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rational to teach him reading, or even spelling; and seeing this, I felt the necessity of leading children from their earliest infancy to a rational view of all things, by presenting them in a manner calculated to draw forth the action of the different faculties upon every object. But I saw likewise, how difficult it is, in the present state of things, to find men, who without the help of art, are capable of leading children in this manner; and I was deeply impressed with the want of 'intuitive elementary books,' by the aid of which, long before the spelling-book comes on, children might be made acquainted with those objects, of which they are to learn the names, either by their being exhibited to them in reality, or represented in good models and drawings.

"Experience entirely confirmed this notion. A mother, full of interest for the education of her child, intrusted me with the instruction of her little boy, then hardly three years of age. I saw him, for some time, an hour every day; and with him, too, I was merely, as it were, feeling the pulse of the method: I tried to convert letters, figures, and whatever else was at hand, into means of instruction; that is to say, I led him to form, concerning every object, distinct notions, and to express these notions clearly in language. I made him state positively, what he knew of every object; its colour, its parts, its position, its shape, its number. Very soon I was obliged to lay aside the alphabet, that first torment of youth; he felt no interest in those dead signs; he would have nothing but things, or pictures of things; and, in a short time, he was enabled to express himself distinctly respecting any objects within the sphere of his knowledge. He gathered general information from the street, from the garden, and from the house; and, upon the basis of clear and self-acquired notions, he soon learned to pronounce correctly even the most difficult names of plants and animals. Nay, by comparing objects entirely unknown to him, with such as he was acquainted with, he was able to form of them a definite idea; and though I am aware, that this attempt led to many deviations from the straight course, by directing his attention to foreign and distant objects, at the expense of realities, present before his eyes, yet it threw a good deal of light upon the means of enlivening the child's faculties, and inducing him to independent exertion for the preservation and increase of his powers.

"But independently of this mistake, the experiment I made with this boy could not be decisive as to the earliest beginning of instruction; for this reason, that he had already been allowed to pass in comparative inactivity the three first years of his life; a period during which, I am convinced, nature urges upon the child's consciousness an immense variety of objects. All that is wanted is, that we should watch the operations of the mind, and follow them by connecting language with every idea of which the child has become conscious; that he may acquire the highest possible degree of clearness, and be enabled, on one hand, to connect the elements of art and science with the teachings of nature, and, on the other hand, to make the

teachings of nature the key to whatever of art and science it may be expedient to teach him hereafter. Both the power and the experience of children are considerably advanced even at that age; but our schools, perfectly regardless as they are of all that passes in children's minds, are, in fact, nothing else than well-contrived machines for the suffocation of life, in which all that has been developed under the guiding hand of nature, is marred or destroyed."

We do not wish to follow Pestalozzi through a Philippic, which is here added, against the artificial systems of education, and against the mischief they produce by undoing the "work of nature;" but we would rather employ our space in offering some explanations on a point which it is absolutely necessary to clear up, in order to avoid a very essential misunderstanding which might otherwise arise in the minds of some of our readers. It will be found throughout the writings of Pestalozzi, and many others of his countrymen, that a great stress is laid upon what is by them termed "nature." This term occurs in a variety of phrases, such as, "the voice of nature," "the goodness of nature,' ""the law of human nature," "the pure impulse of nature," and others of the like description. Now it so happens that the term "nature," in this acceptation, clashes most unfortunately with the meaning attached to it, with reference to the condition of the human soul, in the theological language of English divines; and as there is no point in which men are commonly less inclined, than in religious matters, to abstract from their habitual terms and inculcated notions, and to weigh the terms of a stranger with his own balance, a most unpropitious inference has been drawn, respecting the religious principles of those men, in whose writings such expressions are found. To remedy, if possible, the consequences of this misapprehension; and, at all events, to prevent it from militating against whatever good may be effected by the publication of the present volume; we think it right to state here the result of our observation on this point, which, as it is founded upon personal intercourse with both nations, and a familiar acquaintance with their characteristic modes of thought and

ITS GERMAN MEANING.

J177 expression, may, perhaps, have some weight with our readers in counterbalancing the effects of long-cherished prejudice.

'Nature," in the metaphysical language of German writers, means, in the first instance, "that which God has made, as he has made it." Hence it signifies the whole comprehension of created things, material and immaterial; and, in this sense, the production of divine power and wisdom, as well as the object of their constant operation. It signifies further, the essence and constitution of any being, individually, such as it was established by the will of God; thus, the term "human nature" is to be generally understood of the organic structure, composed of soul and body, which is called man, in its original state, as it came from the hand of the Creator; whereas its present degraded condition, and corrupt tendency, would be called the unnature of man rather than his nature. In a sense analogous to the last mentioned, the term "Divine nature" is frequently used to denote the essential character of the Deity, as fixed by the immutable and self-imposed necessity of his own perfection. Even so far as this goes, it is clear that the German language attaches to the term "nature" a more extensive and more primitive meaning than the English. But there is still another acceptation, in which it is used by German writers, and which bears more directly upon our present subject. By "nature" they designate not only that which the power of God has produced, but also that power itself. "Nature" is to them, in every creature, He by whom it was made, through whom, and in whom it is, and moves, and has its being. In this sense "human nature," or rather the "man-nature," if it were literally translated, frequently signifies that universal power of life, as operating and manifesting itself in man; or in Scripture language, him, in whom was life, that life which was the light of man. With this explanation of the term it can appear neither strange, nor heterodox, that "the voice of nature," "the goodness of human nature," "the law of human nature," "the pure impulse of nature," should incessantly be appealed to as the great source of healing, by

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VAGUENESS OF THE GERMAN WRITERS.

which the ills of our unnature, our corrupted and degraded condition, are to be cured.

"But," will objectors here ask, "if the German writers mean all this, by the term 'nature,' why do they not express it in the direct terms of Scripture? why make use of a term which seems to involve so much vagueness and uncertainty and which seems calculated to throw darkness rather than light on the subject?"

This question might fairly be retorted, by asking: “Are there in the English language, nay in the language of the 'religious world' in England, no terms of merely human sanction, for which Scripture might furnish more adequate expressions? Is there no vagueness, no room for doubt or equivocation left ?"

But we do not wish to evade the question; we speak not in vindication, but merely in explanation. We are perfectly willing to admit, that the term "nature," as used by the German writers, involves a good deal of vagueness, that it is more the expression of a mysterious something, than of an idea, or of a being, clearly apprehended; and that it has the disadvantage of leading the mind to rest satisfied with an obscure notion which has the appearance, rather than the reality, of knowledge. Nay, we are prepared to go farther in our admission, by stating it as our belief, that most of the German writers who have employed the term, if they were pushed to a point on the subject, would find themselves involved in some difficulties and inconsistencies arising out of the vague use of a word of so comprehensive a meaning, and of such a variety of acceptations.

It is but just and fair, on the other hand, to state that this vagueness and uncertainty would by no means be so striking and obnoxious to a German as to an English ear; owing to a characteristic difference in the religious development of the two nations. There does not exist in Germany, nor in fact in any other country of the world, that acuteness of distinction and precision of language, in doctrinal matters, which

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we find in England; sometimes to that degree of hair-splitting refinement which belongs more to the scribe and the sophist, than to the Christian without guile. In Germany, on the contrary, there is, under an outward carelessness about forms, and a general indifference concerning doctrinal distinctions, an internal regard for the spirit of religion, a feeling of piety, of sincerity, and uprightness, which is less common, and less intense, in other nations. We are far from advocating the indifference about doctrine of the Germans; nor do we quarrel with the higher interest evinced for it in this country. As regards principles, we do think, that too much stress cannot be laid upon doctrine; and, abstracting from the tenets of sectarians and ultra-sectarians, we think the advanced state of doctrinal development in England so far desirable that, if it were accompanied with a proportionate increase of religious feeling, of internal piety, of humility, and charity, we should give to this nation the decided preference over all others in matters of religion. On the other hand, while we believe that the Germans,-to become progressive in religion, from being stationary, which they have been, or nearly so, since the Reformation,-must turn their attention to doctrine much more than they have done, we cannot help regretting that justice is not done to their religious feelings by those who have taken upon themselves, as cosmopolite inquisitors, to investigate "the state of faith" in Germany.

Having thus given our view of this matter, we have only to add, as regards the point more immediately in question, viz. the use of the term "nature" in Pestalozzi's writings, that, as we have no express authority for representing him as having held this or that particular doctrine, we must be contented to let the reader take his own choice of three explanations, one of which must necessarily be correct and the two other false.

That which is termed "nature," and appealed to as a power of life, as a good and holy power, by Pestalozzi, is ascribed by him to all men, universally, and pointed out as the great lever of education; as the source of knowledge and