St. Augustine, who, as they suppose, taught that the state of pure nature was an impossibility. This supposition of theirs, however, is totally unfounded, for the majority of theologians assert, that the Holy Doctor in many places teaches the contrary, especially in his writings against the Manicheans (3), and distinguishes four modes in which God might create the souls of men blameless, and, among them, the second mode would be, if, previously to any sin being committed, these created souls were infused into their bodies subject to ignorance, concupiscence, and all the miseries of this life; by this mode, the possibility of pure nature is certainly established. Consult Tournelly (4) on this point, where he answers all objections, and you will see also how Jansenius treats it.

9. They say, likewise, that the propositions of Baius were not condemned in the Bull of St. Pius in the sense the author understood them. The words of the Bull are: "Quas quidem sententias stricto coram nobis examine ponderatas, quanquam nonnullæ aliquo pacto sustineri possent, in rigore, et proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento hæreticas, erroneas, temerarias, &c., respective damnamus," &c. They then say that between the word possent, and the following ones, in rigore, et proprio verborum sensu, there was no comma, but that it was placed after the words ab assertoribus intento; so that the sentence being read thus: " quanquam nonnullæ aliquo pacto sustineri possent in rigore et proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento," the proposition could be sustained in this proper and intended sense, as the Bull declares. According to this interpretation, however, the Bull would contradict itself, condemning opinions which, in their proper sense, and that intended by the author, could be sustained. If they could be sustained in the proper sense, why were they condemned, and why was Baius expressly called on to retract them? It would be a grievous injustice to condemn these propositions, and oblige the author to retract them, if in the proper and plain sense they could be defended. Besides, though in the Bull of St. Pius the comma may be wanted after the word possent, still no one has ever denied or doubted but that it was inserted in the subsequent Bulls of Gregory XIII. and Urban VIII. There cannot be the least doubt that the opinions of Baius were condemned by these Pontifical Bulls.

10. They say, thirdly, that the propositions were condemned, having regard to the Divine Omnipotence, according to which the state of pure nature was possible. but not in regard to the wisdom and goodness of God. The theologians already quoted answer, that in that case the Apostolic See has condemned not a real, but only an apparent, error, since, in reality, the doctrine of Baius, in regard to the wisdom and goodness of God, is not condemnable. It is false, however, to suppose that the state of pure nature is only

(3) St. August. l. 3, de lib. arb. c. 20.

(4) Tourn. t. 5, p. 2, c. 7, p. 67.

possible according to the Omnipotence of God, and not according to his other attributes. That which is repugnant or not agreeable to any of the attributes of God is, in fact, impossible, for "He cannot deny himself" (2 Tim. ii. 13). St. Anselm says (5): "In Deo quantumlibet parvum inconveniens sequitur impossibilitas." Besides, if that principle of our adversaries themselves were true, that there is no middle love between vicious cupidity and laudable charity, then the state of pure nature, even in regard to the Divine Omnipotence, as they suppose, would be an impossibility, since it would, in fact, be repugnant to God to produce a creature contrary to himself, with the necessity of sinning, as, according to their supposition of possibility, this creature would be.

11. In fact, I think no truth can be more evident, than that the state of pure nature is not an impossibility, a state in which man would be created without grace and without sin, and subject to all the miseries of this life. I say this with all reverence for the Augustinian school, which holds the contrary opinion. There are two very evident reasons for this doctrine: First.-Man could very well have been created without any supernatural gift, but merely with those qualities which are adapted to human nature. Therefore, that grace which was supernatural, and was given to Adam, was not his due, for then, as St. Paul says (Rom. xi. 6): "Grace is no more grace." Now, as man might be created without grace, God might also create him without sin-in fact, he could not create him with sin, for then he would be the author of sin. Then he might likewise create him subject to concupiscence, to disease, and to death, for these defects, as St. Augustin explains, belong to man's very nature, and are a part of his constitution. Concupiscence proceeds from the union of the soul with the body, and, therefore, the soul is desirous of that sensitive pleasure which the body likes. Diseases, and all the other miseries of human life, proceed from the influence of natural causes, which, in a state of pure nature, would be just as powerful as at present, and death naturally follows from the continual disagreement of the elements of which the body is composed.

