tions are nevertheless real for his being invifible. Though they are not feen with' an Eye of Senfe, yet they are difcernable to the Eye of the Mind, being understood by the Things that are made, i. e. by the Effects in the Works of Creation. And nothing can yield a nobler or more useful Subject for our Contemplations. I fhall therefore proceed to take a fummary View of thofe Perfections which effentially belong to the fupreme original Caufe and Author of all Things. And fuch a short and general Confideration of them may be of great Advantage, that by placing them together in a clofe and comprehenfive View, their mutual Connection and Harmony may more convincingly appear.

And firft. The first Thing I would obferve is, that this great original Cause of all Things, the God that made the World, and all that in it is, exifted neceffarily from everlafting. This is plainly fignified here when the Apostle fpeaketh of his eternal Power and Godhead, as being understood by the Things that are made. For eternal Power and Godhead neceffarily fuppofe eternal Existence. That fomething muft have existed from everlasting, is as certain as it is that any Thing now exifteth, because otherwise, nothing could ever have come into Being. And indeed none ever was fo abfurd as to deny that fomething

mult

must have existed from all Eternity. The Atheist is forced to acknowledge this whether he will or no, and being unwilling to own an eternal wife intelligent Cause, moft abfurdly afcribeth Eternity to dull fenfelefs Matter. But if Matter alone were eternal, how could Life, or Intelligence, or active Power have ever come into Being? Or how could Matter, or that Suppofition be fubject to fo many Changes and Alterations as we fee it is, fince, if it exifted neceffarily and independently, it cannot be conceived that any Thing could make an Impreffion upon it, fo as to move or alter it? There must in that Cafe have been from everlasting, and so should have continued to everlasting, the fame unvaried State or Appearance of Things, without. Motion or Life, Senfation or Intelligence, none of which originally belong to Matter. But this is contrary to undeniable Fact and Experience. In all Things that come under our Notice we may obferve convincing Proofs of their having had a Beginning of their Existence. With regard to ourfelves, we are conscious that it is but a few Years fince we came into Being. The fame must be said of the whole Race of Mankind, which it is demonftrable could not have been from everlafting upon this Earth; and there are many Things which plainly fhew that they

are

are comparatively but of a late Original. The Earth itself, the Sea, the Air, bear upon them Characters of Mutability and Imperfection, which make it evident that they did not exist of themselves from everlafting. And the fame Thing may be justly concluded concerning the glorious Bodies that perform their Courfes and Revolutions in the vaft Spaces around us. But when we rife beyond thefe Things to the great Author of the Universe, as we must acknowledge that he had an Existence before any Part of this vifible World, which is his Contrivance and Workmanship, so we are naturally led to conclude, that he never had any Beginning of his Being. Let us purfue our Thoughts never fo far through the Series of fubordinate fecond Caufes, we muft unavoidably come at length to fomething which was itself uncaufed, and must therefore have been felf-exiftent, or have exifted neceffarily from everlasting. And this Neceffity of Existence, as it cannot be owing to any external Cause, must have its Reafon and Ground in the Nature of the Thing itself. It can therefore be owing to Nothing but to the peculiar Excellency and Perfection of its own Effence, which is fuch that it is not poffible that it fhould ever have either a Beginning or an End of its Existence. And whatfoever is thus felf-exiftent, or exifteth neceffarily of [VOL. I.] itself,

D

itself, must be independent and felf-fufficient. As it was not beholden to any other for its Being or Perfections, fo there is no other on whom it can be fuppofed in any Cafe to depend. It fubfifteth wholly and only of itself, and standeth not in Need of foreign Affiftance or Support. And for the fame Reason that it is felf-fufficient and independent, it is unchangeable too. That which exifteth neceffarily from everlafting cannot reasonably be fuppofed to be liable to Alteration or Change, fince it is neither obnoxious to the Power or Influence of any external Caufe, nor can have any internal Weakness or Principle of Change in itself, and therefore must continue to everlasting, the fame that it was from everlasting.

It may be farther added, that to be felfexiftent includeth abfolute Perfection in its Idea. All derivative Beings are limited in one respect or other, and the Reason is plain, because they owe their Exiftence, and their Perfections, their Nature and Properties, to a fuperior Cause. But that Being which exifteth neceffarily and of itself, cannot be limited. For it hath nothing to restrain or limit it from without, fince it hath no fuperior no fuperior Cause to determine it to any particular Portion or Quantity of Being or Excellence, nor

hath

hath it any Restriction or Limitation arifing from within, or from its own Nature, fince its exifting neceffarily could be only owing to the abfolute and unparalleled Excellency of its own Nature. And what imaginable Reason can be given why the neceffarily exiftent Being, that hath nothing to fet Bounds to it, fhould have fome Perfections and not all?

And now it appeareth what an eminent and glorious Prerogative this of eternal and neceffary Exiftence is, and that there must needs be an infinite and unconceivable Difference between a Being to which this Privilege belongeth, and a Being that hath nothing of itself, but deriveth all that it is and hath from the Will and Power of another. We fhould therefore, in the inward Eftimation of our Minds, put an immenfe Difference between the eternal and neceffarily exiftent Jehovah, and all other Beings whatfoever; acknowledge his unequalled Glory and Majefty, that he is, and there is none other befides him. He is the rò ov, as one of the most eminent of the ancient Philofophers called him, the Being, by Way of Eminency, that which is or exifteth, viz. neceffarily of himself. Whereas other Things have only a precarious contingent Being, and therefore, in Comparison of God, they