N. D.

Arift. de Mundo, cap. 7.

and fo do other philofophers; and fometime expressly they fignify their opinion to be, that there is but one. Cic. 1. de There are many popular gods, but one natural, Antifthenes faid in Tully: εἷς δὲ ὢν πολυώνυμος ἐςι, faith the author De Mundo. Being one in reality, he hath many names, according to the feveral affections he discovers, and the Sen. de Be- Operations he exerts: whom Seneca thus confents to; Quoties voles tibi licet aliter hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare: tot appellationes ejus effe poffunt, quot munera; hunc et liberum Patrem, et Herculem ac Mercuapud Grot. rium noftri putant; fic hanc naturam voca, fatum, fortu149. sis rais nam; omnia ejufdem Dei nomina funt varie utentis fua poàndia, teftate.

nef. iv. 7.

Vid. Lactant.

Vid. Sopho

clis dictum

excerpt. p.

εἷς ἐσιν Θεός,

&c. Notab.

arg. 10. de

But divine revelation doth most fully declare this truth: Marfil. Fic. I need not mention places; the whole Scripture doth Leg. Sed ne chiefly teach and inculcate it; That there is but one turbet quæ- maker and one governor of the world; to whom all venenumerus, ration and obedience is due: and to whom be all honour, quem non and glory, and worship for ever afcribed and paid, &c.

fo Deorum

turbat nu

merus an- Amen. gelorum.

Nihil enim

Platonem

apud nos

It was anciently objected by Celfus, and other adverplus apud faries of our religion, that Christianity did exact of men a tot poffunt blind, groundless belief*; that it condemned human wifDii, quam dom, banished understanding, and prohibited all inquiry; tot angeli, commanding men to fwallow its dictates without any previous examination or debate concerning the truth of * Ψιλὴν καὶ them ; impofing νόμους ἀναποδείκτους, laws uncapable of Orig. 1. proof, and inculcating this rule, μὴ ἐξέταζε, ἀλλὰ μόνον πίSeve: Do not examine, but only believe.

totque be

ati.

ἄλογον πίσιν.

The ground of this accufation seems to be a great miftake, proceeding from the not diftinguishing that belief, whereby we embrace Christianity itself in general and in grofs; and the belief, whereby we affent to the particular doctrines thereof, (especially such as concern matters fupernatural, and above the reach of our understanding to find out or comprehend.)

As for the first, that faith, whereby we embrace Chriftianity in the gross, I say, that Christianity doth not propound itself as immediately evident, nor requires a preci

pitate affent to it; but offers blind reafon for itself, and invites men to inquire, confider, and judge about its truth: never any religion was fo little liable to this cenfure; none ever fo freely expofed itself to a fair trial at the bar of reafon : it defires of men an εὐγνώμων ἐξέτασις, a candid and discreet examination for its fake and their own: other religions have for their juftification infifted upon the example of ancestors, and custom of times; their large extent and prevalence among many people; their establishment by civil laws, and the countenance of secular power; (arguments extrinfic to the matter, and very weak in themfelves,) declining all other teft or trial of reafon : and it is remarkable, how Celfus and those (who made the forefaid objection) did therein contradict themselves, when they Orig. v. p. affirm men ought, without fcruple, to conform to the re- 248, &c. ligion prescribed by the laws of their country, be they what they will, never fo abfurd or difhoneft: this is indeed an exacting of irrational belief; a ftifling of our understandings and muzzling our judgment; a requiring of men to yield their consent to innumerable most palpable falfehoods and inconfiftencies. The teachers and defenders of Christianity proceeded otherwife: confiding in the truth and reasonableness of their cause, they excited men to lay afide all unreasonable prejudices; to use their best underftandings; to apply themselves to an induftrious and impartial fearch of the truth: hear Lactantius fpeaking for Lib. ii. c. 7. the reft; Oportet in ea re maxime, in qua vitæ ratio versatur, fibi quemque confidere, fuoque judicio ac propriis fenfibus niti ad inveftigandam, et perpendendam veritatem, quam credentem alienis erroribus decipi tanquam ipfum rationis expertem dedit omnibus Deus pro virili portione fapientiam, ut et inaudita inveftigare poffent, et audita perpendere: that is; We ought especially, every one of us, in that matter, which chiefly concerns our life, to confide in ourselves; and rather with our own judgment and our proper fenfes strive to find out and weigh the truth, than, believing other men's errors, to be deceived as men void of reafon: God hath given all men their fhare of wifdom, that they might both inquire into what they hear,

and weigh it. So he disputing against the heathen credulity.

Thus doth Christianity call upon men to inquire into itself; yea it obliges them thereto : it propounds faith as a virtue highly commendable, (fuppofing it therefore voluntary and managed with reafon ;) for all virtue is is poαρετικὴ μετ ̓ ἀληθῶς λόγου, it is ἑκέσιος συγκατάθεσις, a voluntary affent, promifing ample rewards thereto; and infidelity it propounds as a vice very blameable, (and confequently very irrational,) threatening very fevere punishments thereto: it doth not inveigle men by fleight, nor compel them by force; but fairly perfuades them to embrace it: it doth not therefore avoid examination, nor difclaim the use of good reafon; but feeks and procures the one, cheerfully and confidently appeals to the other.

