"Dissenting Churches" has even quoted the example of the Apostle Paul, for submitting "to pay taxes "under the Roman government, part of which was "no doubt applied to maintain the established super"stitions," our reply may be fairly confined to the ground of objection, which this last mentioned writer has reserved; and, in few words, it seems to be that, though dissenters may conscientiously submit to the exaction, it is not lawful, in point of conscience, for any government to reduce them to the necessity of submitting to it.

This proposition implies that there is still a hardship imposed on their consciences, and that the government is still answerable, at the bar of conscience, for having imposed it.-But upon what ground is it maintained that there is any hardship imposed on a man's conscience, by an exaction to which his conscience, at the same time, directs him to submit? There may be injustice in a measure to which his conscience directs him to submit; and the authors of the measure may be answerable for the injustice. But we have already seen that the measure in question is not chargeable with injustice. How, then, does the man's conscience, in these circumstances, still suffer a hardship? One great part of the office of conscience is to convict us of sin and reprove us for it; but there can be no sin in our submitting when our conscience directs us to submit; we, in this case, obey the dictates of conscience, and have therefore its approbation. The ut"Comparison," &c. p. 67.

most, it would seem, that can, in these circumstances, be pleaded-is that, while a dissenter submits to the exaction in question, his conscience disapproves of that exaction and is therefore offended.

How, then, should this consideration affect the conduct of any national government, in either enforcing or declining to enforce such an exaction? My answer in this case is very nearly analogous to that which I offered in repelling the charge of injustice,—it is that the principle, upon which national governments are advised not to enforce the exaction, is one which, if recognised as a rule of conduct, would preclude them from the discharge of many duties, which are so essential, that if their discharge were superseded, no government could be long maintained. Let me refer, for illustration of what I now assert, to the argument of an anonymous author in a late " Defence of Eccle"siastical Establishments."-" Is religion" (says he) "the only subject over which conscience holds empire? May we not plead conscience in refusing to pay a "tax, levied for the prosecution of a war, which we "conceive to be at once impolitic and unjust? We 66 may be of opinion with those who believe the public money is used as an instrument of bribery and cor

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ruption. Can we submit to support a system which "thus violates the laws of God? Is not our conscience “here concerned as well as our property? Quakers "are, on religious principles, opposed to all wars; yet

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they have never pleaded exemption from those taxes "which have been levied for the national defence.

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"class of the community, no less numerous than this “sect, are opposed, on Christian principles, to the se"vere and sanguinary punishments of our criminal "code; yet they pay for the execution of every cri"minal, and for the support of the judges by whom "he is condemned." *

The only thing like an answer, (so far as I know) that has been made to this argument, seems to be comprised in the following words" When I speak of

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persecution and the violation of conscience, I refer exclusively to what is extorted for things religious." + Can any man sustain this as an answer? Not only are the cases and circumstances, to which the anonymous author refers, within the province of conscience, they unquestionably involve a religious objection. They do not, indeed, concern the outward and immediate worship of God; but is there nothing religious beyond what concerns the service of the sanctuary? Has religion no concern with our life and conduct in the world? Is the regulation of our conduct no part of religion? Do we not contravene the great principles of religious obligation, if either directly or indirectly we give any encouragement, which in our station we can avoid giving, to an unjust war in which the lives of thousands are sacrificed? Do we not manifest a disregard of religious obligation, if, in any way which we can lawfully avoid, we contribute to

* Defence of Ecclesiastical Establishments, p. 65. +"Comparison of Established and Dissenting Churches,"

p. 62.

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wards promoting either bribery and corruption, or the subjection of men to such sanguinary punishments as, in our mind, we disapprove?—It is morally impossible for a national government to recognise a principle, which would exempt dissenters from the exaction in question, without acknowledging the same rule as applicable to all the cases to which we have now referred ;—and it is equally evident that, if such a rule were recognised as universally or generally applicable, it would be found very nearly, if not altogether, incompatible with the maintenance of any go

vernment.

Having now considered, and I trust satisfactorily answered, the objections which have been either most frequently, or most strongly, urged against our argument in behalf of ecclesiastical establishments, as founded on Divine authority, we may fairly proceed to the less laborious and more pleasing duty of illustrating the practical utility, and indispensable importance, of such establishments for advancing both the temporal and the spiritual interests of men.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE UTILITY OF ECCLESIASTICAL ESTABLISH

MENTS.

THIS department of the general question is essentially connected with the whole argument by which it has been maintained that we have Divine authority for ecclesiastical establishments. It would be unnatural to believe that what is not calculated to be useful to men is either required or sanctioned by God. If, on the other hand, we shall find that the establishments in question have a tendency to promote both the spiritual and the temporal interests of the great family of mankind, it may well have the effect to establish our confidence in the more direct evidence of their being warranted and authorized by our father in Heaven. Nor is it less certain that such evidence for their Divine authority as that which has passed under our review may, with good reason, incline us now to examine what concerns their utility,—though not with a partial eye-yet with such candour, and such patience, as may effectually secure us against any rash and unfair conclusion.