* ties into sweetness, affections, and ftarings upon the divine beauty. And is carried on to extafies, raptures, fufpenfions, elevations, abftractions, and apprehenfions beatifical. Great Exemplar. p. 60. 34. I make no doubt, but that many an honeft, pious foul arrives to the heavenly Canaan, who is not fed with this Manna in the wilderness. But though every one must not expect these antepafts of felicity that is virtuous, yet none else must. Paradife was never open but to a ftate of innocence. But neither is that enough. No, this mount of God's prefence is fenced not only from the profane, but alfo from the moderately virtuous. 'Tis the privilege of angelical difpofitions, and the reward of eminent piety, and an excellent religion, to be admitted to thefe divine repafts, thefe feafts of love. And here I place the greatest happiness attainable by man in this life, as being the nearcft approach to the ftate of the bleffed above, the outer court of Heaven.

T

3. Thefe (Sir) are my thoughts concerning happinefs. I might have fpun them out into a greater length, but I think a little plat of ground thickfown, is better than a great field, which for the

cft part of it lies fallow. I have endeavour'd to deliver my notions with as much perfpicuity, and in as good method as I could, and fo to answer all the ends of copioufnefs, with the advantage of a fhorter cut. If I appear fingular in any of my notions, you are not to afcribe it altogether to an affectation of novelty; but the reafon may be, becaufe in the compofing of this difcourfe (part of which, I think, had its birth in a garden) I confulted my own experimental notices of things, and I private reflections as much, if not more than the writings of others. So that if fometimes I happen to be in the road, and fometimes in a way by my felf, 'tis no wonder. I affect neither the one nor the other, but write as think. Which as I do at other times, fo more especially when I fubfcribe my felf,

All-Souls College, Apr. 18. 1683.

SIR,
Yours most affectionately,

J. N.

A Refolution relating to a paffage in the foregoing Treatife.

SHUNSTONSNUNUNUNUNUNUNUN

I.

SIR

"T

HE kind entertainment which you gave my Idea of Happiness, does not only encourage, but oblige me to endeavour the fatiffaction of that fcruple, which the perufal of it has occafion'd.

2. You fay you should like my notion concerning the reality of that which is ufually call'd imaginary happiness, that is, (as you well explain both your own and my meaning) that altho' the objec may be an imaginary good, yet the happiness which confifts in the fruition of that object, will not be imaginary too, but real; and confequently, that 'tis impoffible for a man to seem to himself to be happy, and not to be really fo, all happiness confifting in opinion. This notion, you fay, you fhould like rarely well, could you free your felf from one difficulty which it engages you upon; (viz.) That hereafter, in the ftate of glory, either one Saint hall think himself as happy as another, or not; if not, this muft needs occafion envy or difcontent; but if one fhall think himself as happy as another, then, according to my hypothefis, that opinion is the measure of happinefs, 'twill follow, that he will already be fo; and this brings in equ

fity of happiness, which you look upon (and I think justly too) as another abfurdity.

3. I confefs, Sir, this argument is pretty fubtle and furprizing; but I conceive the knots of it may be untied by this anfwer. Firft, it may be juftly queftion'd, whether the first part of your dilemma be neceffarily attended with the appendant abfurdity. 'Tis true indeed, not to think ones felf as happy as another, is the fpring of envy or difcontent, among men in this world; but whether this be the genuine and conftant effect of that confideration, or whether it ought not rather to be afcribed to the present infirmities and imperfections of human nature, may admit difpute. Nay, I rather think that fo indeed it must be accounted for, and that fuch a confideration would not be productive of fuch an effect in Heaven, confidering the perfect charity of the Saints, and their as perfect fubmiffion to the divine will. But in cafe this abfurdity should inseparably cleave to the first part, then I might my felf to the latter, that in Heaven one Saint fhall think himself as happy as another. Then, according to my own notion (fay you) it will follow, that he is really fo. No, I deny the confequence, the invalidity of which will plainly ap pear, by diftinguishing the ambiguity of the phrate. For this expreffion, one Saint thinks himself as happy as another, may be taken in a double sense; either that he thinks himself as happy as he himfelf thinks that other; or, that he thinks himself as happy as that other thinks himself. I grant, fhould one Saint think himself as happy as another in this latter fenfe of the phrafe, he would, according to my hypothefis, really be fo; fo that this would bring in equality. And therefore in this fenfe, I deny the propofition; and that without the leaft danger of splitting upon the firft abfurdity. But for the former fenfe, that has no fuch levelling quality; for to fay that I think my felf as happy as I think another, amounts to no more than this, that in my apprehenfion another does not exceed e in happiness: But tho' he does not in my ap

prehen

Be

prehenfion, yet he may in reality; for tho' my opinion gives meafures to my own happiness, yet it does not to another man's. So that one Saint may be faid to think himself as happy as another in the former fenfe, without equalling the happiness of the bleffed; tho', I confefs, fhould much rather adhere to the contrary propofition, (viz.) That one shall not think himself as happy as another, in cafe fuch an opinion be not neceffarily attended with envy or difcontent, as I think it is not. cause it feems unreasonable to make them ignorant of the degrees of one another's blifs, unless that ignorance be neceffarily required to prevent the alledg'd abfurdities. But I determine nothing in this point; my business was only to break the force of your dilemma, and to fhew that my notion does not involve you in the difficulty fuppofed. This, Sir, is all that I think neceffary to fay to a perfon of your apprehenfion; and therefore I end these nice fpeculations with this profitable reflection, that although the notion of happiness be intricate and obfcure, yet the means of attaining it are plain; and therefore 'twould be moft advisable both for you and me, chiefly to apply our felves to the latter here; and we shall understand the former with the beft fort of knowledge, that of experience, hereafter.

Tours,

J. M.

An

An Account of PLATO's Ideas, and of Platonick Love.

By way of Letter.

Tanta vis in Ideis conftituitur, ut nifi bis intelle&tis, fapiens effe nemo poffit. S. Aug.

1.

SIR,

Ere not I as well acquainted with your

W fingular modefty, as I am with you intel

lectual accomplishments, I should readily conclude, that your directing your enquiries.to me, proceeded not fo much from a curiofity to improve your own knowledge, as to try mine. But when I confider, that you are ignorant of nothing fo much as of your own worth and abilities, I begin to think it poffible that you may propofe thefe queftions, even to me, out of a defire to be inform'd. Which way foever it is, I acknowledge my felf to be obliged to you for affording me an opportunity of ferving you, especially in fuch an inftance, where I cannot gratifie your request without humouring my own genius at the fame time. For indeed to my apprehenfion, there is not a finer or more fubTime piece of fpeculation in all Plato's philofophy, than that of his ideas, and that of his love;, tho' it has undergone the fame hard fate with many osher excellent theories; first to be either ignorant