rality of Persons in the Godhead, seems necessary from the nature of God himself, and his most compleat happiness; for as he is the best, the greatest and most perfect of Beings, his happiness in himself must be the most perfect and compleat; now happiness lies not in solitude, but in society; hence the three personal distinctions in Deity, seem necessary to perfect happiness, which lies in that most glorious, inconceivable, and inexpressible communion the three Persons have with one another; and which arises from the incomprehensible inbeing, and unspeakable nearness they have to each other, John x. 38. and xiv.

10, II,

OF THE PERSONAL RELATIONS;

OR, RELATIVE PROPERTIES WHICH DISTINGUISH THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS IN THE DEITY.

SINCE there are Three who are the one God; and these Three are not one and the same Person, but three different Persons, there must be something which distinguishes them from each other; and the distinction between them is. not merely nominal, which is no distinction at all; as when the Sabellians say, God is one Person, having three names, Father, Son, and Spirit; here is no distinction; just as when a man has three names, they no more distinguish him than one would; be he called, William, Henry, Frederick, William would not distinguish him from Henry, nor Henry from William, nor Frederick from them both, he being one man, having these several names: nor is the distinction merely modal; rather real modal; for though there are three modes of subsisting in the Deity, and each Person has a distinct mode, yet the phrase seems not strong enough; for the distinction is real and personal; the Three in the Godhead are not barely three modes, but three distinct Persons in a different mode of subsisting, who are really distinct from each other; so that the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the holy Spirit either the Father or the Son; but the difficulty is, what that is which gives or makes the distinction between them? Now let it be observed,

I. Be it what it may, which distinguishes the divine Persons, it must be as early as the existence of God itself: God is from everlasting to everlasting; what God is now he ever was; he is the eternal and immutable I AM; he is what he was, and will be what he is; he is he "which is, and was, and is to come;" he is eternally and invariably the same; if the one God existed from eternity; and if the three Persons are the one God, they must exist from eternity, and exist as distinct Persons; and consequently what gives them their distinction must exist as early. Wherefore,

II. Whatever distinguishes them, cannot arise from, nor depend upon any works done by them in time, since their distinction is from eternity; and besides, the works of God ad extra, or his external works, are common to all the three Persons; for though one may be more commonly ascribed to one person, and

another to another, yet the three persons have a concern in each; and therefore they cannot distinguish them from one another. Creation is commonly ascribed to the Father of Christ, who is said to make the worlds, and create all things by him his Son; not as a mere instrument of action, since he is a co-efficient Cause of them; "without him is not any thing made that is made;" and the holy Spirit has a concern in the same; as has been observed; see Psal. xxxiii. 6. The salvation of men is commonly attributed to the son, and he is called Jesus Christ our Saviour; and yet, in the same place, God the Father is called God our Saviour, and is said to save" by the renewing of the Holy Ghost," Tit. iii. 4-6. Regeneration is more commonly said to be the work of the Spirit; and yet men are said to be born of God, of the Father, and of Jesus Christ, as well as of him; and God the Father is expressly said, to beget men again, according to his mercy, 1 Pet. i. 3. I have made use of the works of God, both to prove the Being of God, and to illustrate and confirm the doctrine of a Trinity of Persons in the Godhead; but these do not make God to be, but to appear to be what he is; had they never been wrought, he would have been just the same as he is, in his Being, Perfections, and Persons; for,

III. His works are arbitrary, depending upon his pleasure: thus of the works of creation it is said, For thy pleasure, or by thy will, they are and were created, Rev. iv. 11. and as all things in providence, so all things in grace, are done according to the counsel of his will; it is of his will he has mercy on men, is gra cious to them, regenerates and saves them; wherefore these are things that might or might not be, just as he thought fit; but not so his Being, the Persons in the Deity, and their manner of subsisting in it; for if there had never been a creature made, nor a soul saved, nor a sinner sanctified, God would have been the same he is, three Persons in one God. In the oeconomy of man's salvation, to which some ascribe the distinction of Persons, as taking its rise from thence; the three divine Persons are manifested, but not made, nor made distinct; but were so before, and would have been so, if that had never taken place, as it might not have done, since it flows from the good will and pleasure of God; whereas,

IV. What gives the distinction, be it what it may, is by necessity of nature; God exists necessarily, and not by choice and will, as has been before argued; for if his existence is owing to will and choice, it must be either the will and choice of another, or his own; not another's, for then that other would be prior and superior to him, and so be God, and not he; not his own will, for then he must be before he was; have will and choice before he existed, which is an absurdity not to be endured: if the one God then necessarily existed, and the three Persons are the one God, they must necessarily exist; and if they exist as three distinct Persons, that which gives them the distinction, must be necessary also, or arise from the necessity of nature; as God is, and the manner in which he is, so the distinction in him is by necessity. But,

V. When I say it is by necessity of nature, I do not mean, that the divine

nature, in which the divine persons subsist, distinguishes them; for that nature is one, and common to them all; the nature of the Son, is the same with that of the Father; and the nature of the Spirit, the same with that of the Father and the Son; and this nature, which they in common partake of, is undivided; it is not parted between them, so that one has one part, and another a second, and another a third; nor that one has a greater, and another a lesser part, which might distinguish them; but the whole fulness of the Godhead is in each. VI. To come to the point; It is the personal relations, or distinctive relative properties, which belong to each Person, which distinguish them one from another; as paternity in the first Person, filiation in the second, and spiration in the third; or, more plainly, it is begetting, Psal. ii. 7. which peculiarly belongs to the first, and is never ascribed to the second and third; which distinguishes him from them both; and gives him, with great propriety, the name of Father; and and it is being begotten, that is the personal relation, or relative property of the second Person; hence called, "the only begotten of the Father," John i. 14. which distinguishes him from the first and third, and gives him the name of the Son; and the relative property, or personal relation of the third Person is, that he is breathed by the first and second persons; hence called, the breath of the Almighty, the breath of the mouth of Jehovah the Father, and the breath of the mouth of Christ the Lord, and which is never said of the other two persons; and so distinguishes him from them, and very pertinently gives him the name of the Spirit, or breath, Job xxxiii. 4. Psal. xxxiii. 6. 2 Thess. ii. 8. Those men I have now respect to, hold that there are three distinct persons in the Godhead, or divine nature; and therefore it must be something in the divine nature, and not any thing out of it, that distinguishes them; not any works ad extra, done by them; nor their concern in the oeconomy of man's salvation; nor offices bore by them, which are arbritary things, which might, or might not have been, had it pleased God; and what that is in the divine nature that can distinguish them, besides what has been mentioned, let it be named if it can. If one of these distinct Persons is a Father, in the divine nature, and another a Son, in the divine nature, there must be something in the divine nature, which is the ground of the relation, and distinguishes the one from the other, and can be nothing else than generation, and which distinguishes the third Person from them both, as neither begetting nor begotten. From generation arises the relation, and from relation distinct personality. And as an ancient writer says, “unbegotten, begotten,, and proceeding," are not names of essence, (and it may be added, nor of office,) but are modes of subsistence; and so distinguish persons. Upon the whole, it is easy to observe, that the distinction of Persons in the Deity, depends on the generation of the Son; take away that, which would de stroy the relation between the first and second Persons, and the distinction drops; and that this distinction is natural and necessary, or by necessity of nature, and not arbitrary, or of choice and will: which if it was, it might not have been Justin. Expos. Fid. p. 373

at all, or have been otherwise than it is: those who place it to the oeconomy of the Persons in the redemption of men, have been urged with this, that if it was so, he that is called the Father, might have been called the Son; and he that is called the Son, might have been called the Father?; which has so pressed them, that they have been obliged to own, that so it might have been, if it had so seemed to God, and been agreeable to his will. Moreover, those who are in this way of thinking, and explain away the generation of the Son, and make it no more than a communion of nature, and a co-existence with the first Person, though they profess there are three Persons in the Godhead, they are not able to prove it, nor to point out that which distinguishes one from another; and besides, are not able to call them by any name, only say, the one is the first Person, the other the second, and the other the third; and even the reason of this order they cannot account for; for if they have their names and distinction from the oeconomy of man's salvation, and the part they take therein these cannot be given them antecedent to the said oeconomy; and yet they must exist, and be considered as existing previous to it: if the first Person has the name of a Father, from his constituting and appointing Christ to be the Mediator and Saviour; and the Second Person the name of a Son, from his constitution as such; though the reason of such names from hence does not appear; and the third Person has the name of Spirit, from an office or work undertook by him, to breathe into men, in creation or regeneration; these names cannot be given them antecedent to such oeconomy, constitution, and agreement, taking place; and yet they must be considered antecedent thereunto, in some view or another. To such straits are men reduced, when they leave the form of sound words, which to do is dangerous, and generally leads into one error or another. But all this will more manifestly appear, by considering each divine person particularly, his relative property, and name pertinent to it.

