratuitous, and comes from the mercy of God alone, independent of our natural merits. In one place he says: "For unto you it is given for Christ, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him" (Phil. i. 29). Therefore, as St. Augustin reflects (1), it is a gift of God, through the merits of Jesus Christ, not alone to suffer for love of him, but even to believe in him, and, if it is a gift of God, it cannot be given us through our merits. "Utrumque ostendit Dei donum, quia utrumque dixit esse donatum; nec ait, ut plenius, et perfectius credatis, sed ut credatis in eum." The Apostle writes similarly to the Corinthians, that "he had obtained mercy of the Lord, to be faithful" (1 Cor. vii. 25). It is not through any merit of ours, therefore, that we are faithful to the mercy of God. "Non ait," says St. Augustin, in the same place already quoted, "quia fidelis eram; fideli ergo datur quidem, sed datum est etiam, ut esset fidelis."

6. St. Paul next shows most clearly, that, whenever we receive light from God, or strength to act, it is not by our own merits, but a gratuitous gift from God. "For who distinguisheth thee," says the Apostle," or what hast thou, that thou hast not received; and if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hast not received it" (1 Cor. iv. 7)? If grace was given according to our natural merits, derived solely from the strength of our free will, then there would be something to distinguish a man who works out his salvation from one who does not do so. St. Augustin even says, that if God would give us only free will—that is, a will, free and indifferent either to good or evil, according as we use it— in case the good will would come from ourselves, and not from God, then what came from ourselves would be better than what comes from God: "Nam si nobis libera quædam voluntas ex Deo, quæ adhuc potest esse vel bona, vel mala; bono vero voluntas ex nobis est, melius est id quod a nobis, quam quod ab illo est" (2). But it is not so; for the Apostle tells us, that whatever we have from God is all gratuitously given to us, and, therefore, we should not pride ourselves on it.

7. Finally, the gratuity of grace is strongly confirmed by St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans (xi. 5, 6): "Even so then at this present time also, there is a remnant saved according to the election of grace. (The Apostle means, by "the remnant," those few Jews who were faithful among the multitude of unbelievers.) And if by it is not now by works; otherwise grace is no grace, grace. Now, the Apostle could not express in stronger terms the

(1) St. Aug. l. 2, de Præd. S. S. c. 2.

(2) St. Aug. l. 2, de Pec. mer. c. 18.

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