success, and the duke of Brunswick-Els escaped the pursuit of a superior force. But the occupation of Walcheren by the English (see Otranto), the capitulation of Flushing, August 15th, and the conquest of the Ionian Islands, October 9th, did not affect the success of Napoleon in Austria. On the 13th, a German youth of the name of Staps (q. v.) attempted to stab him in Schönbrunn. Meanwhile he had united, May 17, 1809, the whole of the States of the Church with France. Pius VII (q. v.) had no arms but excommunication, and this he pronounced, June 12, against the emperor. For this he was carried to France,where Napoleon thought he could deprive him of all political influence. October 14, peace was concluded at Vienna. Austria lost some valuable provinces and its seacoasts. The Illyrian provinces were made a French government. The most important of the negotiations following this campaign was that for the hand of an Austrian princess for the emperor, who, if his elevation to the imperial dignity had been necessary, according to the general opinion, to give quiet to France, certainly wanted a son for the firm establishment of his throne, and the security of the laws and institutions connected with it. Hard as it was for him to separate from Joséphine, the step was one that might have been expected; but whether he acted the wisest part in marrying an Austrian princess is another question, not to be discussed here. (See Otranto.) December 2, Napoleon celebrated the anniversary of his coronation at Paris with unusual pomp-a festival remarkable for the great number of sovereigns from Germany and other parts of Europe, who attended it, and for the speech which Napoleon delivered on that day in the hall of the legislative body, and which was directed much more to all Europe than to the assembled representatives of the numerous departments of France. December 16, a decree of the senate annulled the marriage between Napoleon and Joséphine. March 11, 1810, the nuptials of the emperor with the archduchess Maria Louisa (q.v.) of Austria were celebrated in Vienna, and, April 2, cardinal Fesch performed the marriage ceremony at Par18. Peace had also been concluded, Jan. 6, 1810, with Sweden, on the basis of the continental system. March 1, moreover, the viceroy of Italy was appointed hereditary grand-duke of Frankfort, as successor of the prince primate; the remaining part of Hanover was united with the kingdom of Westphalia; and, on the 16th,

the king of Holland was compelled to make great concessions. He therefore unexpectedly resigned his crown, July 1, which he could no longer wear with independence and honor (see Louis Bonaparte); and on the 9th, the incorporation of the whole kingdom with the French empire was declared. A similar fate befell Valais and the countries of the German confederacy at the mouths of the Ems, Weser and Elbe, the Hanseatic towns, Oldenburg, a portion of the grand-duchy of Berg, and even some parts of Westphalia, which the king was obliged to cede. A great portion of Europe was subjugated. Spain alone continued to fight. England remained unconquered, and Russia was still a formidable power. With America, too, differences arose respecting the continental system; for this reason the decrees of Berlin and Milan were ostensibly revoked, April 28, 1811. But the tariff of Trianon, as it was called, the continued captures and burning of English and colonial goods, inflicted still deeper wounds. Napoleon stood on the pinnacle of his power, which, if possible, was still more consolidated by the young empress giving birth to a prince, March 20, 1811, to whom, even before his birth, had been given the title of king of Rome. (See Reichstadt.) About the end of the year new differences arose with Russia and Sweden. Sweden was easily deprived of its German provinces, Jan. 27, 1812. Preparations on the most extensive scale were soon after made in France against Russia. The difference between France and Russia, it is generally stated, was caused by Napoleon's annexing the territory of several members of the confederation of the Rhine to France. Among these was the duke of Oldenburg, who refused to take Erfurt, with the territory appertaining to it, in exchange for his duchy, and preferred to retire to the court of the emperor of Russia, his near relation. But, in fact, the chief cause of the war between France and Russia was, that Alexander would not adhere so strictly to the continental system as he had promised to do at Erfurt. Napoleon thought that peace could not be obtained but by carrying this system through. He had made too many sacrifices already, in maintaining it, to be willing to give it up. Moreover, he saw that the two empires would necessarily come to war as soon as Russia should attempt to execute her plans upon Constantinople, which western Europe could not permit. Napoleon was then at the head of such a force as he might never again be able to

