value every thing in God's kingdom, according to its real worth: and is that a mistake? Perhaps the Doctor means to say, that the mistake 'of some believers consists in this, viz., they hold that they must surrender their personal interest, when it becomes incompatible with the personal interest of those more valuable in the scale of being than themselves. If there be any meaning in what he says about "the mistake," it must be this, though he does not say it. But wherein is the mistake of this sentiment? If there be two interests, a greater and a less, which are incompatible with each other, is it a mistake to hold that the less ought to be given up for the sake of the greater? If there are two vessels at sea, one containing a hundred, and the other a thousand souls, and one or the other of them must be lost at sea; would any man be at a loss to say which of them ought to sink? A wonderful mistake, indeed!!! If my neighbour's value, in the scale of being, be equal to a hundred, and mine equal to ten, and the personal interest of one or the other of us must be given up, is it difficult to say whose ought to be given up? Suppose, for example, that the Doctor himself was worth a hundred, and I but ten, and the interest of one or the other of us must be given up, and the Doctor himself was to set in judgment on the question -would he not, with his usual volubility, say, "I am worth ten times as much as he, therefore the less must be sacrificed to the greater?" And suppose, finally, I myself were to be the judge of that question, would my interest in the matter alter the nature of justice? Ought I to save ten, and destroy a hundred, because the ten are mine? Reader, read and judge.

But how does the Doctor make this wonderful mistake appear? His argument, which ought, at least, to make him master of the magicians, is worthy to be had in everlasting remembrance, as a specimen of triangular metaphysics. He takes up a whole large octavo page in saying that we have no "graduated scale" whereby to measure the value of each other. And what then? Who says we have? Does our want of a " graduated scale" to measure the comparative value of men alter or impair the above-mentioned rule of valuation? The governor of the world has that scale of valuation always before him; and he has given us reason and sense, or, at least, some of us, to perceive the

above rule of valuation to be equitable and necessary to be used in all cases where a less object comes in absolute competition with a greater. For no other reason does he punish the wicked, but because their happiness is absolutely incompatible with the happiness of an infinitely greater sum of being.

Which of all the believers, (Hopkinsians he might say,) whom he accuses of a mistake, ever supposed that we had in our hands the "graduated scale?" But we can perceive and demonstrate, the principle of equitable valuation, and of its application to all cases, where a greater and a less good stand in competition or repugnancy to each other. But his most curious argument, to make out the "mistake" is, that if a believer in fact, could make this valuation-"if on fair impartial examination of the pretensions of others and his own, he is constrained to judge that he is of more value than others, and claims his right, as such, he will be considered vain, assuming, and arrogant, by all who understand human nature.” A wonderful stroke, indeed!-What if he is considered "vain, assuming, and arrogant, by all who understand human nature, does that help to prove the mistake?" If his judgment be correct, as the writer grants, it is the judgment of God; and eternal justice will keep him in countenance though "all who understand human nature think him vain, arrogant, and assuming."

But, would not his argument have appeared better if he had said, "by all who do not understand human nature?" For I am sure that no man who understands human nature could think him vain, arrogant, and assuming, for claiming his rights which resulted from a fair impartial comparison and valuation.

The sum of the argument, provided sense can be extracted from a series of sentences, which, as they stand, amount apparently to nothing, is,

1. That, where two interests, a greater and a less, are absolutely repugnant to each other, that the less must be sacrificed to the greater, is a "mistake."

2. This mistake is made out by two grand arguments; first, that mankind have no "graduated scale" of valuation; and, secondly, that if they had, and could absolutely discover which the greater and which the less interest was, it would not do for

them to give a just and equitable decision, for fear of being thought "vain, arrogant, and assuming," by all who understand human nature. "A Warburton in controversy!!!

On page 282, the Doctor is so good as to tell us whence this mistake orignates. A very clever thing in him.

