But I confess myself utterly at a loss to find out what the adversaries of ecclesiastical establishments could gain by an admission of what is in this case asserted. Supposing the regal office in the person of the kings of Israel and Judah to have been itself typical of the kingly office of Christ, what new bearing can it have on the argument? It is fully admitted that the exercise of the office in question, or the actions performed by individuals invested with it, did, in many cases, prefigure what was to be done by Christ in the exercise of his office as a king. What, then, would follow from our admitting, farther, that the regal office itself, abstractedly considered, was to be regarded as a type or a figure? What additional ground of argument could it in any way supply? One author, in adverting to our Lord's office as a king, says that, " of this "divine office, the glory of which belongs to himself, "and never was given or can be given to another, he "was pleased to institute a type, or symbolical repre"sentation, in the kingly office under the Old Testa"ment;" and, after some unexceptionable reference to the Jewish priesthood as having "passed away," he adds" who, then, does not see that the office of "the Jewish kings has transpired as truly as the office "of the Jewish priests ?"* Most certainly, every thing connected with the Jewish kings, whether it shall be called office or administration of office, has

*

"Ecclesiastical Establishments farther considered,"-pp.

77, 78.

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transpired" or passed away. But are we to be thereby prevented from looking back to the conduct of the Jewish kings at the time when they both exercised, and were warranted to exercise, the office in question ? Or does the circumstance of their office having so "transpired" forbid us to distinguish, in the way previously stated, what was merely typical and figurative in their regal government from that which was also moral and exemplary, so as, on the one hand, to improve what was typical and figurative, only for the confirmation of our faith, and, on the other, to make what was moral and exemplary an object of our imitation ?

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We are told, indeed, by the same author to whom I have last referred, "that it is only one part of the "conduct of the Jewish kings with which, in this "controversy we have any concern; it is only the power they exercised in matters of religion, the "compulsory power by which they interfered with "the natural liberty of men, controlling their opin❝ions and subjecting them to penal inflictions for ne"glecting or profaning the worship of God."* This seems to be an important explanation. But does it not amount to an abandonment of the author's whole objection against the argument that is founded on the example of the kings of Israel and Judah? So far as I know, it is not maintained that any thing in the conduct of these rulers can be regarded as an example

*"Ecclesiastical Establishments farther considered," p. 79.

for the exercise of " compulsory power in matters of religion, either interfering with the natural liberty

of men, or controlling their opinions ;" an imitation of them in any such case would be an infringement of the moral law which God hath given us. But it will not be denied that they upheld the cause of religion by other and very different means; and, in respect of such means only is it proposed that their conduct should be sustained as an example.

If I could suppose myself doing injustice to the argument of any man, I should be truly sorry for it. But it seems to me that a very false importance has been attached to the objection that has now been examined.

From the whole argument, then, of this section, I hold myself entitled to conclude-That we have, in the Old Testament, the authority of example under Divine guidance and direction, for what constitute the leading principles of an ecclesiastical establishment,that the patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations are in this respect, as in others, consistent,—that the same authority, with which Melchisedek was invested as a king, and by which it may be fairly presumed that he strengthened his own hands as a priest, was afterwards employed, under the sanction of heaven, by kings and other potentates of Israel and Judah,—in a way which may be regarded as an example,—for the protection and aid of the visible church of God, or, in other words, for all that is truly necessary towards the maintenance of an ecclesiastical establishment.

Whether these conclusions be fairly applicable to the circumstances of the church under the Christian dispensation-will fully appear when the various objections to their application shall be brought under review. But, as the same objections may be urged against what is contained in the next section, the requisite answer will be given with more effect, when we shall have it in our power to consider them in all their bearing.

SECTION II.

ON THE DIVINE AUTHORITY FOR ECCLESIASTICAL ESTABLISHMENTS, DERIVED FROM CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE CHRISTIAN DISPENSATION.

I. It will not be supposed that this part of the argument is to be presented and followed out in an isolated view, or in a way that shall admit of our forgetting what we have found sanctioned by Divine and scriptural example under two preceding dispensations. As certainly as the Divine Being is, in His nature, unchangeable, all his ways are consistent; and his condescension is so great that, so far as concerns his dealings with men, we are enabled to account for every change in his moral government, by a corresponding change in the circumstances with which it is connected. Great changes have been, at two periods, permitted and sanctioned in the condition of his visible church upon earth; but, in both cases, the reasons of the change have been manifest. When the patriarchal gave way to the Mosaic dispensation, there was virtually nothing abolished; the change consisted, chiefly if not entirely, in the enactment of a ritual