the only interpretation which, consistently with this idea, we can adopt is, the imputation of sin. The congregation laid their hands on the blasphemer, and the witnesses on Susanna, in order, in both cases, to discharge upon the guilty individual the burden of sin which, unexpiated, rested upon the whole body. And if in the third instance, that of the Levites, we cannot connect with the transaction the notion of sin, yet that of substitution is plainly expressed: the Levites were taken instead of the firstborn of Israel; and to symbolize this substitution, the people laid their hands upon them, and they became the Lord's property.

Finally, Jewish tradition, if it is to be allowed any weight, is entirely in favour of the vicarious import of the ceremony under consideration. Let the following testimonies from Outram suffice: "The comment of R. Levi Ben Gerson on these words, And Aaron and his sons shall put their hands on the head of the bullock,' is, This was the imposition of their both hands, and was designed to indicate, that their sins were removed from themselves, and transferred to this animal.' The same author remarks on another passage: The imposition of hands was a tacit declaration on the part of every offerer, that he removed his sins from himself, and transferred them to that animal.' To the same purpose is the language of Isaac Ben Arama: 'Whenever any one sins through ignorance, or even with knowledge, he transfers his sins from himself, and lays them upon the head of his victim. And this is the design of those confessions, I have sinned, I have been rebellious, I have done perversely; as appears from the confessions of the high priest pronounced over the bullock sacrificed as his sin-offering on the day of atonement.' Among other observations respecting the bullock sacrificed as a sin

offering for the whole congregation, Abarbinel says, 'After the confession, the sins of the children of Israel rested upon him.' him.' Whence we may infer it to have been the opinion of this Rabbi, that those sins, of which solemn confession was made over a piacular victim, devolved upon the victim immediately on that confession." De Sac. D. i. c. 22. s. 5.

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ON THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.

Page 141, line 28. that doctrine of imputation, both of sin and of righteousness.] That the vicarious efficacy of Christ's sacrifice depends upon the representative character of Christ Himself is obvious: He cannot be said to have died for, or instead of, man, if He did not stand towards man in the relation of a federal Head, whose acts were to have an influence on the condition of the whole race, or at least of that portion of it which constitutes His Church. That in Scripture Adam and Christ stand opposed to each other in this capacity admits not of doubt: it appears from the appellations, "first man" and "second man," by which St. Paul designates each respectively (1 Cor. xv. 47.); and from the parallel, but contrary, effects which flow from connexion with each. "As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin... much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many;" "As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the

obedience of one shall many be made righteous." Rom. v. 12-19. The plain and obvious sense of these passages is, that as the race was implicated in the sin of the first man and its consequences, so it is affected by the obedience, active and passive, of the second man; the sin of Adam, and the righteousness of Christ, being the sources, respectively, of death and life to the world. More than this the Apostle does not expressly assert in this passage; but even this is enough to establish the Augustinian view, in its general features, as contrasted with that which bears the name of Pelagius.

The Pelagian theory regards mankind as a collection of individuals, isolated and independent, or affecting each other only in the way of teaching or example: not as an organized whole, propagating itself. Each man comes on the stage of life, free to stand or to fall; and, though placed in a disadvantageous position, owing to the prevalence of evil in the world, which is a matter of fact and cannot be denied, not otherwise incapacitated from working out his salvation. According to Augustin, the human race forms a whole, the separate members of which are connected together by their common relation to one stock, in the qualities of which they all participate; as the leaves and branches of a tree form an organized system, and spring from one root. Which of the two views is most accordant with the mind of St. Paul can hardly be a matter of doubt. Let it be granted, that he does not explicitly affirm that the guilt of Adam's transgression is imputed to his posterity; let it be admitted, that the Vulgate rendering of ¿4' ☀ návres «μagtov, in quo omnes peccaverunt, will not stand the test of criticism; it is enough that St. Paul recognises a causal, and not a mere typical, connexion between Adam's transgression and the general corruption of mankind,

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a federal relation between our first parent and his posterity. "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." It may be remarked, however, that it is not easy to reconcile the Apostle's expressions, or the facts of the case, with the supposition that the corruption of nature which we derive from Adam does not, in God's sight, partake of the nature of guilt. Death is the punishment of sin; where then death reigns, as St. Paul argues, there must be sin, sin meriting punishment: but "death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression;" that is, against a positive law. From the principle which he lays down in ver. 13, that "sin is not imputed where there is no law," it might be supposed that the death which reigned over adults in the interval between Adam and Moses was the penalty, not of actual, but of original, sin; but even if this interpretation be rejected, the case of infants still remains, who cannot have committed actual sin, and yet are liable to death. On what grounds are we to explain this fact? If we suppose that the race, irrespectively of the sins of individuals, inherits guilt, as well as corruption of nature, in consequence of the fall, it is accounted for; otherwise it remains a mystery. And this is a case in which we must make our choice between difficulties. If it is "at variance with our first notions of the moral nature of God"" to suppose that He regards as guilty those who have never committed actual sin, it is equally, we should think, to us unaccountable that such beings should suffer pain, sickness, and death. But since this latter is a fact, by no means more intelligible than the doctrine of imputation, we are reduced to the conclusion that our reasonings against St. Paul's doctrine are fallacious, if we could Jowett, vol. ii. p. 167.

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only discover where the fallacy lies; and that if we knew all, we should perceive that it is not irreconcileable with God's attributes that the human race should so far be identified with its progenitor as to derive from him both corruption and guilt. Meanwhile it may be observed, that this notion is by no means contradictory to natural reason. The imputation of guilt may be compared to the effect of our ancient laws of attainder, by which a whole family was, for the crime of its ancestors, subjected to various civil disqualifications; i. e. was treated as guilty, though innocent of the offence in question, or of any other the derivation of an inherent "fault or corruption" of nature has its analogy in the transmission of diseases, and even moral dispositions, from father to son. It may be observed too, that the difficulty is not alleviated by interpreting the Apostle's expressions to signify merely temporal death. Let it be granted, that no one will be punished everlastingly, save for his own personal sins; yet temporal death is assuredly of the nature of a punishment, and we know that beings innocent of actual sin (infants) suffer it; through the sin of Adam the race has suffered the forfeiture of immortality: it is obvious that the objections and difficulties which may be urged against Augustin's doctrine of the penal consequences of original sin in another world, apply equally to this more limited view. The apparent injustice is the same under either supposition.

The imputation of Christ's righteousness is the correlative of that of Adam's sin; and by the latter, according to St. Paul, we are to explain the former. As through Adam's transgression we bring into the world a corrupt nature, and so, antecedently to actual sin, lie under a spiritual attainder; so by new birth we become interested in a righteousness not originally wrought out by