command, and thought it a great object to prevent the execution of the projects of the Russian colossus. The formidableness of this gigantic power to the west of Europe, and the necessity of clipping the wings of its ambition, are now sufficiently apparent. But Napoleon foresaw not the burning of Moscow, and the great impulse given thereby to the Russian people. The winter, which set in several weeks earlier than usual, did the rest. The battalions of the French and allied armies assembled in Germany and Poland. The Prussian fortresses and Dantzic were still occupied by the French. Napoleon left St. Cloud May 9. In Dresden he collected around him the German kings and princes, the emperor and empress of Austria. June 24, he led his army across the Niemen. Thus began the war with Russia. He called it the second Polish war. (See RussianGerman War of 1812-15, forming a division of the article Russia.) Napoleon's genius, however, shone amidst his reverses, and amazes even amidst the horrors of the passage of the Berezina (November 26 and 27). How striking is the twenty-ninth bulletin, of December 3! The battle of Leipsic, on the 16th, 17th and 18th of October, displayed all his talent, but its consequences were most disastrous to him. All his energies were called into action in the series of conficts between the Marne and Seine, in February and March, 1814. In spite of the entreaties of all who surrounded him, he refused to make peace. (See Chatillon, Congress at.) Several of his ministers, who thought his ruin certain, considered it prudent to provide, in time, for themselves, especially Talleyrand. They assisted the enemy on their way to Paris. The senate, too, formerly so submissive, rose against the emperor, and the insecurity of absolute power was strikingly demonstrated. Marmont, at last, abandoned his master. (See Marmont.) April 11, 1814, Napoleon signed the act of abdication, and the treaty, which left him the island of Elba, with sovereign power, the title of emperor, and an income of 2,000,000 francs. He abdicated with the words, "The allied powers having proclaimed that the emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the reestablishment of peace in Europe, the emperor Napoleon, faithful to his principles, declares that he renounces, for himself and his heirs, the thrones of France and Italy, because there is no personal sacrifice, even that of his life, which he is not

ready to make, for the welfare of France, and for the peace of the world." At this point we may consider the history of the empire as, in the main, closed, and pause for a moment. The time has not yet arrived when Napoleon can be coolly estimated. It must be left to future generations to consider calmly his whole career, undisturbed by personal or party feeling, and unembarrassed by the multitude of details which now prevent the true bearing of his measures from being seen. The opinions now entertained respecting him may be classed, we think, under the following heads: 1. That he was a usurper. This charge is preferred by two very different parties; a. by the adherents of legitimacy, who think his noblest course would have been to play the part of general Monk. We need not discuss this point, in this country, and in the year 1832. b. The charge of usurpation is also made by some republicans. We have already observed that, up to the time when Napoleon took the reins of government, no republic can be said to have existed in France. We need then only ask, whether the tendency of France was towards a republic, and whether Napoleon ought to have lent his power to establish it, provided he could have seen the possibility of its permanence. The forms of governments, important as they are, are but secondary compared to the primary elements of national character and political condition, and are always dependent on the latter. The preservation of the new politico-social relations was first to be attended to. If a republic was incompatible with justice, safety of person and property, internal peace, or national independence, the former ought to have given way to the latter. We believe there are few people of judgment who, at present, maintain that, at that period, a republic would have comported with the internal and external relations of France. Firmly attached as we are to republican institutions, we yet must admit that, as there must be a difference in the habitations of men, according to the materials which they possess for their construction, so governments must differ with the character and condition of the governed. Republics cannot exist without republicanism, and republicanism cannot be created by the forms of a constitution, but springs, in a great measure, from the nature of men's relations in ordinary life. Those forms of social connexion which are favorable to this spirit, it is, of course, the duty of every lover of liberty to

