ed with the belief or unbelief from which their conduct has proceeded? The only ground, (so far as I know,) on which, without seeing into their hearts, we can charge them with iniquity, because the only ground on which we can charge them with a dishonest belief, proceeding from unrighteous dispositions, and consequently inferring condemnation,-is at least very doubtful and precarious,—nothing more than that of their having believed WHAT WE KNOW to be false. Consequently, my answer to the objection, as originally stated, is equally simple and decisive,-That it does not concern my argument, whether, in such a case, their conduct has, or has not, been iniquitous,-because it is plain that, by us at least, Protestant governments cannot be convicted of iniquity on the same ground. They proceed upon a belief of what we know to be true, and, under the influence of that belief, establish what we know to be true. Is it possible that we can regard them as wrong in doing so, merely because other governments have established what we know to be false, and, in doing so, may have been actuated, not only by a false belief, but by a belief originating in such a hatred of what is good, and such a love of what is evil, as renders them answerable, both for their belief itself as iniquitous, and for the iniquity of all its consequences? To infer, from the latter case, that there is also iniquity in the former, is so manifestly an error, that no man, I think, after considering the distinguishing circumstances of the two cases, will persevere in the argument.

But it is only, with reference to Roman Catholic governments, that I have thought it essential to make such a statement. For, so far as concerns Mahometan or Pagan rulers, the objection as urged has not even the shadow of any bearing on the argument which it is brought forward to subvert. I have argued and concluded, from the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, that Christian magistrates have, in these Scriptures, a Divine authority for ecclesiastical establishments; and, most certainly, that Divine authority has a distinct and exclusive reference to the Christian faith. It is not an authority, generally speaking, for establishing something under the name of religion. It is, strictly and exclusively, an authority for the establishment of the religion contained in those Scriptures from which the authority is derived. How then is it possible that any thing in the case of Pagan and Mahometan rulers either establishing, or declining to establish, what they call religion, should affect the Scriptural warrant of Christian rulers, or so bring its reality into question as to induce any man to doubt or deny it ?

Pagan or Heathen magistrates are either altogether ignorant of those Scriptures from which Christian rulers derive their warrant and authority, or they refuse to acknowledge the Scriptures as a revelation from Heaven; to them the Bible, which we have in our hands, is altogether a sealed book. To them, therefore, it practically imparts no warrant of any kind. But, admitting that it, notwithstanding, con-.

go

tains, though unknown to themselves, a warrant or authority to them respecting other matters, it assuredly gives them no warrant to establish the rites of Pagan or Heathen worship. What, then, becomes of the argument that " if it be the duty of Christian "vernments to establish Christianity, it must also be "the duty of Pagan governments, in all quarters of "the world, to do the same thing, for their various <6 bloody and barbarous superstitions ?" So far as the argument in behalf of Christian governments is founded on Scriptural and Divine authority, it is evident that, from the first case, nothing can be inferred with respect to the last.

It may, indeed, be thought that, in reference to this point, there is a distinction to be recognized between Pagan and Mahometan governments, because Mahometans profess to believe in some part of the Old and New Testaments. But the distinction is altogether unavailing for the support of the argument opposed to us. Much of our argument for ecclesiastical establishments is derived from sacred writings which Mahometan rulers do not acknowledge. Even those parts of the Old and New Testaments, in which they profess to believe, they have so mutilated as to accommodate them to the Mahometan faith. And, in reference to the point, which, above all and of itself, is decisive, they are exactly upon a footing with Pagan or Heathen rulers ;-they can have no authority from the Scriptures of either the Old or the New Testament to establish the rites of Mahomet, since it is not,

as I have said, religion in general, but the religion of Christ in particular, of which these Scriptures authorize the establishment.-In these circumstances, I scarcely need to add that the duty which, under God, Christian rulers perform, in establishing the Christian faith, does not in any degree involve that absurd consequence in reference to Mahometan rulers, which has been rashly imputed to it.

I am not aware of any farther argument, by which an attempt has been made to prove that any civil government, such as that under which we live, is incompetent to specify and determine the particular scheme of Christian doctrine and worship, which ought to be preferred and sanctioned. Much has, indeed, been said about oppression to which it is alleged that Dissenters are exposed, by means of an ecclesiastical establishment. But I have patiently waited for the time and place, in which that charge may be, once for all and fully, examined; and for this purpose an opportunity will present itself under the next section.

SECTION IV.

ON THE OBJECTION AND ARGUMENT THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF ANY PARTICULAR SCHEME OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHERS, AT THE PUBLIC OR GENERAL EXPENSE, AND CONSEQUENTLY MORE OR LESS AT THE EXPENSE OF DISSENTERS-IS ANTISCRIPTURAL, UNJUST, AND A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS

OF CONSCIENCE.

If one may judge from the frequency with which this part of the case is adverted to by the adversaries of an ecclesiastical establishment, it must be understood as possessing in their view an importance paramount to every other. The oppression to which dissenters are said to be subjected, by what is exacted from them for the support of an established church, is so combined with almost every other part of their argument, as may tempt one to suppose that, but for this pecuniary consideration alone, every other objection to a church establishment would have been more easily overlooked. One author, indeed, to whose posthumous name and character no small importance has been attached, seems to announce it as the single object and design of his work to compare established and