or an untoward Representation of them. And afte
he has thus misused me, then to beat up for Voluntiers,
and to endeavour to animate and stir up the whole
Clergy against me as a Common Enemy, who mean
no harm to any Body But I will lay no more,
than that by it he has utterly forfeited all the Thanks
which perhaps he might otherwise pretend due to him
for his kind Intentions and Endeavours.

I confess however, that I did not expect to be so
publickly assaulted by a Neighbour and a Friend, who kille
methinks might with greater Decorum have left so un-
grateful a Work to another hand, especially at this
time of Day, when we have no need of quarrelling
among our felves for want of Adversaries to try our
Skill upon. But it seems, contrary to the Proverb,
Necessity has now too much Law; and Neighbourhood,
Friendship, Peace, Decorum, and every thing mụft be
facrificed to that which is better than Sacrifice. But
to the Point.

In order to which be it premised, that in all Personal Disputation or Controversie an Objection carries in it this Addition to the Nature of an Argument in general, that 'tis an Argument against fomething before laid down or maintain d by the Party opposed. So that an Objection is an Argument, and something more; and consequently there goes more to make an Objection good, than to make an Argument good. For to make an Argument good, 'tis Tufficient that it be True as to Matter and Form; but to make an Objection good, it must not only be a Truth, but a Contradi&tory Truth. So that though a good Objecțion be also

it yet a good Argument is not always a Argument in : Argument (because Objection includes good Objection, and that becaute an Objection implies something more than bare Argument as such, as being not only an Argument, but a Contradictory Argumenr.

And therefore though there be but one general way whereby an Argument may be Faulty, viz. by reason

of the Ontruth ofit, either as to Matter or Form; yet an Objecti. on may be Faulty two ways, either for want of Truth, or for wanr of Contradiction; that is, it may be Faulry either imply as an Argumen", or as an Objection, or if you will, either as to the Arguinent part, or as to the Objection part of it. Either the This Objected is not True, or if it be True, yer it is not a Contradictory Truth; and to a bad objection, though perhaps a good Argument.

Accordingly there are two general ways of dealing with an Objection, according as the denciency of it is in one or other of these relpects. It it be truly Contradictory, but notabsolutely true, as to the Matter or Form of it; then I have something to deny, the Syllogism it felf if wrong in Forin, or fome Propofition of it it wrong as to Matter, and that again either Major or Minor, or Consequence according to the Matter of the Peopofitions, and the form of the Syllogism.

But if the Objection be Abiolntely true both Materially and Formally, but not truly Contradictory, what is to be done then? Why in this Caf: B. Sanderson says in his Appendix de ufu Lozi. C£, pag. 273. that the Conclusion is to be denied. There are Three Things, says he, that may be denied, the Conclusion, the Form, and the Propofition. The Concluton if it be Forreign, the Form if Virious, and the Proposition if Falle. And again says he, Si Opporaciis aut in primo Sy!!og ijwło non Contradicat Thesi Respondentis, aut in reliquis non inferat propofitionem ab co proxime Negaram, Refpondens habet negare Conclufionem. But then he after explains waar le Means by Denying, viz. by rojecting it as not to the purpose, or (which he fays is allone) by admisring the whole Argument. In which Account iho' his meaning be right enough, it righuy un feritood, yet I think he has not express'd hmelf with either his usual, or with Suficient Clearneis

. Fo“ a: 'cis inolt Certain in the general, that the ConcluHon can never be denied if the Preniles are allow'ů to be True, (becaule the Conclusion is containd in the Premniles) and therefore the Denial when any is necessary, properly falls upon one of the Premises, nor upon the Conclusions; to'tisallo moit certain that in the present Cale there is no need of denying any thing, rhere being indeed nothing at all to be denied. And therefore this great and otherwise very Logical)Writer did not do so well in using the word Deny, however Interpreted afterwards by Rejecting, in reference to the Conclusion, since Denying is always applied to the Truth of the objection, and thai as to the Mutter, or as to the Form of it; in relation to the Former of which we say Negatir Propofitio, and in reiation to the Latter, Negatzem Syllogifnius. But now here the Objection is supposed to

be Absolutely True both as to the Material and also as to the Formal part of it. And therefore 'ris moft certain that here is nothing to be Denied, or that can be said with any Propriety to be fo. And then again, whereas he says, by Rejecting it as Impertinent, or (which is the fame) by admitting the whole Argument, I cannot think this neither to be a clear Account of the Matter. For Rejecting and Admitting are in themselves so far from being the same, that they are Formally Contrary, and Vertually Contradictory to each other, and are no otherwise to be reconciled than by the difference of Respects, which yet he has not here aflign d.

Let us see then whether this Marrer may not be set in a little clearer Light. The Question is what is to be done when the Objection is Ablolutely true, both Materially and Formally, but not truly Contradictory? To which it is answers in the firit Place, Absolutely and without any qualification, that here is Nothing to be Denied, the Matter and Form of the Argument being supposed to be True. And as there is nothing that can justly be denied, because all is supposed to be true; so neither has the Respondent any Reason, Perlwalive or Inducement to deny any thing, fince though a Truth 'tis yet an uncontradictory one, and luch as though ad. mitted does not concern hiin, nor affect the Thesis he Maintains. What then is he to do? I answer Secondly, That he is e'n frankly to admit the whole. For what shouid he do elle? He cannot deny it because it is True, and he need not deny it because 'tis also an uncontradictory Truth. He must then, and may (afely grant ir intirely. Not thar the Admilion is lo intire Neither, but that it consequentially implies a Rejection too, through in a different Respect. That is, he Admits it as a Truth, but then by doing to docs by Contequence Reject it as an Inpertinent unconcerning Truth, (ince if it were to the purpose, and againit bim, he would not Admit, but Deny is) or if you will admits it as an Argument, but Rejects it as an Objection, because not a Contradictory Argument, as every good Objection should be.