Indeed after it hath convinced men of its truth in general, having evidenced the truth and certainty of its fundamental principles, it then requires a full and cordial confent (without exception) to all its particular doctrines grounded upon them: when, I fay, it hath propounded fufficient reafon to fatisfy men's minds, that is grounded upon most folid principles, it then requires men to furcease farther doubt or fcruple concerning what it teaches: which is a most reasonable proceeding, and conformable to the method used in the strictest sciences: for the principles of any science being either demonftrated out of fome higher science, or evidenced by fit examples and experiments to common fenfe, and being thence admitted, it is afterward unlawful and abfurd to refufe the conclufions deduced from them: fo it having been proved that our principles are true; (viz. that God is perfectly veracious; and that Christian religion did proceed from him, and is built upon his atteftation;) it is a part of abfurd levity and felf-contradiction then to question any particular propofition evidently contained therein: and in this fenfe it is true, (and thus I take thofe Chriftians to be underftood * Vid. Orig. *who commend immediate faith, and exclude reason from being too busy in matters of religion, and discountenance curious inquiry; thus, I fay, it is true, that Christianity

pag. 9.

engages us to believe, without reafon or difpute. It will allow (yea it invites and exhorts) an infidel to confider and judge of its truth; but it will not allow a Christian to be fo vain and inconftant, as to question any particular of its doctrine: by doing so he renounces his faith, at least ceases to be a steady Christian.

Now the first principle of Christianity (common thereto and all other religions) is, that there is one God: the next, (which also no religion doth not acknowledge,) that God is perfectly veracious; or, that whatever appears to be afferted or attefted to by God is certainly true which two principles we have already proved by reasons proper and fufficient, we conceive, to fatisfy any well-disposed mind. A third principle is, that God is the author of the Christian doctrine in general; that it hath been revealed and impofed upon mankind by divine authority. And a fourth is, that thofe authorities and traditions upon which we ground, and by which we prove, (mediately or immediately,) the particular doctrines of Christianity to be truly such, (that is, admitting the former principle to have come from God,) are proper and fufficient to that purpose. These two latter principles involving matter of fact, and confequently being not evident in themselves, do (for a full conviction of a man's mind, and producing therein a folid perfuafion) require a rational probation; and that it may appear we believe like reasonable men, not upon wilful refolution, or by mere chance, (as Pagans and Mahometans, and other ignorant opinionifts do,) as alfo to confirm the grounds upon which the fubfequent articles or doctrines of faith are built, I fhall endeavour briefly to fhew the reasonableness of them; þeginning with the first, and advancing my difcourfe by several steps or degrees. And I obferve, that,

1. It is reasonable to fuppofe, that God fhould fometime reveal unto men the truth concerning himself, and concerning them, as they stand related toward him; (his nature and will; our state and duty;) his prime attributes perfuade thus much. It is most evident to common experience, that mankind, being left to itself, (in matters of

this nature especially,) is very infufficient to direct itself; it is apt to lie under a woful ignorance; to be poffeffed with vain conceit; to wander in doubt, and fall into error: it is fubject to all kind of delufion, which either the malice of wicked fpirits, or the fubtilty of naughty men, or the wildness of its own unruly paffions and defires, can bring it under; and confequently it is liable to incur all thofe fins, (difhonourable, hurtful, and deftructive to its nature,) and all those miseries, which from ignorance, error, and fin, do naturally fpring; (an estrangement especially from God, and his grievous displeasure :) we see that not only the generality of mankind did fometime lie in this fad condition, but that even the most elevated and refined wits, thofe among men, who by all poffible improvement of their reafon did endeavour to raise and refcue themselves from the common ignorance, mistakes, fuperftitions, and follies of the world, could by no means, in any good measure, attain their end: what did their diligent ftudies and inquiries produce, but diffatisfaction and perplexity of mind? wherein did their eager difputations conclude, but in irreconcileable differences of opinion, and greater uncertainty, than at firft? moft were plunged into a defperate scepticism; (a doubt and diffidence of all things;) none arrived higher, than fome faint conjectures, or some unsteady opinions, concerning those matters of highest Rom. i. 21. confequence: éμataiúdnoav ev tois diaλoyiopois: they were, Eph. iv. 17. as St. Paul obferved, made vain (were fruftrated and be

fooled) in their reasonings, and their foolish heart was 1 Cor. i. 21. darkened, &c. The world by wifdom did not know God:

could not attain to a requifite measure of knowledge in divine things. This being the natural state of men, destitute of divine help and direction, doth it not, I pray, greatly need another light to guide it in this darkness, a helpful hand to relieve it from these inconveniences? Can then that infinite goodness hear mankind groan under fo lamentable oppreffions, and not pity. it? Can he behold his own dear offspring, the flower of his creation, lying in fo comfortless, fo remedilefs a distress, without affording fome relief? Can fuch a spectacle delight that gracious