promote. 2. There are some who admire Napoleon, and acknowledge that he did much good to France, but maintain that his own genius and success led him astray; that by degrees he deviated from the principle which had elevated him, and afforded the only firm basis of his power; and that he gradually gave way to principles which must ruin him; that, moreover, he laid the foundations of numerous institutions which, if they had been developed, would have brought in again many of those evils which the revolution had just removed; and that he omitted to lay the foundation of those institutions which, if developed, would have produced that wide-spread political and social activity, on which true liberty can alone rest; but, on the contrary, deprived the nation of free action, and organized the whole body politic less in a civil than in a military manner; and that ambition, so natural to noble and elevated souls, overpowered him. 3. Lastly, there are those who insist upon Napoleon's having sincerely wished for peace; that he had no desire for renewing war after the peace of Luneville and of Amiens, but that he was forced to war by the unrelenting attacks of the aristocracy of Europe, supported by the money of England, which was itself ruled by its own aristocracy, who expected that Napoleon would exhaust France, and exasperate Europe, by continual conflicts. As his repeated of fers of peace were spurned, he was unable, they say, to establish in France institutions in accordance with free principles, which he sincerely wished to establish, and which he must have been desirous of establishing from his love of posthumous fame, and from his knowledge of the character of his age, in which authority could no longer be maintained merely by brute force, but required the support of public opinion. They sum up the whole history of the empire in these few words: "Napoleon was forced to war by the English, and to the dictatorship by the war." Napoleon used, not unfrequently, to say to his confidants, "If a general peace is ever concluded, then only shall I be able to show myself such as I am, and become the moderator of Europe. France is enabled, by her high civilization, and the absence of all aristocracy, to moderate the extreme demands of the two principles which divide the world, by placing herself between them, thus preventing a general conflagration, of which none of us could reasonably expect to see the end, or guess the issue: for 50

VOL. X.

that, I want ten years' peace, and the English oligarchy will not allow it." We quote his brother Joseph, as one to whom he disclosed himself in this way repeatedly. The latest events are melancholy commentaries in favor of Napoleon, whether we do or do not approve entirely of his course, considering what the internal state of France, as well as what the condition of Europe, required. We return to our brief biographical sketch. On the island of Elba, Napoleon occupied himself with literature, and the construction of public works; and whilst he was observing the discord of the European powers at the congress of Vienna, and the blind folly manifested by the Bourbons in France, the court papers of Paris represented him as mad! We are unable to state what caused him to return from Elba precisely at the time when he did. He embarked, February 26, 1815, with 900 men, and landed, March 1, at Cannes, not far from Frejus, where he had landed sixteen years before, on his return from Egypt; and his march to Paris at this time might well be compared to his former journey. On the voyage, he had written a proclamation, which set forth the reasons of his return, and of which he caused many copies to be made. Without encountering any royal troops, he advanced rapidly. March 7th, he first met a body of royal troops, commanded by Labédoyère, who could not prevent them from joining Napoleon's guards. The same evening, the gates of Grenoble were opened to him. Lyons was entered on the evening of the 10th. On the 13th, marshal Ney (q. v.) went over to him; and March 20th he reached Paris, which Louis XVIII had left in haste, an event which plainly showed, that the great majority of the French were against the Bourbons, and several distinguished persons, who had been always unwilling to rally round Napoleon, now joined him, either considering his return indispensable, or at least the return of the Bourbons as the greatest evil which could befall France. The royalists now became liberals, and preached the cause of liberty against the tyrant! The monarchs assembled at Vienna declared Napoleon out of the pale of national law, as the Bourbons had already given orders to hunt him down (courir sus), as the expression was, by which Napoleon was put on the same footing with the lowest criminal. Whilst he was exerting himself to collect and organize an army, he caused the "additional act" to be added to the constitutions of the empire. In the preamble of this "ad

