heritance. For where a covenant is made by sacrifice, there is a necessity that the death of the appointed sacrifice be produced: for, according to the practice of God and man, a covenant is made firm over dead sacrifices; seeing it never hath force whilst the goat, calf, or bullock, appointed as the sacrifice of ratification, liveth; because from the beginning God ratified his covenants by sacrifice, to preserve among men the expectation of the sacrifice of his Son: hence not even the covenant at Sinai was made without sacrifice of blood.”—Macknight in Scott, in loco.

Such interpretation entirely nullifies any value or merit in the atonement; and this, moreover, in the part of Scripture where that doctrine is expressly handled, or has its proper and principal seat. It becomes no longer a condition, but a confirmation; which is clearly quite contrary to the context, Heb. ix. 22, "Without shedding of blood there is no remission : " which makes it not only a condition, but the only condition.

How much better is the statement of Polhil. "Christ was not a mere witness, but a Priest, Redeemer, and Mediator: his blood was not only a testimony, but a propitiation. Neither was it only confirmative of the covenant, but fundative. All the promises of grace and glory spring up out of his satisfactory and meritorious passion."-Polhil's Divine Truths, p. 51.

"Intercession is an act or exercise of Christ's sacerdotal office, subsequent to and dependent upon his foregoing sacrifice."-H. Hurst's Revival of Grace.

Scott continues as follows: "It appears to me that the original will admit of this interpretation. But the nature of this work does not admit of my enlarging on the criticisms by which it is supported. On the one hand, the cavils which have been raised against the Apostle's reasoning as inconclusive, if the first interpretation be adopted; and, on the other hand, the venerable names which have sanctioned it; with other circumstances of a similar nature, render me afraid of too confidently preferring either interpretation. I cannot, however, but think that the latter exposition is the most obvious, and consonant to the Apostle's general way of reasoning."-Scott in loco.

As to the rendering of diatheké, Witsius says, p. 43, "It both singularly and plurally very often denotes a testament; as Budæus shews in his Comment, Sing. Græc. from Isocrates, Æschines, Demosthenes, and others. In this sense we hinted it was used by the Apostle, Heb. ix. 15."- Witsius on the Covenants, p. 43.

What Dr. Owen advances on Heb. viii. 6, to prove that the Old cannot mean the Adamic covenant, is also important on this point.

"The covenant called afterwards the first, was diatheké,

a testament; so it is here called. It was such a covenant as was a testament also. Now there can be no testament but there must be death for the confirmation of it; Heb. ix. 16. But in the making of the covenant with Adam, there was not the death of any thing whence it might be called a testament; but there was the death of beasts in sacrifice, on the confirmation of the covenant at Sinai; as we shall see afterwards. And it must be observed, that although I use the name of a covenant, as we have rendered the word diatheké, because the true signification of that word will more properly occur to us in another place: yet I do not understand thereby a covenant, properly and strictly so called; but such a one as hath the nature of a testament also, wherein the good things of him that makes it are bequeathed unto them for whom they are designed. Neither the word used constantly by the Apostle in this argument, nor the design of his discourse, will admit of any other covenant to be understood in this place. Whereas, therefore, the first covenant made with Adam was in no sense a testament also, it cannot be here intended."-Owen on Heb. vol. vi. p. 74.

We have an unexceptionable witness in Dr.Macknight himself, who says: "I acknowledge that in classical Greek diatheké commonly signifies a testament." And I believe I might add, that suntheke is invariably used for covenant, or a deed to which there are two or more parties. But this proves nothing; for the Hebrew word bereth is by the LXX. (except in Deut. ix. 15) invariably rendered by diatheké; which is the only word in the New Testament to express either testament, covenant, or bereth, when quoted from the Old Testament.

He

Gill on Heb. ix. 16 gives some curious information. says, "The covenant of grace, as administered under the Gospel dispensation, is a testament, or will." He adds, "The Jews have adopted the Greek word here used into their language, and pronounce it ", and by it understand a dying man's last will and testament.' He goes on, "The covenant of grace is properly a covenant to Christ, and a testament or will to his people."-Gill in loco.

I have thus given the several views of divines on the subject, at considerable length; being anxious that the fact, of our not having yet received the new covenant, should be inferred rather from the conflicting opinions concerning how we are under it, than that, in the first place, it should be inferred directly from Scripture. For thus is shewn the real difficulty to be overcome; and not simply, that, in order to establish peculiar tenets, a plausible gloss is proposed in the place of some equally probable interpretation. It will also be shewn, that these discordant views may in great measure be reconciled, by an interpretation more according to common sense respecting the nature of a

covenant, and more analagous to the common faith respecting the nature of the testaments.

In the first place, it does not appear that Adam was under a covenant of works. His conformity was a conformity of holiness, and not of righteousness; a conformity to the Divine image, and not to an arbitrary law. Bishop Hopkins says: "Holiness is not the same with righteousness, strictly and properly taken; for righteousness, properly, is rather a denomination arising from the conformity of actions to their rule, than either the principle or substance of the actions themselves: for that is righteous which is right; and that is right which is agreeable to the rule by which it is measured. Even in Adam, whose holiness was perfect, yet was there this difference between it and his righteousness, at least in our clear conceptions: that his grace, as it was conformable to its pattern, viz. the purity of God, so it was his holiness; but as it stood in conformity to the law of God, so it was his righteousness. For, in strict propriety of speech, the rule of holiness is different from the rule of righteousness holiness is measured by similitude to God, righteousness by conformity to the law."-Bishop Hopkins, Prelim. Obs. to the Covenants.

