Vid. Tertull. adv. Marc. i. 13. they without a wife hand, by a cafual running together of atoms, or whatever senseless matter, be fo ordered, as for fix thousand years together to perfift in the same places, and retain the fame periods of time, in their motion, without any fenfible alteration? He that can think it, may think any thing, and it were in vain to endeavour to confute him: how much more reasonable is that heathen philofopher, who thus fpeaks; Effe præftantem aliquam, æternamque naturam et eam fufpiciendam, adorandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cœleftium cogit confiteris. But this argument is infinite and inexhaustible; as full and pregnant as is the world of creatures; each of which is a wonder, and proclaims the incomprehenfible wisdom, power, and goodness of its Maker to us: we cannot without stopping our eyes exclude that light of divine glory, which fills and illuftrates the world; without ftopping our ears we cannot but hear that universal shout (that real harmony of the spheres) which all creatures in heaven and Quocun- earth confent in utterance to his praife. Every ftar in eris, ibi il- heaven, every beaft upon earth, every plant, every minelum videbis ral, yea every stone; fome in a language very loud and tem tibi, exprefs proclaim, others in a more still and low (yet to an &c. Sence. attentive ear fufficiently audible and fignificant) ftrain do Pfal. xix. fpeak those most glorious properties of God; There is no que te flex Occurren Benef. iv. 8. Speech or language, where their voice is not heard; their accent is gone out through all the earth, and their words to Rom. i. 19. the ends of the world, as the Pfalmift fings. The rò yvwsòv TO OEO, as St. Paul fpeaks, the cognofcibility of God, is manifeft in and by them: and the invifible things of God, even his eternal power and divinity, are perceived by obferving the makes or conftitutions of the creatures in the world; as St. Paul's words may be rendered, with which I conclude this argument. 2dly. That there is a God, is proved by the general con Cic. ii. de Divin. Quod fi omnes mundi partes ita conftitutæ funt, ut neque ad ufum meliores potuerint effe, neque ad fpeciem pulchriores, &c. De N. D. ii. p. 85. Kaλòv woixiapa ríxrovos copă. Eurip. de Mundo, apud Plut, de Plac. i. 6. fent of mankind concerning it; by that teftimonium, as Lactantius fpeaks, populorum atque gentium in una hac re Lact. i. 2. non diffidentium; that unanimous teftimony of all people and nations not disagreeing in this only point. If the authority of fome particular men, agreeing in vote, of one city, of one nation, doth pass for an argument, and fhews the thing probable, how can we decline or contemn the common fuffrage of mankind? He had need have a very clear and ftrong reafon for it, who will dare to diffent from all the world. Hear Seneca thus difcourfing; Multum Epift. 117. dare folemus præfumptioni omnium hominum; apud nos veritatis argumentum eft, aliquid omnibus videri; tanquam Deos effe fic colligimus, quod omnibus de Diis opinio infita eft; nec ulla gens ufquam eft adeo extra leges morefque projecta, ut non aliquos Deos credat : Cum de animarum Vid. Gr. de æternitate differimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet confenfus hominum, aut timentium inferos, aut colentium, ac P. ii. 20. That is, we are wont to attribute much to what all men prefume; it is an argument with us of truth, that any thing seems true to all: as that there be Gods, we hence collect, that all men have implanted in them an opinion concerning the Gods; neither is there any nation fo deftitute of laws and manners, that it doth not believe there be fome Gods. V. R. p. 37. 45. vid. p. 53. In like manner Cicero; Itaque inter omnes omnium gen- De Nat. D. tium fententia conftat: omnibus enim innatum eft, et in. p. 57. animo quafi infculptum, effe Deos: quales fint varium est, effe nemo negat: It is therefore an opinion manifeft among all men of all nations, and, as it were, engraven in their minds, that there be Gods: how qualified they are, there is a difference; that they are, none denies. Even Nelleius, the Epicurean, in his difputation against De N. D. i. creation and providence, yet acknowledges there are Gods, P. 22. being compelled, as he faith, by this argument; Cum Vid.Tufcul. enim non inftitulo aliquo, aut more, aut lege fit opinio conQ. i. p. 299. ftituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firme confentio, intelligi neceffe eft effe Deos, quoniam infitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus. De quo autem omnium natura confentit, id verum effe neceffe eft; effe igitur Deos confitendum eft, &c. For fince, faith he, not by any inftitution or custom or law this opinion is established, and among all (not excepting one) a firm confent doth abide, it is neceffary there fhould be Gods; because we have implanted, or rather inbred opinions of them. But about whatever thing all men naturally agree, that must needs be true; therefore we muft confefs there be Gods. De Calo, i. Ariftotle: Πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχεσιν ὑπόληψιν, 3. Cap. 6. πάντες τὸν ἀνωλάτῳ τῷ θείῳ τόπον ἀποδιδόασι και βάρβαροι κα XXEVES. That is, All men have an opinion concerning the Gods, and all men (both Barbarians and Greeks) do affign to the Divinity the highest place in the world, (viz. they believe his habitation to be in heaven.) The author of the book De Mundo, (attributed to Aristotle, and dedicated to Alexander the Great ;) 'Agxaïos μèv ἐν τις λόγος και πάτριός ἐςι, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἐκ Θεῖ τὰ πάντα, καὶ διὰ Θεῖ ἡμῖν συνέςηκεν. There is then indeed a