But then it may be further Consider'd (which is all that can be said in this Matter) that as in denying any part of an Argument, either as to Marter or Form, ihe Reipondent may be sometimes Obliged to align fome Reason of his Denial (for otherwise there would be no End of Disputation, fiuce one Fool may deny more than a Hundred Wise Men can prove) fo likewise in this Second way of dealing with an Objection by admitting the Arguinent as True, buc rejecting it as Imperdie ment, the Respondent may sometimes be concern'd to alligo a

Realon

04

Reason of his Procedure, which is to be done only by Scaring his own Thesis, and by thewing that the Conclusion of his Oppolers Argument does not really Contradict it. This indeed is a mort Cur,bur 'uis all that can or need be done in this Case; and when he has done this, he has done as much as his Opposer can juftly demand, and though in this way of proceeding he has nothing of Denying Solving Refuting, &c. he has yet answered his Objiction as fullyas such an Objection is capable of being Answer'd.

Now shusitands the Case between me and my lare worthy Opposers, who have both of them (especially the Second) raken a gread deal of Pains not to contradict me. They pretend to write againft me, and feem not to doubt but that they have Confured me, and yer do not lo much as attaque me, Not attending suficiently to the Principles, nor to the Conclufion of the Discourse they offer to oppose, nor duly confidering the exact Hate of the Queition, they inilapprehend my Meaning; and so fupposing me to hold what indeed I do not, they run on upon a wrong Ground, very elaborately let themselves to prove a Conclusion that is not contradictory to minc, and so fight, not with me, bur with a Shadow of their own. In mort, they both harp all along upon the same false String, and beltow great Pairs to prove a wrong Proposition: Wrong I mean, not absolutely in it felf, but in relation to me, as not being truly Contradictory to what I maintain; and so are guilty of that Fallacy which in Logick is call d Ignoratio Elenchi, as Sr. James would have been in relation to St. Paul, (lupposing he had intended to contradict him) when he fays thar a Man is not justified by Faith only, he not taking Faith in the fame Sense, when he lays a Man is non justified by Faith only, as St. Paul does when be says that he is; and so rio truly Contradicting him, because nor denying the fame thing that the other affirms, whereas all Contradiction fhould be ad idem. And therefore I look upon iny felf to be no further concern'd with my prefent Adversaries (if I may fo call theni) than only to grant them, without any more ado, the ingin body of their Argument; allowing it to be True, but at thelame time rejecting it as an Uncontradictory, and therefore nor Pertinent Truth. I say I have no more upon my hands than th's, unless it be for their Satisfaction to give them fome Account why I do thus, which may be done in a little room.

I remark then that the whole Argument of the present Controversie is a mere Equivoque upon thele two Terms, Love and Good, which my Adversaries (I hope they will pardon me for giving them a wrong Title) are pleased to take in the most large and popular Senle, and not according to that due strictness wherein I do, and wherein they should take them to contradict

me,

me. Thus as to the term (Good) they use it according to the
urmoft Latitude, as it comprehends all that which any manner
of way contributes to our good, minifters to our conveniency,
and is better for us to have than to be without. And taking
(Good) in this large popular Sense, they contend thar the World
is good, that the Creatures are good, that Meat is good, and
Drink is good, &c. and for the truth of this appeal to Experience,
And no doubt all this is true. But herein they do not Contradict
me, who use the term (Good) in a stricter, and as I think inore
Philosophical Sense, meaning by it that which really and truly
does us good, or is the efficient Cause of Pleasure to us. la
which Sense it is that I deny the World, or any Creature in it,
to be a Good to us, truly and properly fpeaking; because not
efficient Causes of the least degree of Happiness or Good to us;
wherein I am not at all contradicted by their saying that the
Creatures are good in the other larger Sense; especially contidere
ing that at the same time that I deny them to be Efficient Causes,
1 allow them to be Occasions of Good to us.

Then again as to the term (Love) this also they use in the
large and popular Acceptation, as it extends even to the willing
she use of a thing, as fappose of Fire when we are Cold, or Meac
and Drink when we are Hungry and Thirsty, and the like.
But now I use the term (Love) more Atrictly, and it may be
more Philosophically, for the Souls uniting it felf to any thing
as its true Good, Beatifick Object, or the Cause of its Good or
Happiness. And accordingly in this strict and rigorous Sense
of Love I make God the only due Object of it; and deny that
the World, or any Creature in it, is to be loved by us; and
zhat because God only, not the Creature, is our true Good,
Beatifick Object, and Efficient Cause of all our Happiness.
Whereas they taking the word (Love) more largely and popu-
Jarly, as it comprebends within its Latitude even the willing the
use of a thing, conrend that God is not the only Object of our
Love, but that tbe Creature may also be loved by

us. Wherein indeed they say true,but do not contradict me; Serm. Of the especially conKdering that at the same time that wel.

of . Pag. 74.

I deny that the Creacures are to be loved as fi $2.:

our Good, I allow that they may be fought and used for our Good.

And indeed setting aside the Passage last quoted, which fully expreffes my meaning, and several others which I might quote both from the Discourse it felf, and the Letters which Comment upon it, to the like purpose; the very Principles I go upon, my way of

arguing upon those Principles, and the whole Current of the Discourses ihemselves da ali so jointly combine to de

termine