infinitely wise God could not possibly have influenced all mankind to continue in their obedience, as the elect angels have done, without destroying their liberty? God will order it so,

But the sinfulness of the act (which is often expressed by the shorter word sin) cannot possibly proceed except from some defect, which therefore must be a negative cause, and which no more needs the divine will for its production, than does mere nihility need it. The idea of perfection and of will, is positive; but that of imperfection and of permission is negative. And as perfection admits of degrees, considered as existing in creatures, so does the want of perfection. The former is the effect of divine will, but the latter needs no will, nor can admit any. Nay, for a creature to exist without any want of perfection, is the same as a self-sufficient creature, (for then alone could he be without imperfection,) which is infinitely absurd.

We may further observe, that if there were nothing good in an act concretive. ly sinful, no evil could attach to such act; for what is moral evil, if not the perversion of that which is naturally good? If the natural powers and their acts, abstractedly considered, were not in themselves good, moral evil would be impossible. And were there no negative cause, or some kind of defect in the agent, all his acts would be morally as well as physically good, and that infallibly, as those of the absolutely perfect Being. In the Deity there is no defect of any kind, nor any negative cause of any effects or consequences; and therefore no liability to moral evil.

But how can we conceive of a negative cause, affording a demonstration of an ineffable consequence? Is there any thing analogous to it in the nature of things? And if there be, what importance can be attached to it? Let us coolly endeavour to furnish a reply to these questions. We can easily conceive of a mathematical point. and it is universally allowed that it has no dimensions-it has neither length, breadth, nor thickness-and therefore is a negative idea. It implies a negation of every thing that has positive existence It is therefore pure nihility under a relative consideration. But though in itself it is nothing positive, yet that nothing, when it stands related to a line which has positive length, becomes a source of innumerable demonstrations. For, if we take into the account, together with a point, a circumference of equal radii, we have the positive idea of a circle, composed of a centre and circumference. And without this relation subsisting between a relative nothing and a positive something, the idea of a circle is not possible; and consequently the ideas of the properties of a circle (which are innumerable) are absolute impossibilities So nearly allied and so perfectly similar, are the very first principles of geometrical and metaphysical science. For, as without the negative idea of a mathematical point, (for points are the boundaries of lines,) constituting an adequate reason of an infallible consequence, not a single demonstration in geometry can be effected; so without the negative idea of passive power, as the opposite to that power which is active and positive, not one demonstration properly so called, can be effected in metaphysical and moral science. This may appear to some a bold assertion; but it is not more bold than true. He who would dispute the fact, may just as well dispute the truth of the very first definition in geometrical science, viz. that of a point. He may indeed raise objec→ tions, and plead that we can see a point, therefore it must have some dimensions; or, if it be nothing, it can be no cause, no adequate reason of any thing as a consequence, &c. but if he attempts seriously to vindicate his objection by argument, he cannot avoid showing himself perfectly ridiculous to those who understand the subject. And equally ridiculous must he appear who would attempt to disprove the fact of negative causation in moral science.

But how can we admit that there may be two co-existent causes in the same subject, one positive and the other negative? We are obliged to admit it from a due consideration of stubborn facts. For what fact can be more plain, than that from the same agent may, and actually do proceed, effects, virtue and vice, which are diametrically opposite to each other? And surely such effects must proceed from opposite causes. If therefore virtue proceeds from a positive

that the saints and angels in heaven never will sin; and does it therefore follow, that their liberty is destroyed, and that they

cause, as all must allow, vice must proceed from a negative causality. This evidence is demonstrative. Yet, the inquisitive may ask, is there any phenomenon in the nature of things analogous to this? Though an answer to this question is not necessary to the end of establishing the fact, it may serve, ex abundanti, for illustration. For this purpose, then, we may appeal to a mathematical line, which has positive length, with a negation of breadth; and without this negative causality no geometrical demonstration can be established. And the same may be said of a plane superficies, the boundaries of which are lines. Thus a negative causality enters into every geometrical demonstration, in conjunction with what is positive. But the reader should keep in mind that these instances are adduced for illustration, not professed proofs of the dectrine. The latter is founded on direct evidence from the very nature of God and that of a creature.

That a comparative defect is a negative cause, in the sense before explained, is evident, when we consider (as before intimated) that in no creature can it be found without a comparative good, conjoined with it; and that in free agents this good, which consists chiefly in the natural intellect and will, is capable of opposite directions, one conformable to rectitude and another opposed to it. Now, it is clearly impossible that these directions, one for the chief good, and the other against it, should proceed from the same cause, whether good or bad. The direction of the will towards rectitude cannot be caused by defect, any more than something positive can proceed from nihility. Nor can the directions of the will against rectitude be caused by perfection of any kind or degree. But intellect and will in all beings, whether original or derived, are perfections, and therefore cannot be the cause of a direction against perfection; for then there would be a cause repugnant to itself, which is impossible The wrong choice, therefore, which is a wrong direction of the will, must proceed from a negative cause; for in causes there is no medium between positive and negative.

But though infinite perfection cannot be the cause of imperfection of any kind or degree, for reasons which have been already adduced, yet perfection affords occasion, an innocent occasion, for imperfection to show itself, by way of contrast. Thus, if absolute perfection were to produce no creature, no occasion would be afforded for comparative imperfection to show itself; and without the latter, moral evil would be impossible. The inference, therefore, is irrefragable, that moral evil originates from a negative causality, or that defect in the agent, which is the want of ulterior perfection. Yet here it may be proper to add, as of the utmost importance to be taken into the account, that though effects may proceed from negative causes, as well as from positive, and with equal certainty, yet there is this important difference; the former is only hypothetical, the latter absolute, originally considered. The first cause is positive existence independent of will, and unconditional, and every other positive cause must emanate from the first will; but a negative cause, consisting in defect, cannot possibly take place, with respect to causality, but on condition, viz. the condition of a created nature, and that of permission in the explained sense of the word. A positive cause may counteract the tendency of a negative one, but not

vice versa.

Hence is derived the proper notion of permitting moral evil to take place; the negative cause is not hindered from taking effect, for reasons infinitely good and wise. But to represent this permission, or sufferance, as willing or decreeing the negative as well as the positive part of sin, is an infinite absurdity; for the sinfulness of an act being the direct opposite to infinite perfection, such representation makes infinite perfection to oppose itself. Thus all good, in every degree-every quantum of created nature, from the greatest to the least, together with all positive and active causality—are from God. "He is light," knowledge, and purity, "and with him there is no darkness at all," no ignorance, no want of holiness. And thus also all moral evil proceeds from the offender, who is the subject at once of a quantum of derived, and therefore liVOL. VII.

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are not free, but forced in their actions? does it follow, that they are turned into blocks as the Arminians say the Calvinists'

mited perfection, and of comparative defect. And these two things (perfection and defect) enter into the very notion of a created nature.

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Is it necessary to say any thing more in confirmation of the general theorem, that there is in the human mind a negative causality, from whence may flow a certainty of consequence? It inay tend to the further satisfaction of the reader, if we advert to another argument founded on the nature of free will. The term "will" designates a power of the mind which is positive and active; but the term "free," connected with it, expresses a negative idea. For it expresses, when properly used, the absence of coercion and restraint, but in different respects. The complex idea of free will" is resolved into this plain proposition, the will is free; that is, the will is not constrained in one respect, and is not restrained in another. It is neither decretively constrained to evil, nor decretively restrained from good. No other freedom can be predicated of the will as the cause of moral effects. And it is as much a relative nothing as a mathematical point. We may therefore safely affirm, that among the countless millions of moral effects, which take place, not only among men but also in the created universe of free agents, there is not one but what is beholden to a negative causality for its existence, in connexion with what is positive. For, if freedom be excluded, no act can have a moral quality.

To conclude this note, which has already exceeded the limits at first intended, we must observe once more, and it cannot be too strongly inculcated, that there is no case or circumstance in which moral evil might not be prevented by the supreme will, were it employed for that purpose. For as God is all sufficient, and as his control over his creatures, for their good, is absolute; his power to effect a prevention of moral evil is undoubted. Nor can there be any question that this power, in pursuance of divine decrees, does in fact, and in instances which to us are inconceivably numerous, counteract the tendencies of negative causes to prevent moral evil. But if it be required, why in any instances it is permitted to take place, when God might with infinite ease prevent it? It is sufficient here to say that God is infinitely wise, as well as powerful, and equitable as well as benevolent. But a further answer to this inquiry would lead us to consider the ultimate reasons of moral government, or why a moral system is at all established; and the question has been already discussed in the first volume of this work, to which the reader is referred.

COROLLARIES.

1. Negative causality, in connexion with what is positive, is an essential Principle of moral science. If either be excluded, we can have no clear and adequate idea of any moral act, much less a demonstration of its cause.

2. These two principles relatively connected, furnish us with sufficient data, and the only sufficient ones, for a demonstrative solution of this problem, What is the origin of moral evil?

3. In these principles we have the means of demonstrating the origin of all evil whatever, as well as of all good.

4. We may further infer, that Mr. Locke was not mistaken, when he said, "I am bold to think, that morality is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics." Essay B. III. chap. xi. 16. And again, "The idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of ourselves, as understanding, rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations-as might place morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration: wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences, as incontestable as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one who will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one, as he does to the other of these sciences." B. IV. chap. iii. § 18. Once more, "This gave me the confidence

doctrines turn men? God decrees all the good that ever comes to pass; and then there certainly will come to pass no more good, than he has absolutely decreed to cause; and there certainly and infallibly will no more believe, no more be godly, no more be saved, than God has decreed that he will cause to believe, and cause to be godly, and will save. If God, from all eternity, knew that such and such things were future, then they were future; and consequently the proposition was from all eternity true, that such a thing, at such a time, would be. And it is as much impossible that a thing should be future, without some reason of its being future, as that it should actually be, without some reason why it is. It is as perfectly unreasonable to suppose, that this proposition should be true, viz. such a thing will be, or is to be, without a reason why it is true; as it is that this proposition should be true, such a thing actually is, or has been, without some reason why that is true, or why that thing exists. My meaning is, that it does not remain a question; but the matter is decided, whether the proposition shall be true or not.-The, thing, in its own nature, is not necessary, but only possible; and therefore it is not of itself that it is future; it is not of itself in a state of futurition, if I may so speak,

to advance that conjecture, which I suggested, chap. 3. viz. That morality is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics. And I doubt not but if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave to a considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics which have been demonstrated to him.". B. IV. chap. xii § 8.

5. As geometrical evidence proceeds upon the supposition of points, lines, angles, &c. and the province of the demonstration is to show the consequence resulting from the supposition; so, the above stated principles afford the means of demonstrating moral consequences, on the supposition of effects being given to show their necessary causes, or of causes being given to show their necessary effects. If the quantum of moral good, or of moral evil, in any given act, be supposed, the business of a demonstration is to show the relative proportion it bears to its appropriate cause or causes: Or, on the other hand, if the quantum of causal influence be supposed, to show as a demonstrative consequence, the nature and relative proportion of moral good or evil in the act. This is the true province of moral science, as contradistinguished from conjectural observations and a set of rules. These, in their proper place, have an important use for the purpose of moral conduct; but they can by no means furnish data for scientific knowledge.

6. There is one inference more that must not be omitted, viz. that the true principles and demonstrative consequences of moral science are incomparably more important in themselves, and ought to be more interesting to all mankind, than any others: because they lead us in a more direct manner than any others to the knowledge of God and ourselves. They point out to us at once the sources of good and evil, happiness and misery; they afford motives for devout affections of the noblest kind; and in proportion as they are properly applied, they stimulate to the practice of the sublimest virtues, and the most circumspect conduct. Without a divine revelation, indeed, it is highly probable, that the true principles and relations of moral science could never have been discovered by mankind; but that circumstance, while it has no tendency to depreciate the evidence, demands our gratitude to him who is the only source of "every good, and every perfect gift."-W.

but only in a state of possibility; and there must be some cause to bring it out of a state of mere possibility, into a state of futurition. It cannot be chance or mere accident: that is con. trary to every rational supposition. For it is to be supposed, that there is some reason for it, and that something does decide it. If there be any thing that comes to pass by mere accident, that comes to pass of itself without any reason.

§ 13. The first objection of the Arminians is, that the divine decree infringes on the creature's liberty. In answer to this objection, we may observe some things to show what is the true notion of liberty, and the absurdity of their notion of liberty. Their notion is, that there is a sovereignty in the will, and that the will determines itself, so that its determination to choose or refuse this or that is primarily within itself; which description of liberty implies a self-contradiction. For it supposes the will, in its first act, choosing or refusing to be determined by itself; which implies that there is an antecedent act of the will to that first act, determining that act. -For, if the will determines its own first act, then there must be an act of the will before that first act, (for that determining is acting,) which is a contradiction. There can be no fallacy in this; for we know that if the will determines its own act, it does not determine it without acting. Therefore, here is this contradiction, viz. that there is an act of the will before the first act, There is an act of the will determining what it shall choose, before the first act of choice; which is as much as to say, that there is an act of volition before the first act of volition. For the will's determining what it will choose, is choosing, is willing. Therefore I inquire what determines that first act of the will, viz. its determination of its own act? It must be answered, according to their scheme, that it is the will by a foregoing act. Here, again, we have the same contradiction, viz. that the first act of the will is determined by an act that is before that first act. If the will determines itself, or determines its own choice, the meaning of it must be, if there be any meaning belonging to it, that the will determines how it will choose; and that it chooses according to that determination how to choose, or is directed in choosing by its own determination. But then I would inquire, whether that first determination, that directs the choice, be not itself an act or a volition ; and if so, I would inquire what determines that act? Is it another determination still prior to that in the order of nature? then I would inquire, what determines the first act or determination of all? If the will, in its act of willing or choosing, determines or directs itself how to choose, then there is something done by the will prior to its act of choosing that is determined, viz. its determining or directing itself how to choose. This act determining or directing, must be something besides or distinct from the