certain ancient saying, and familiar to all men, That from God all things, and by God all things fubfift unto us. I allege these authorities, felected from many others producible to the fame purpose, from the wifeft heathens, (that is, from witneffes in this cause most impartial and unfuspected,) not only to strengthen the argument, but to evidence the matter of fact upon which it is grounded; to whose testimony all hiftories both ancient and modern do confent. Nor doth the force of this difcourfe rely merely upon the authority of mankind, thus confenting in opinion, (though that, as I faid, is not contemptible,) but upon a much more folid foundation; and that is, upon the manner of this opinion, its being produced in men, and propagated. That men should so conspire must neceffarily proceed either from that fuch an opinion was put into them by nature, (by way of natural notion or instinct, as the first most evident principles of science, and the most powerful inftincts (after what is good) are fuppofed innate,) at leaft a very near difpofition to entertain and embrace it; or that some very manifest and prevalent reason (obvious to all, even the most rude and barbarous) did beget this agreement in them; or that it was derived from fome common tradition, fome one common fountain of instruction to them. Be it which of thefe ways it will, that this opinion became fo univerfally inftilled into men's minds, the argument carries great weight and validity. If nature either plainly forces men, or ftrongly inclines them to this perfuafion, it is a vain extravagancy to oppose it; but if it came (as most probably to my seeming it did) from primitive tradition, it argues mankind to have proceeded from one stock, from fome one or few men at first gathered together; of whose original who could be more credible witneffes than themselves? If they did teftify and teach their pofterity that they came from God, why should we disbelieve them? especially seeing whence else should they come? Who fhould form their bodies, who should infuse their reasons, who should inftill this very notion into them, we cannot well imagine: of themselves they could not be, (what fuch thing as a man did we ever observe, or can we conceive, to spring up of itself?) nor is there any other caufe here, to which (without great fondnefs) we can attribute their original. It is true, that original tradi- Vid. Plat. tion did by degrees over the world (by the devil's malice and man's infirmity or wickedness) degenerate into many adva fhapes of polytheism and idolatry; but fo was Judaism, &c. depraved by the Scribes; and Christianity itself hath been much debased by a long courfe of bad times; yet who doubts but they both derived from one pure inftruction; that of Mofes, and this of Christ our Lord? It is very obfervable what Ariftotle hath concerning this matter, Metaph.xii. being spoken with fo much judgment: It was delivered 8. by our ancestors, faith he, and the ancients, being left in a fabulous dress to pofterity, that these are Gods, and that a Divinity contains all nature: but other things concerning religion were fictitiously fuperinduced, for the inveigling of the vulgar, and for accommodation of laws, and the public utility. Hence they speak of them as of having human fhape, or being like to other animals, and other things fuitable to these, and agreeable to what is fpoken; of which things, if we, making a feparation, take Tim. p. 1053. ἀδύνατον θεῶν παισὶν ἀπι only what was first delivered, that they thought the Gods the first fubftances, he may fuppofe it divinely spoken; feeing it is probable, every art and philofophy being invented, (as things would bear,) and afterward decayed, that fuch opinions as relics fhould be preserved even until now. The opinion of our fathers, and that which was derived from the first man, is therefore only thus far manifeft unto us. So Ariftotle expressly. To confirm which discourse, (and to prevent farther objections against it,) we may confider, that (however perhaps among fome very barbarous nations this tradition may have been almost worn out by time and men's stupid negligence) yet the most ancient hiftories (that of Mofes especially, the far most ancient of all, and in this matter to no man incredible) do attest that this opinion was most univerfal, running in a most strong and clear current among the eastern people, the Chaldeans, Phenicians, and Egyptians; who that they were moft ancient people, from whom the rest were propagated, the multitude of people, the antiquity of dominion, the use of letters, the rise of arts, the greater progrefs in all kind of civil culture, (all which things argue longer continuance in one place and ftate,) do plainly enough fhew; whofe confent therefore doth involve that of all men befide, and confirms this general opinion to arise from the clear fpring of our first parents' inftruction. I might add, the fame manner of worshipping God, (by invocation, by confulting him in way of oracle, by confecrating temples and altars, by vows and dedications, by facrifices and oblations,) which likewife men did anciently agree in, doth also argue that all religion did proceed from one fimple original institution, or inftruction common to all mankind. But I cannot infift upon and purfue every particularity. A third argument of God's exiftence is from the difcoveries of a divine power in works that cannot be ascribed Vid. Cic. de to any other caufe vifible or natural. Such are the preNat. p. 54. diction and prefignification of future events; (especially fuch as are contingent, and depend upon man's free choice;) curing the fick of great chronical distempers |