The first Person; whose distinctive relative property is begetting, and who is very pertinently called the Father, which distinguishes him from the second and third Persons: and here let it be observed, that it is not his being a Father with respect to the creatures, that distinguishes him; not a Father in creation, providence, and grace: not in creation; he is a Father as the Creator of all; all his creatures are his offspring; and he is particularly the Father of spirits, of angels, and of the souls of men; but this does not give him the name of Father in the Trinity; so he would have been, if not one man had ever been made, or an angel formed; nor does his being a Father to creatures distinguish him from the second and third Persons: for they are equally concerned with him in creation; and being the one God that has made us, they are the one Father of us, even the second and third Persons, as well as the first: nor in providence; God is the Father that provides for all his creatures, supplies them with things necessary, and supports them in their Beings; but this is not peculiar to the first Person; in this the second Person jointly and equally operates Vitring. Epilog. Disp put, contr. Roel. P. 3. 4.

Roel. Dissert. 1. s. 39. p. 40.

with him, by whom all things consist, and by whose power all are upheld; and so the third Person; and therefore on this account equally entitled to the character of Father: nor in grace, in adoption, and regeneration; in which all the three Persons have a concern: in adoption, as the Father bestows the won derful grace on the sons of men, the Son gives to them that believe in him power to become the sons of God; and the Spirit has so much to do with it, that he is called the Spirit of adoption in regeneration, the Father of Christ begets men again to a lively hope of an inheritance; the Son quickens and regenerates whom he will; and those that are born again are born of the Spirit: it is not therefore what the first Person does in either of these respects, that entitles him to the character of Father in the Godhead, and distinguishes him from the others; but it is his being the Father of the second Person, or the Father of Christ, as he is often called, and very emphatically and significantly, God the Father, Gal. i. 1. Eph. i. 3. and iii. 14. and this name he has from begetting the Son, who is therefore called his Son, his begotten, his only begotten Son, Psal. ii. 7. John i. 14, 18. and this personal relation, or relative property, is what distinguishes the first Person in the Trinity, it being never attributed to any other.

The second Person, whose distinctive relative property and character is, that he is begotten, which is never said of the other two Persons, and so distinguishes him from them, and gives him the name of Son; and that he is the Son of God, there is abundant proof; all the three Persons bear testimony of it; the Father at the baptism and transfiguration of Christ, Matt. iii. 17. and xyii. 5. see Psal. ii. 7. and lxxxix. 27. the Word, or Son of God himself, John xix. 7. and v. 17, 18. and x. 30. Mark xiv. 61, 62. John viii. 13-18. and the Spirit Matt. iii. 16, 17. it is testified and acknowledged by angels, the good angels, Luke i. 31, 35. Heb. i. 6. evil angels, the devils, Matt. viii. 29. Mark iii. 11. Luke iv. 41. by men of all sorts; by good men, John i. 6, 7, 33, 34, 49. Matt. xvi. 15, 16. John vi. 67. and xi. 27. Acts viii. 37. by bad men, Matt. xxvii. 54. So that he is on all hands acknowledged and owned to be the Son of God. The Sonship of Christ is an article of the greatest importance in the christian religion; it has a very great concern in, and connection with the ordinance of christian baptism; it was declared by a voice from heaven, at the baptism of our Lord, saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. Matt. iii. 17. That ordinance is ordered by our Lord himself to be administered in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, Matt. xxviii, 19, considered as in their natural relative characters to each other, equally divine persons, and not as sustaining any office, which no one name or term used is expressive of; and it is mentioned in the first confession of faith, and as the sum of it, in order to an admission to that ordinance the scripture gives an account of; I believe, says the Eunuch desiring baptism of Philip; who required an express declaration of his faith; I believe, says he, that Jesus Christ