"The mistake of which I am speaking," says he, "originates in the idea that virtue or holiness consists, not in choosing and performing every duty in its place, but merely in the love of being, in general." An origin worty of the "mistake!" I ask the reader, in what respect these two definitions of virtue are inconsistent with each other? Does not he who loves being, in general, perform every duty in its place?—and who so likely as he to do it? Does not God love being, in general? God is love; but love must have an object; and what does God love? Is not the love of being a duty in every Christian ?—and does not he who loves being, in general, do that duty "in its place ?” And does not he who loves God, and angels, and men-yea, his friends, and his enemies, do all these duties in their places? What duty, my good Doctor, is not included in love; since love worketh no ill to his neighbour, and is the fulfilling of the law? But, Reader, Reader, the secret of all this metaphysical bungling, and Jesuitical twisting, for argument it cannot be called, still lies behind. There is, in all this harangue about the "mistake," no case stated-nothing made plain-nothing refuted—no mistake discoverable at the mast-head with a first-rate spy-glass. Though supremely miserable and contemptible in point of argument, as every reader must perceive, there was a design in it; which design did not fail of its effect. The design was to impress the minds of the hearers of that sermon, that certain people held to monstrous errors :—to make them believe that these people pretend to carry about them "a graduated scale," to measure every one's value by; that when they have found that one man is more valuable than another, they pretend that the man of minor valne must, of course, surrender up all his religious rights or interest to him who is of superior value; and that without any apparent motive, reason, cause, or provocation, but merely because the other is of most value.

And for the origin of this wondrous "mistake," what is it?

Why, some people hold that virtue does not consist in doing every duty in its place, but in the love of being, in general. Gog and Magog! what metaphysics. Suppose the love of being, in general, is a duty, do they not do it in its place? Does not he who loves God supremely, and his neighbour as himself, love being, in general, and do duty in its place? And will any one deny that that is the first of all duties? Whoever does that, does the sum of duty, for love is the fulfilling of the law. From whom are we to expect the performance of duty in the detail, if not from him who is thoroughly imbued in the first grand principles of duty and virtue ?

"Since, then," continues the Doctor, p. 284, "it is obviously impracticable to ascertain the precise value of different persons, why should we tamper with the moral sensibilities of our nature, by making our impartial love to them the test and evidence of a gracious state?" Was ever a declaration so barefaced, or so impious? More than this could scarcely have been expected from the of Thomas Paine. It is an open and bold attack on the law of God.

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"Since, then." The reader perceives this to be an inference. But what conclusion does he draw from what premises? He had been arguing that some were in a mistake, because they supposed that a little being must give up all his interest to a great one, merely on account of his superiority; and without giving the reader a glimpse of any rational opinion ever held by any mortal, or confuting it by one rational argument: in short, he effectually tangles down three or four pages of words and sentences, and only enables the reader to conjure out the idea, that he is trying to overthrow some horrible Hopkinsian error, and then comes this inference, in nowise connected with any thing preceding, that since we cannot measure the value of beings, therefore we must not tamper with the sensibilities of our nature by making impartial love to our neighbour an evidence of grace. He that loves his neighbour as himself loves him impartially, and the phrase can mean nothing else. All this senseless jargon of several pages has for its sole object to destroy this precept of the law; since he begins, by saying, that precept required a man to love his neighbour as

extensively and forcibly as the design of the Jewish economy, and the character of the Jewish people, would permit: a complete annihilation of it, as to Christians; and closes by declaring, that, to require a man to love his neighbour impartially, is a useless tampering with the sensibilities of his nature.

If this is not tampering with the law of God, I do not understand the meaning of the term.

I trust I have redeemed my pledge, in relation to my first allegation, to wit, that correct instructions are not given in the triangular pulpits of the city. Far be it from me to say that they preach no truth. Their sermons are not without excellent paragraphs; and these occur, as observed in a former number, when, forgetting themselves and their theories, they give a loose to their better feelings, and break fairly out of the triangle. They then are known sometimes to tamper with a man's selfish sensibilities, so far as to point out to him his duty, his obligations, his danger, and his remedy. But so long as they preserve self-consistency, and keep to the triangle, no matter whether it be scalene, isosceles, equilateral, or rectangular, their instructions are incorrect.

Though the reign of superstition and astrology is past away, and, with it, the belief of fortunate and unfortunate days, yet you have doubtless observed, that states and empires, and the most important institutions, both civil and religious, have their crises, their moments of highest interest and import, on which their destiny turns, and from which may be traced their misfortunes or felicity-their prosperity or decline. I cannot but feel