99.66

Now Adam's law of righteousness was a negation, "Thou shalt not eat :" and indeed it appears to me of great consequence to notice this, in considering the origin of evil. Had Adam's transgression proceeded from a breach of holiness, it would shew that God had not "created man in his own image," very good," or upright. And this would give sin an efficient, and not only a deficient cause; thereby charging God foolishly, in making him the author of sin. And hence we find Adam's transgression was a breach of righteousness, in a law that did not affect holiness, or the image of God in his attributes. Then, with Adam before the fall I do not think it can be said there was a covenant : "For where an obligation to a duty is natural subordination, there it cannot be strictly and properly fœderal, or arising from a covenant."-Bishop Hopkins, Introd. to the Covenants.

Roberts, who, as far as I can discern, expresses the common opinions, says, "God covenanted with Adam, not explicitly, but implicitly. In the explicit threat of death in case of disobedience, was an implicit promise of life in case of obedience: of which the sacramental trees were symbolical; the one for confirmation in obedience, the other for exploration of obedience."-Roberts, &c.

But to their view I cannot accede: for, First, here is an inference drawn which by no means appears a necessary consequent: a threat in case of disobedience, in no way implies a reward of obedience. The converse of the threat of death, is

no more than the retention of the life he had in present possession. As Roberts himself well expresses it, "Adam was immortal in innocency, not by an inability of dying, but by an ability of not dying.....Adam before the fall had an immortal life....his soul being in itself immortal, and his body....having a remote capacity of dying, and yet an immediate ability of not dying."

Secondly, here is an assumption which appears equally unfounded; namely, that a threat and promise compose a covenant, without consulting the option of the parties. Riccalton opposes the general notion in a manner to which I can fully subscribe: "It has been, I know not how, in a manner taken for granted, that, after continuing for some time under probation (how long none have pretended to say, but some time or other), he (Adam) should have been transplanted into a state much like that, if not the very same, which believers in Christ have the well-founded prospect of. We may surely say, that all this is mere guessing, as there is not the least shadow of any promise or grant of life, much less of such a life, found in the record. He needed no grant of the life he was in possession of. But even that, he had no promise of being continued to him, except what was implied in the terms on which he held it. But in the denunciation solemnly made to him, That in the day he should eat of the fruit he should be subjected to death, there seems to be a plain enough intimation, that his present happiness was not to be perpetual; as we are sure, by the event, it was never designed it should be."-Riccalton's Works, vol. ii. p. 60.

I do therefore affirm, that this test of negative obedience cannot be called a covenant of works. Nor can it be considered synonymous with the law of works; "The man that doeth these things shall live by them." And, indeed, in their very nature a law and a covenant appear to be opposed: the one is the command of a superior; the other, if not a mutual agreement, is at least a voluntary obligation.

I rather incline to believe, that by eating the tree of life was intended an eternal confirmation in the state in which he was; either of sinless perfection, prior to the fall; or of eternal condemnation, subsequent to the fall. Adam might have united himself to the " Word"" in whom was life," as a head of sustentation, as did the elect angels. And was in mercy kept from eating the tree of life after transgression; as, had he done so, he must have remained in eternal condemnation; as "the angels who kept not their first estate." His eating" the tree of knowledge of good and evil," was unfolding the law of righteousness in its power and positive precept. The very existence of a law implies the experimental knowledge of good and evil as the devil most truly said, " God doth know that in the day ye çat

:

thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," Gen. iii. 5; and this the Lord confirms ver. 22. They therefore, prior to the fall, did not know good and evil; were not susceptible of evil; their natural bias was to good only. Here again Riccalton is my support: " Adam had no such law given him as was afterward, when sin had entered; no duties either of religion or morality enjoined him. He needed none, for he was a law to himself. He needed only follow the dictates and inclinations of his own perfect constitution, which would naturally determine him to all those offices of love to his great Friend and Benefactor, which would of course have brought all other duties along with it."-Riccalton's Works, vol. ii. p. 64.

However, I will not involve this with the present question, but refer those who may differ to my former quotation from Owen, to prove that the old covenant could not mean the covenant with Adam.

I hold, in the next place, that the covenant of grace is no distinctive term. The Creator cannot covenant with the creature for the performance of that for which he has not given the creature a capacity: it would be "charging God foolishly;" it would be saying, "I knew that thou wert austere, reaping where thou hast not sown," &c. Of course, by saying "God cannot, I mean, It is impossible with God to "act contrary to his attributes that he cannot do contradictories; is not impotence, but power and perfection." (Polhil's Divine Truths, p. 100.) Then, if God only demands that for which he has given a capacity of performance, all promised reward in case of obedience is of grace: if he bind himself to obligation, it is of grace; for "after we have done all, we are unprofitable servants; we have only done that which is our duty to do." There is no such expression in Scripture as the covenant of grace; but, apparently, it is so called to be opposed to the law of works; which is made a covenant of, and called a covenant of works: then the covenant of grace is called the new covenant; and the Mosaic testament is called the old covenant, and so confounded with the law of works before the fall. Thus by fallacy within fallacy the present system of the covenants is upheld.

But I would say further, that there is no such covenant as that intended by the term "covenant of grace," but only the covenant called by divines the covenant of redemption. For this I have the direct support of Dr. Gill, in Heb. vii. 22: "Jesus was made surety of a better testament.' It is a testament....which was confirmed, and comes to God's children by the death of Christ, the testator: and a covenant, it being a compact or agreement made by the Father with Christ, as the representative of all the elect." And again, speaking of the present dispensation, which he calls the new covenant, he says: