ratione objecti,' without evidence. Even as there is no sight but of an illustrated object, that is, a visible object.

II. The other extreme (of some of the same men) is, that yet faith is not true and certain if it have any doubtfulness with it. Strange! that these men can only see what is invisible; believe what is inevident as to its truth, that is, incredible, but also believe past all doubting, and think that the weakest true believer doth so too! Certainly there are various degrees of faith in the sincere: all have not the same strength! Christ rebuketh Peter in his fears, and his disciples all at other times, for their little faith. "When Peter's faith failed not, it staggered, which Abraham's did not: "Lord, increase our faith," and " Lord, I believe, help my unbelief," were prayers approved by Christ, I will call a prevalent belief which can lay down life and all this world for Christ and the hopes of heaven, by the name of certainty, which hath various degrees. But if they differ 'de nomine,' and will call nothing certainty but the highest degree, they must needs yet grant that there is true, saving faith, that reacheth to no certainty in their sense. Yea, no man on earth then attaineth to such a certainty, because that every man's faith is imperfect.

To conclude. Though all Scripture in itself (that is indeed the true canon) be equally true, yet all is not equally* certain to us, as not having equal evidence that it is God's word. But of that in the next Chapter of the Uncertainties.

CHAP. VI.

V. What are the unknown Things, and Uncertainties which we must not pretend a certain knowledge of.

SOMEWHAT of this is said already, Chap. iii. But I am here to come to more particular instances of it. But because that an enumeration would be a great volume of itself, I shall begin with the more general, that I may be excused in most of the rest; or mention only some particulars under them as we go.

I. A very great, if not the far greatest part of that part of philosophy called Physics, is uncertain (or certainly false) as it is delivered to us in any methodist that I have yet seen;

whether Platonists, Peripatetics, Epicureans, (the Stoics have little, but what Seneca gives us, and Barlaam collecteth, I know not whence, as making up their ethics, and what in three or four ethical writers is also brought in on the by, and what Cicero reporteth of them) or in our novelists, Patricius, Telesius, Campanella, Thomas White, Digby, Cartesius, Gassendus, &c., except those whose modesty causeth them to say but little, and to avoid the uncertainties; or confess them to be uncertainties. To enumerate instances would be an unseasonable digression. Gassendus is large

in his confessions of uncertainties. I think not his brother Hobbes, and his second Spinosa worth the naming. Nor the Paracelsians and Helmontians as giving us a new philosophy, but only as adding to the old. There needs no other testimony of uncertainty to a man that hath not studied the points himself, than their lamentable difference, and confutation of each other, in so many things, even in great principles of the science.

Yet here no doubt, there are certainties, innumerable certainties, such as I have before described. We know something certainly of many things, even of all sensible objects. But we know nothing perfectly and comprehensively; not a worm, not a leaf, not a stone, or a sand, not the pen, ink or paper which we write with; not the hand that writeth, nor the smallest particle of our bodies; not a hair, or the least accident. In every thing nearest us, or in the world, the uncertainties and 'incognita' are far more than that which we certainly know.

II. If I should enumerate to you the many uncertainties in our common metaphysics, (yea, about the being of the science) and our common logic, &c., it would seem unsuitable to a theological discourse. And yet it would not be unuseful, among such theologians as the schoolmen, who resolve more of their doubts by Aristotle than by the Holy Scriptures; doubtless, as Aristotle's predicaments are not fitted to the kinds of beings, so many of his distributions and orders, yea, and precepts are arbitrary. And as he left room and reason for the dissent of such as Taurellus, Carpenter, Jacchæus, Gorlæus, Ritchel, and abundance more, so have they also for men's dissent from them. Even Ramus hath more adversaries than followers. Gassendus goeth the right way, by suiting verba rebus,' if he had hit righter

on the nature of things themselves. Most novel philosophers are fain to make new grammars and new logics, for words and notions, to fit their new conceptions, as Campanella, and the Paracelsians, Helmontians, (and if you will name the Behmenists, Rosicrucians, Weigelians, &c.) Lullius thought he made the most accurate art of notions; and he did indeed attempt to fit words to things: but he hath missed of a true accomplishment of his design, for want of a true method of physics in his mind, to fit his words to. As Cornelius Agrippa, who is one of his chief commentators, yet freely confesseth in his "lib. de Vanitate Scientia," which now I think of, I will say no more of this, but desire the reader to peruse that laudable book, and with it to read Sanchez's "Nihil Scitur," to see uncertainty detected, so he will not be led by it too far into scepticism. As also Mr. Glanvile's "Scepsis Scientifica."

