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and effects. Dr. Clarke undertakes to demonstrate that there is a first cause, by showing that an infinite series involves the absurdity of an existence without a cause. His argument is this: If we consider endless progression as one series by itself, it is plainfirst, that it has no cause of existence, ab extra, because the series contains within itself everything that ever was; and, secondly, that it has no cause of existence within itself, because not an individual of the series is self-existent or necessary. And where no part is necessary, the whole cannot be necessary. Therefore it is without a cause of its existence.' Now what does this vaunted demonstration really amount to? Simply to this: the atheistical hypothesis of an infinite series implies an existence without a cause; therefore the hypothesis is false; and there must be a first cause, Here we have a direct contradiction. It is self-evident, that a first cause cannot have had a previous cause. Dr. Clarke's demonstration, therefore, when strictly stated, is neither more nor less than this there can be no existence without a cause; therefore, there must have been an existence without a cause. The fact is, that a finite mind can form no adequate conception of infinite existence; and, so far from being capable of reasoning from it, is unable to comprehend the non-existence of a beginning. That which we call a first cause must be self-existent; for if brought into being by anything else, it could not be an original cause. Hence, our notion of a first cause necessarily involves the idea of an existence without a cause; and it is impossible to confute the Atheist by arguments derived from abstract causation; for, he answers, if the Deity can exist without a cause, the system of the universe may also exist without one.

Where principles, true in themselves, are received upon erroneous evidence, there is always some danger lest the inquiring mind should reject the conclusion upon discovering the falsehood of the premises. While its foundations are unsound, the temple will be insecure. When the intelligent student in moral science finds that Locke and Clarke pretend to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God, by abstract arguments and à priori reasonings, he will naturally, and almost necessarily infer, that these eminent Theists were ignorant of the principles of accurate and philosophic logic; or else, that the truths of natural religion are placed beyond the cognisance of the human faculties. But how few are competent to convict Locke and Clarke of errors in the conduct of the human understanding? and how many will be ready to rest upon the authority of those celebrated names, and to conclude, without further inquiry, that the principles which such intellects failed to prove cannot in themselves be true? therefore, of the last importance to the cause of religion, to point

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out the erroneous and unphilosophical mode of investigation adopted by the metaphysical Theists,

Who nobly take the high priori road,

And reason downward till we doubt of God.'

Natural theology is an inductive science. Our knowledge of the existence and attributes of God, as far as that knowledge is traceable by the light of nature, is acquired by an intellectual process strictly analogous, and exactly similar, to the intellectual process by which we acquire our knowledge of the laws of the physical world; but if the inductive philosophy is to be applied to theology, all metaphysical arguments from first causes, and from the supposed nature of things, must be banished, as contrary to the rules of sound investigation; and all the principles from which we reason must themselves be facts, ascertained by experience, and true in all the actual circumstances to which they can be traced. By this reasoning, Newton discovered the true system of the heavens; and it is only by this reasoning that the theist can ascertain, from the light of Nature, the existence and the attributes of Him who made the heavens. The proof of a divine intelligence ruling over the universe, is as full and as perfect as the proof that gravitation extends throughout the planetary system. Newton found by experience, that on our globe all bodies approach towards the earth, according to a certain law. On observing the heavens, he perceived that the motions of the planets corresponded exactly with those which the law of attraction was calculated to occasion in bodies placed respectively as they are in space; and thus he discovered, by a full and complete induction, that the principle of attraction, experienced on our globe, extends throughout the universe, and regulates the planetary movements. The inductive reasoning of the theist is identical with this. perience assures him of the general fact, that, in human affairs, intelligence produces regularity, order, and the aptitude of means to ends: he looks through nature, and observes, though in an infinitely higher degree, an order, a regularity, and a concurrence of means to ends, precisely similar in character to those which, in human affairs, he finds inseparably connected with intelligence; and hence, by an induction as full, and an analogy as conclusive as it is possible to conceive, he infers that intelligence pervades and governs the universe.

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This argument for the existence of God is open to no objection. It proceeds in strict conformity with the rules of the inductive philosophy. The principle, that in human affairs, order, regularity, and the concurrence of means to ends, are the effects of intelligence, is not a fictitious principle assumed for the sake of accounting for facts: it is in itself a fact—a general fact, true in

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all the individual cases which come within our experience, and therefore a principle, or law, as universal, wherever human agency extends, as is the law of gravitation experienced on the surface of our globe. If it be admitted that gravitation is the cause of the motions of the heavenly bodies, it cannot be consistently denied that intelligence is the cause of the regularity and order, and concurrence of means to ends, observable in the universe. If we apply to theology the inductive philosophy which Bacon directed to physics, it will be seen that the truths of natural religion rest on the same foundation as the truths of material science. When the philosophy of causes, and the metaphysical reasoning of the schools, shall be completely banished from theology, as they have already been from physical inquiry, the doctrine of theism will be consistently denied by those only who reject the Principia' of Newton.