12. The second reason is, that it is not repugnant to any of the Divine attributes to create man without grace and without sin. Jansenius himself admits that it is not opposed to his Omnipotence; neither is it to any other attribute, for in that state, as St. Augustin (6) teaches, all that is due by right to man's natural condition, as reason, liberty, and the other faculties necessary for his preservation, and the accomplishment of the object for which he was created, would be given to him by God. Besides, all theologians, as Jansenius himself confesses in those works in which he speaks of pure nature, are agreed in admitting the possibility of this state, that is consi

(5) St. Anselm, 7. 1, Cum Deus homo, c. 1. (6) St. August. l. 3, de lib. arb. c. 20, 22, 23.

dering the right of the creature alone, and this is precisely the doctrine of the Prince of Schoolmen, St. Thomas. He teaches (7), that man might be created without consideration to the Beatific Vision. He says: "Carentia Divino visionis competeret ei qui in solis naturalibus esset etiam absque peccato." He likewise, in another passage (8), teaches that man might be created with that concupiscence which rebels against reason: "Illa subjectio inferiorum virium ad rationem non erat naturalis." Several theologians, therefore, admit the possibility of the state of pure nature, as Estius, Ferrarensis, the Salmanticenses, Vega, and several others. Bellarmin (9), especially, says he does not know how any one can doubt of this opinion.

13. We have now to answer the objections of our adversaries. The first objection is on the score of "Beatitude." St. Augustin, according to Jansenius, teaches in several places that God could not, without injustice, deny eternal glory to man in a state of innocence: "Qua justitia quæso a Regno Dei alienatur imago Dei in nullo transgressu legem Dei." These are St Augustin's words(10). We answer that the Holy Father in this passage was opposing the Pelagians, according to man's present state, that is, supposing the gratuitous ordination of man to a supernatural end: according to that supposition, he said that it would be unjust to deprive man of the kingdom of God if he had not sinned. Neither is it of any consequence that St. Thomas (11) says that man's desires can find no rest except in the vision of God: "Non quiescit naturale desiderium in ipsis, nisi etiam ipsius Dei substantiam videant;" and as this appetite is naturally implanted in man, he could not have been created unless in order to this end. We answer, that St. Thomas (12), in several places, and especially in his book of Disputed Questions, teaches that by nature we are not inclined in particular to the vision of God, but only to beatitude in general: "Homini inditus est appetitus ultimi sui finis in communi, ut scilicet appetat se esse completum in bonitate; sed in quo ista completio consistat non est determinatum a natura." Therefore, according to the Holy Doctor, there is not in man an innate tendency to the beatific vision, but only to beatitude in general. He confirms this in another place (13): Quamvis ex naturali inclinatione voluntas habeat, ut in beatitudinem feratur, tamen quod feratur in beatitudinem talem, vel talem, hoc non est ex inclinatione naturæ." But they will still say that it is only in the vision of God that man can have perfect happiness, as David says (Psalm, xvi. 15): "I shall be satisfied when thy glory shall appear." To this we reply, that this refers to man in his present state, since

(7) St. Thom. qu. 4, de Malo. a. 1. (9) Bellarm. 7. de Grat. primi. hom. cap. 5. cap. 12. (11) St. Thom. 1. 4, contra Gentes, (13) Idem, 4, Sent. Dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3.

66

(8) Idem in Summa. 1, p. q. 95, art 1. (10) St. August. 1. 3, contra. Julian, c. 50. (12) St. Thom. q. 22, de Verit.

he has been created in order to eternal life, but never would be the case in another state, that of pure nature, for example.

14. The second objection is on the score of "Concupiscence." God, they say, could never be the author of concupiscence, since we read in St. John (1st Epis. ii. 16), that "it is not of the Father, but is of the world;" and St. Paul says: "Now, then, it is no more I that do it, but sin (that is concupiscence), that dwelleth in me" (Rom. vii. 17). We answer the text of St. John, by saying that the concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father, in our present state of existence, for in that it springs from sin, and inclines to sin, as the Council of Trent (Sess. v. Can. 5) declares: "Quia est a peccato, et ad peccatum inclinat." In our present state even, it influences us more powerfully than it would in a state of pure nature; but even in this state it would not proceed formally from the Father, considered as an imperfection, but would come from him as one of the conditions of human nature. We answer the text of St. Paul in like manner, that concupiscence is called sin, because, in our present state, it springs from sin, since man was created in grace; but in a state of pure nature it would not come from sin, but from the very condition itself, in which human nature would have been created.

15. They say, secondly, that God could not create a rational being with anything which would incline him to sin, as concupiscence would. We answer, that God could not create man with anything which, in itself, in se, would incline him to sin, as with a vicious habit, for example, which of itself inclines and induces one to sin; but he might create man with that which accidentally, per accidens, inclines him to sin, for in this is the condition of his nature only accomplished, for otherwise God should create man impeccable, for it is a defect to be peccable. Concupiscence, of itself, does not incline man to sin, but solely to that happiness adapted to human nature, and for the preservation of nature itself, which is composed of soul and body; so that it is not of itself, but only accidentally, and through the deficiency of the condition of human nature itself, that it sometimes inclines us to sin. God, surely, was not obliged, when he produced his creatures, to give them greater perfections than those adapted to their natures. Because he has not given sensation to plants, or reason to brutes, we cannot say that the defect is his; it belongs to the nature itself of these creatures, and so if, in the state of pure nature, God did not exempt man from concupiscence, which might accidentally incline him to evil, it would not be a defect of God himself, but of the condition itself of human nature.

16. The third objection is on the score of the "Miseries" of human nature. St. Augustin, they say, when opposing the Pelagians, frequently deduced the existence of original sin from the miseries of this life. We briefly answer, that the Holy Doctor

speaks of the misery of man in his present state, remembering the original holiness in which he was created, and knowing, from the Scriptures, that Adam was created free from death and from all the penalties of this life. On this principle, God could not, with justice, deprive him of the gifts granted to him, without some positive fault on his side; and, hence, the Saint inferred that Adam sinned, from the calamities which we endure in this life. He would say quite the contrary, however, if he were speaking of the state of pure nature, in which the miseries of life would spring from the condition, itself of human nature, and especially as in the state of lapsed nature our miseries are, by many degrees, greater than they would be in a state of pure nature. From the grievous miseries, then, of our present state, original sin can be proved; but it could not be so from the lesser miseries which man would suffer in a state of pure nature.

REFUTATION XIII.

THE ERRORS OF CORNELIUS JANSENIUS.

1. In order to refute the errors of Jansenius, it is quite sufficient to refute his system, which, in substance, consists in supposing that our will is forced by necessity to do either what is good or bad, according to the impulse it receives from the greater or less degree of celestial or terrestrial delectation, which predominates in us, and which we cannot resist, since this delectation, as he says, precedes our consent, and even forces us to yield consent to it. This error he founded on that well-known expression of St. Augustin: "Quod amplius delectat, id nos operemur, necessum est." Here are his words: "Gratia est delectatio et suavitas, qua Anima in bonum appetendum delectabiliter trahitur; ac pariter delectationem concupiscentiæ esse desiderium illicitum, quo animus etiam repugnans in peccatum inhiat” (1). And again, in the same book (cap. 9), he says: "Utraque delectatio invicem pugnat, earumque conflictus sopiri non potest, nisi alteram altera delectando superaverit, et eo totum animæ pondus vergat, ita ut vigente delectatione carnali impossibile sit, quod virtutis, et honestatis consideratio prævaleat."

2. Jansenius says that in that state of justice, in which man was created-"God made man right" (Eccles. vii. 30)-being then inclined to rectitude, he could with his own will easily perform what was right, with the Divine assistance alone, called sine quo-that is, sufficient grace (which gives him the power, but not the will); so that, with the ordinary assistance alone, he could then agree to,

(1) Jansen. l. 4, de Grat. Christ. c. 11.