rum,

As for the lamentable uncertainties in medicine, the poor world payeth for it. Anatomy as being by ocular inspection hath had the best improvement; and yet what a multitude of uncertainties remain! Many thousand years have millions yearly died of fevers, and the medicating them is a great part of the physician's work; and yet I know not that ever I knew the man that certainly knew what a fever is. I crave the pardon of the masters of this noble art for saying it; it is by dear experience that I have learned how little physicians know; having passed through the trial of above thirty of them on my own body long ago; merely induced by a conceit that they knew more than they did; and most that I got was but the ruin of my own body, and this advice to leave to others:—Highly value those few excellent men, who have quick and deep conjecturing apprehensions, great reading and greater experience, and sober, careful, deliberating minds, that had rather do too little than too much: but use them in a due conjunction with your own experience of yourself. But for the rest, how learned soever, whose heads are dull, or temper precipitant, or apprehensions hasty or superficial, or reading small, especially that are young, or of small experience, love and honour them, but use them as little as you can, and that only as you will use an honest, ignorant divine, whom you

◄ See a book written long since this, called "the Samaritan," of excellent use, by Mr. Jones of Suffolk.

will gladly hear upon the certain catechistical principles, but love not to hear him meddle with controversies. So use these men in common, easy cases, if necessary, and yet there the less the better, lest they hinder nature that would cure the disease. If you dislike my counsel, you may be shortly past blaming it; for though their successes have tongues, their miscarriages are mostly silent in the grave. O how much goeth to make an able physician! but enough of such instances.

III. But though errors in politics the world payeth yet much dearer for, I must not be too bold in talking here. But I will confess that here the uncertainties are almost all in the applicatory part, and through the incapacity of the minds of men for the truth is, the main principles of policy are part of the Divine law, and of true morality, and in themselves are plain, and of a satisfying certainty, could you but get men's heads and hearts into a fitness duly to consider and receive them.

IV. But to come nearer to our own profession, there is much uncertainty in those theological conclusions, which are built on such premises, where any one of these physical, metaphysical, or logical uncertainties are a part; yea, though it be couched in the narrowest room, even in one ambiguous term of art, and scarcely discerned by any but accurate observers. With great pomp and confidence many proceed to their ergos, when the detection of the fraud not only of an uncertain medium, but of one ambiguous syllable, will mar all. And the conclusion can be no stronger or surer, than the more weak and doubtful of the premises.

V. When the subject is of small and abstruse parts, far from the principles and fundamentals of the matter, usually the conclusions are uncertain. Nature in all matters beginneth with some few great and master parts, like the great boughs or limbs of the tree, or the great trunks and master vessels in our bodies; and from thence spring branches, which are innumerable and small: and it is so in all sciences, and in theology itself. The great, essential and chief integral parts are few, and easily discerned: but two grand impediments hinder us from a certain knowledge in the rest: one is the great number of particles, where the understanding is lost, and, as they say, seeketh a needle in a bottle of

hay, or a leaf in a wood; and the other is the littleness of the thing, which maketh it undiscernible to any but accurate and studious minds. And therefore how much soever men that trade in little things, may boast of the sublimity of them, and their own subtlety, their perceptions usually are accompanied with uncertainty; though in some cases an uncertain knowledge, known to be so, is better than

none.

VI. Yea, though the matters themselves may be more bulky, yet if in knowing and proving them, we must go through a great number of syllogisms and inferences, usually the conclusion is very uncertain to us, whatever it may be to an extraordinary accurate and prepared mind. For 1. We shall be still jealous (or may be) lest so many terms and mediums, some of them should be fallacious and insufficient, and weaken all. And we are so conscious of our own weakness, and liability to forget, oversee or be mistaken, that we shall or may still fear lest we have missed it, and be overseen in something, in so long a course and series of arguings.

VII. Those parts of history which depend merely on the credit of men's wisdom and honesty, and are so merely of human faith, must needs be uncertain. For the conclusion can be no surer than the premises. All men as such are liars, that is, untrusty, or such as possibly may deceive. 1. They may be deceived themselves. 2. And they may deceive others where they are not themselves deceived. Every man hath some passion, some ignorance, some error, some selfish interest, and some vice. This age, if we never had known another instance, is a sad proof of this, that tears are fitter than words to express it. Most confident reporters totally differ about the most notorious matters of fact. I must not name them, but I pity strangers and posterity. If it come especially to the characterising of others, how ordinarily do men speak as they are affected? And they are affected as self-interest and passion leadeth them; with Cochlæus, Bolseck, and such others, what villains were Luther, Zuinglius, Calvin, &c. with their most faithful acquaintance; what good and holy men, saving Luther's animosity! If the Inquisitors torment Protestants, or burn them, is it not necessary that they call them by such odious names as may justify their fact?