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“ Waterland modernizes Tertullian." Ib., p. 63. Dr. Pusey does the same, I think, when he argues that the ancient writer could not have separated the new birth from receplion of the Spirit. (Script. Views, pp. 152–4, and Lib. of the Fathers, 10, p. 263.) From T.'s own language, it seems clear enough that he did separate them; that he believed the soul to be reformed by water and supernal virtue first, informed by the Spirit afterwards; the tenement to be prepared before the Divine Tenant entered. His words are (I give Dr. P.'s own translation, only changing water for waters, as more literal), “ Thus man, who had aforetime been in the image of God, will be restored to God after his likeness, &c. For he receiveth again that Spirit of God, which he had then received by his breathing upon him, but had afterwards lost by sin. Not that we obtain the Holy Spirit in the waters, but being cleansed in the water, under the Angel, we are prepared for the Holy Spirit.” To make his plain meaning doubly plain, he adds, “For thus was John aforetime the forerunner of the Lord, preparing his way." I do not forget that, in those days, Anointing and Imposition of hands were immediate adjuncts of Baptism, and T. affirms that in them “ the Spirit descends upon the flesh;" but to call them parts of Baptism, is surely to use a deceptive phrase ; if they were component parts, the Church could not have detached them from that which they helped to constitute ; they are either distinct sacraments, or no sacraments, in the higher sense here in question, at all. On this and other points Tertullian's doctrine of baptism differs essentially, as it seems to me, from that which is now set forth as the doctrine of the Fathers,—which was the doctrine of some of them. True it is, that such a separation of ideas as I have ascribed to Tertullian argues an utter want of metaphysical insight into the ideas themselves; but I believe that in the early times of Christianity there was this want of insight in Christian writers; Hermas, the inspired Shepherd, as Irenæus and others then thought him, separates ideas still more strangely, and his strange separation seems to be adopted by Clemens Alexandrinus ! (Hefele’s edit., p. 224, with extract in note from Strom. II., p. 452.)
“ tacit establishment.” Ib., p. 73. I mean silent as to its coincidence with Luther's doctrine. But Mr. N. expressly admits that Luther is “ in the right” with regard to “the exact and philosophical relation of justification to sanctification,” and “prefers” his statement, scientifically considered, to that of St. Austin ; Luther himself considered St. Augustin to be substantially of his mind in the matter. See Table Talk, p. 211. Truly as now Mr. N. teaches a “ rationalistic Romanism," so formerly he taught a Lutherano-Anglicanism; he never has succeeded in blinding his mind's eye to one whole side of truth.
His literary genius and intellectual power are as apparent in his last work as ever ; but it is one thing to walk in the high road, and quite another to make paths in an untrodden territory.
“ faith justifies before and without charity.” Ib., 83. In Gal. ii., 16, the grace, charity, is so connected with deeds of charity, bona opera, that it is not easy to tell, from the author's mere words, whether he meant the former by itself, or as incarnated in the latter, when he says, hæc fides sine et ante charitatem justificat. But, even if he meant that faith justifies before the inward grace of charity, this is but asserting that priority of faith, in the order of thought, which the mind cannot reject,—which is involved in the Tridentine saying, that faith is the rool of all justification; for the root is before the stem and branches. Faith justifies before outward charity in time; before inward charity in order of nature. Mr. Newman asks, in reference to Melancthon's and Calvin's statements on this point, “ what is the difference between saying, that faith is not justifying unless love or holiness be with it, or with Bellarmine, that it is not so, unless love be in it ?" Answer, none at all, if in be taken merely to denote the relative situation of love and faith in the human mind. But that is not the point; the point is, does the justifying power belong to faith, as faith, or does love help it to justify? By denying that faith is informed with charity, Luther only meant to deny that it is rendered justifying by charity. Mr. N. himself teaches that faith has the exclusive privilege of connecting the soul with Christ, and thus implicitly denies, that love is in it for the purpose of such connexion ; while to works he seems to ascribe another sort of justifying power. What Luther meant to insist upon is, that it is the apprehension of Christ that justifies rather than any quality of the mind considered as such. “substituted for general renovation.” Ib.,
p. 80. Mr. Ward holds it a sure sign of moral corruptness in Luther's doctrine of faith, that it is proposed as affording relief to the conscience. But how does it propose this ? By deadening the conscience ? No, but by giving it rest. He giveth his beloved rest; but they must be His beloved who can obtain this rest, according to Luther. It proposes to relieve the conscience by substituting simple faith in Christ as the means and instrument of justification, which includes righteousness and spiritual peace, for outward works of penance as the preparatory means. His opponents affirm that such performances are the way to true Faith; but this Luther denied; he thought that men might go on all their lives obeying a priest's prescriptions, yet never turn to God with their whole heart and soul, but be kept walking to and fro in a vain shadow; he saw too that spiritual physicians often acted selfishly, making a worldly
profit of the means without the least real desire to promote the end, or render the patient independent of their costly services; that they even hid the Gospel, lest men should see by its light how, under God, to heal themselves. He denounced the whole system not merely as liable to corruption, but as certainly, in the long run, involving it, being based on untruth and mere human policy. The cross of the Christian profession, in the Bible, is wrapped up in Christian duty strictly performed; the Papist makes a separate thing of it, and thus converts it into an engine of superstition.
So wenig er auch bestimmt seyn mag, andere zu belehren, so wünscht er doch sich denen mitzutheilen, die er sich gleichgesinnt weiss (oder hofft), deren Anzahl aber in der Breite der Welt zerstreut ist ; er wünscht sein Verhältniss zu den áltesten Freunden dadurch wieder anzuknüpfen, mit neuen es fortzusetzen, und in der letzen Generation sich wieder andere für seine übrige Lebenszeit zu gewinnen. Er wünscht der Jugend die Umwege zu ersparen, auf denen er sich selbst verirrte.
(Goethe. Einleitung in die Propyläen.)
TRANSLATION. Little call as he may have to instruct others, he wishes nevertheless to open out his heart to such as he either knows or hopes to be of like mind with himself, but who are widely scattered in the world : he wishes to knit anew his connexions with his oldest friends, to continue those recently formed, and to win other friends among the rising generation for the remaining course of his life. He wishes to spare the young those circuitous paths, on which he himself had lost his way.
Motives to the present work-Reception of the Author's first publication
Discipline of his taste at school-Effect of contemporary writers on youthful minds—Bowles's Sonnets-Comparison between the poets
before and since Pope. It has been my lot to have had my name introduced both in conversation and in print more frequently than I find it easy to explain, whether I consider the fewness, unimportance, and limited circulation of my writings, or the retirement and distance, in which I have lived, both from the literary and political world. Most often has it been connected with some charge which I could not acknowledge, or some principle which I had never entertained. Nevertheless, had I had no other motive or incitement, the reader would not have been troubled with this exculpation. What my additional
purposes were, will be seen in the following pages. It will be found that the least of what I have written concerns myself personally. I have used the narration chiefly for the purpose of giving a continuity to the work, in part for the sake of miscellaneous reflections suggested to me by particular events, but still more as introductory to a statement of my principles in Politics, Religion, and Philosophy, and an application of the rules, deduced from philosophical principles, to poetry and criticism. But of the objects which I proposed to myself, it was not the least important to effect, as far as possible, a settlement of the long continued controversy concerning the true nature of poetic diction; and at the same time to define with the utmost