ditional act," which is, in several respects, more liberal than the charter of the Bourbons of 1814, he declares that his object had been to establish a federative system over the continent of Europe, and that he had, on this account, delayed the developement of individual liberty in France; but that "henceforth he has no other object than to promote the welfare of France by giving security to liberty." (See Peers.) The battle of Waterloo (q. v.) defeated all his plans and hopes. He returned to Paris June 21, where, at the requisition of the representatives, he abdicated, on the 22d; but this time not for himself and his heirs, but in favor of his son, Napoleon II, which abdication, of course, was not accepted by the allied powers, who had not ceased to acknowledge the Bourbons as rulers of France, though they were little disposed to make any great effort to support the elder branch of this line, if the French should prove unwilling to receive them. Napoleon retired to Malmaison, and, after some days, to Rochefort, where he found the frigates, destined for him, ready, but the harbor closely blockaded by the English. He wished to embark for the U. States. (See Joseph Napoleon.) July 3, the capital surrendered to the enemy, and Napoleon was exposed to be given up to the Bourbons by Fouché or Talleyrand. At the same time, being prevented from sailing, he asked, July 10, the commander of the British ship Bellerophon, which lay off the port of Rochefort, what he had to expect if he claimed the hospitality of the English. The answer was, that the commands of the admiral should be obtained. On the 14th, Napoleon sent once more to the British commander, who answered, that he had not yet received orders, but that he was authorized, if Napoleon would embark immediately for England, to carry him thither, and to show him every respect due to his rank. Napoleon accepted the offer, and, despatching general Gourgaud to the prince regent, with a letter, comparing his own fate to that of Themistocles, he went on board, July 16; and the vessel immediately sailed for Torbay, where he was informed, on the part of the English government, that he was to be conveyed as a prisoner to St. Helena. On that island he lived from October 18, 1815, to May 5, 1821, at Longwood, receiving from the English the title of "general Bonaparte," and watched by the commissioners of the allies, as a European prisoner of state. Napoleon was voluntarily accompanied by general Bertrand,

with his wife and child; count Montholon, with his wife and child; count Las Cases, with his son, who was obliged to leave him in 1817; general Gourgaud, who returned to Europe in 1818; and by several servants. Napoleon's life at St. Helena has disarmed the hatred of many of his contemporaries, while it has increased the respect of his adherents. He maintained his character in the miseries of exile as in the palace of the Tuileries. All the persons who served him at St. Helena treated him as emperor; and he appreciated and returned their fidelity with feelings of gratitude and friendship. The governor of the island, sir Hudson Lowe, watched him with unsparing rigor; but Napoleon still exhibited the immovable firmness which had previously distinguished him. In no respect would he concede to the English the right to dispose of his person. When his physician, O'Meara, was ordered to leave him, by the English governor, he remained for some months without medical aid: the prayers of his attendants, and the daily declining state of his health, could not induce him to admit a physician sent by the English governor. When he was no longer permitted to go abroad without military escort, he never left his habitation. His principal employment was the composition of his memoirs. For recreation, he played chess, or some one read to him, chiefly tragedies. In the confidential circle, he spoke of his childhood and his fate with the calmness with which he would have spoken of the history of antiquity. Of the French at St. Helena, Napoleon was the most serene. He entertained for his son the most tender affection; of France he spoke only with respect and love. His sickness first assumed a dangerous character in the last six weeks of his life. According to the English physicians, who opened his body in the presence of the physician Antommarchi, sent to Napoleon from Italy, it was occasioned by a cancer of the stomach. Napoleon was aware that his death was approaching, and spoke of it frequently and with composure. When he heard from the physician that he had but forty-eight hours to live, he asked general Bertrand to assist him in making his will, which occupied them both about fifteen hours. His last dispositions contain several proofs of gratitude and kindness. At the hour of his death, no change was visible in his countenance. He expired-on the field-bed which he had used at Austerlitz-with calmness, in the