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The present work of Dr. Crombie must be regarded as supplying an important desideratum in theological literature, inasmuch as in the popular and greatly celebrated treatise of Paley, the rules of logical investigation are not always strictly and consistently applied. Paley does not go to the bottom of his subject. His leading argument frequently involves a petitio principii. When he says, 'there cannot be a design without a designer-contrivance without a contriver,' he takes for granted that which he should prove. The atheist affirms, that in the series of events which we observe in nature there is neither design nor contrivance; and this affirmation cannot be disproved by the contrary affirmation of the theist, that design and contrivance exist. It is self-evident that there cannot be contrivance without a contriver-design without a designer. But the question at issue between the atheist and the theist is this,-Is there contrivance ?-is there design?-and no approach can be made towards the solution of this question by assuming that which is denied. Is the regular sequence of events observed in nature, the effect of contrivance, or of some other antecedent? This is the question.-How is it to be solved? Our experience does not extend to the origin of natural phenomena, and therefore we can have no right, as far as our direct and immediate experience is concerned, either to affirm or to deny what the origin of such phenomena may have been. In human affairs, however, we have direct and immediate experience, that intelligence and design are the origin of order, regularity, and the concurrence of means to ends; and from this fact, which we know to be true in itself, we infer, according to the strict principles of inductive logic, that intelligence and design are the origin, antecedent, or cause of the order, regularity, and concurrence of means to ends, which we perceive in nature. In this full develope

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ment of the argument Paley failed. He was not a perfect master of the inductive logic, and he left it to other and more skilful hands to do for theology that which Bacon did for physics-compelling the atheist to one or other of these alternatives; either to deny that we have any evidence of human intelligence, or to admit the existence of a divine Intelligence.

Dr. Crombie has devoted many pages of his work to an exposure of the fallacies of Hume, the subtleties of Drummond, and the dogmas of Spinoza.

The hypothesis of the eternity of this globe, and its vegetable and animal beings, is satisfactorily disproved by an appeal to various geological facts; and man is shown to be a comparatively recent creation.* The fanciful cosmologies which Buffon and other speculatists have been pleased to invent, our author assails sometimes with ridicule, and sometimes with argument. His proofs of the divine intelligence are drawn solely from the phenomena of nature—the planetary system-the physical constitution of our globe-its adaptation to the growth and sustenance of the animal and vegetable creation; and more especially he dwells on the wonderful means by which man and the brute species are supplied with the requisites essential to life and happiness-air, water, food, and clothing. The phenomena seem judiciously chosen, as calculated to amuse and interest the reader, and they are forcibly applied to the subject in question. But, though the arguments drawn from the laws and affections of brute matter are amply sufficient to evince the necessity of an intelligent and designing cause, yet it is when we leave the wonders of the material world, and ascend into a higher grade of existence-where life, instinct, and thought, are combined with physical organization-that we discover the most striking instances of creative wisdom. Here the mechanical and chemical agencies-the vital powers-the attractions and repulsions-the transpositions and combinations-and all the guesses and fancies by which the atheist would account for the phenomena of the universe, avail him nothing.

Let us direct our attention to animal instincts; and, though all of these irresistibly lead to the conclusion of a wise and designing cause, there is none perhaps, in the vast chain of animal being, more striking than that of the bee. Our limits will not permit us to enter minutely into the economy of this wonderful insect; we shall therefore confine ourselves to one fact:

'When we behold this little creature constructing its cell, to *On this head, as on many others, we may refer our readers to the splendid summary of Mr. Sedgewick, in his recent Discourse before the University of Cambridge; perhaps the most remarkable pamphlet that has appeared in England since Burke's Reflections, but one which, being itself a masterly reviewal, is not exactly suited for the purpose of detailed notice in a critical journal.

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contain its winter stock, and constructing it of that form which is demonstrably the strongest, and the most convenient, it seems the extravagance of absurdity to suppose, that the instinct by which it is directed is the offspring of ignorance. The phenomenon, indeed, is one of the most extraordinary that the animal world presents to our contemplation. It must be evident to every one who has given the least attention to the obvious properties of different figures, that there are only three which will admit the junction of their sides, without any vacant spaces between them-all the figures being equal and similar; namely, the square, the equilateral triangle, and the hexaedron: of these, the last is the strongest and the most convenient. In this form, then, we find that all the cells are constructed. This is a curious and wonderful fact; and, what is equally remarkable, the middle of every cell, on one side, is directly opposite to the point where the three partitions meet on the opposite side. By this posi tion, the cell receives additional strength. This is not all. If human ingenuity were to contrive a cell, which would require the least expenditure of material and labour, it would be a question, not easily solved, at what precise angle the three planes which compose the bottom ought to meet. The late celebrated mathematician, Maclaurin, by a fluxionary calculus, determined precisely the angle required; and he found, by the most exact mensuration the subject would admit, that it is the very angle in which the three planes in the bottom of a cell of a honey-comb do actually meet. The same curious fact was ascertained by a German mathematician :-Reaumur, presuming that the angles were adopted for the purpose of saving material, proposed to Koenig, a mathematician of eminence, that he should determine what should be the angles of a hexagonal cell, with a pyramidal base, to require the least material. By the infinitiomal calculus, he ascertained that the greatest angle should be 109° 26', and the smaller 70° 34′-the very angles which the insect adopts. What an astonishing coincidence is this! A profound mathematician is required to solve a very difficult problem; and it is found that his conclusion, gained by the exercise of considerable ingenuity and deep thought, was practically exhibited in the operations of the bee. How few are capable of that scientific investigation which this insect illustrates by its practice? It seems the extravagance of folly to believe, that out of the numerous different combinations of which two angles are susceptible, that which most saves labour and material should be adopted by random chance or blind necessity.'

A bird's nest presents a phenomenon nearly as wonderful as the cell of the bee. This object is so familiar to us, that it excites little or no curiosity; but let it be shown to a person capable of reflection, who had never seen such a structure; let him examine the materials of which it is composed-their admirable aptitude for the purpose which it answers, the convenience of its form for the shape and the warmth of its inhabitants-the lightness, the firmness-the neatness with which its materials are twisted and interwoven;

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