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Py. Very true; we are both perfectly innocent; and it is equally unjust to make either of us suffer.
Dio. Why dost thou then assert, that it were injustice to put him to death instead of thee?
Py. It is unjust, in the same degree, to inflict death either on Damon or myself; but Pythias were highly culpable to let Damon suffer that death, which the tyrant had prepared for Pythias only.
Dio. Dost thou then return hither, on the day appointed, with no other view, than to save the life of a friend, by losing thy own?
Py. I return, in regard to thee, to suffer an act of injustice which it is common for tyrants to inflict; and, with respect to Damon, to perform my duty, by rescuing him from the danger he incurred by his generosity to me.
Dio. And now, Damon, let me address myself to thee. Didst thou not really fear, that Pythias would never return; and that thou wouldst be put to death on his account?
Da. I was but too well assured, that Pythias would punctually return; and that he would be more solicitous to keep his promise, than to preserve his life. Would to heaven, that his relations and friends had forcibly detained him! He would then have lived for the comfort and benefit of good men; and I should have had the satisfaction of dying for him!
Dio. What! Does life displease thee?
Da. Yes: it displeases me when I see and feel the power of a tyrant.
pio. It is well! Thou shalt see him no more. I will order thee to be put to death immediately.
Py. Pardon the feelings of a man who sympathises with his dying friend. But remember it was Pythias who was devoted by thee to destruction. I come to submit to it, that I may redeem my friend. Do not refuse me this consolation in my last hour.
Dio. I cannot endure men who despise death, and set my power at defiance.e Da. Thou canst not, then, endure virtue.
Dio. No: I cannot endure that proud, disdainful virtue, which contemns lise; which dreads no punishment; and which is insensible to the charms of riches and pleasure.
Da. Thou seest, however, that it is a virtue, which is not insensible to the dictates of honour, justice, and friendship.
Dio. Guards, take Pythias to execution. We shall see whether Damon will continue to despise my authority.
Da. Pythias, by returning to submit himself to thy pleasure, has merited his life, and deserved thy favour; but I have excited thy indignation, by resigning, myself to thy power, in order to save him; be satisfied, then, with this sacrifice, and put me to death.
Py. Hold, Dionysius! remember, it was Pythias alone who offended thee: Damon could not
Dio. Alas! what do I see and hear! where am I? How miserable; and how worthy to be so! I have hitherto known nothing of true virtue. I have spent my life in darkness and errour. All my power and honours are insufficient to produce love. I cannot boast of having acquired a single friend, in the course of a reign of thirty
And yet these two persons, in a private condition, love one another tenderly, unreservedly confide in each other, are mutually happy, and ready to die for each other's preservation.
Py. How couldst thou, who hast never loved any person, expect to have friends? If thou hadst loved and respected men, thou wouldst have secured their love and respect. - Thou hast feared mankind; and they fear thee; they detest thee.
Ďio. Damon, Pythias, condescends to admit me as a third friend, in a connexion so perfect. I give you your lives; and I will load you with riches.
Dá. We have no desire to be enriched by thee; and, in regard to thy friendship, we cannot accept or enjoy it, till thou become good and just. Without these qualities, thou canst be connected with none but trembling slaves, and base flatterers. To be loved and esteemed by men of free and generous minds, thou must be virtuous, affectionate, disinterested, beneficent; and know how to live in a sort of equality with those who share and deserve thy friendship.
Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambray.
SECTION III. a Skep-ti-cism, skep-te-sizm, uni-ic Un-dis-cov-er-a-ble, ủn-dis-kủy. versal doubt.
ůr--bl, not to be seen. b Dog-ma-tize, dog'-må-tize. to as- d Nos-trum, nogʻ-trům, a medicine sert positively
not made publick,
e Log-ick, lod/-jik, the art of reason-js Sect, sekt, a body of men united ing well.
in some particular tenets. f En-vel-ope, én-vél-iip, to inwrap, t Sanc-tion, sångk -shủn, ratificahide.
tion, a law, to ratify. g Pre-sume, pré-zúme', to suppose, u Rig-id, rid-jid, stift, severe, inventure.
flexible. h Pred-e-ces-sor, préd-e-s&s'-sůr, anv Pas-sion, påsh'-ún, commotion of
ancestor, one going before. the mind, anger, love. i Phe-năm-e-non, fe-nômo-e-nôn, ado Cred-u-lous, kred -3d-lds, too apt new appearance.
to believe. & Ge-om-e-try," je-ôm-me-trė, the < Pest,pést,plague,pestilence, bane. science of quantity: * '
y Fraud, frảwd, cheat, trick,artifice. 1 Fa-nat-ick, f3-nát-ik, an enthusi- z De-lir-i-um, de-lirl-e-úm, alienaastick person.
tion of mind, dotage. * m En-thu-si-asm, én-thu'-zhe-ázm, a Mas-sa-cre, mås-så-kår, butchheat of imagination.
ery, murder. n Des-cartes,de-kårt',a philosopher.lb Con-vul-sion, kön-vål'-shủn, an o Ob-scene, ob-séén', immodest, dis involuntary contraction, gusting.
c Par-a-lyt-ic-al, pår-å-lit'-tik-ål, p Pen-i-tence, pên'-ne-tense, re palsied, inclined to palsy. pentance.
d E-van-gel-i-cal, e-van-jél-e-kål, 9 In-fir-mi-ty, in-fér/-me-te, weak agreeable to gospel. ness, sickness.
le Med-i-cine, měd'-de-sin, a remeto Con-se-crate, kõn'-se-krate, to dy, physick. make sacred, dedicate.
LOCKE AND BAYLE.
Bayle. Yes, we were both philosophers; but my philosophy was the deepest. You dogmatized;" I doubted,
Locke. Do you make doubting a proof of depth în philosophy? It may be a good beginning of it; but it is a badend.
Bayle. No:-the more profound our searches are into the nature of things, the more uncertainty we shall und; and the most subtle minds see objections and difficulties in every system, which are overlooked or undiscoverable by ordinary understandings.
Locke. It would be better then to be no philosopher, and to continue in the vulgar herd of mankind, that one may have the convenience of thinking that one knows something. I find that the eyes which nature has given me, see many things very clearly, though some are out of their reach, or discerned but dimly. What opinion ought I to have of a physician, who should offer me an eye-water, the use of which would at first so sharpen my sight, as to carry it farther than ordinary vision; but would in the end put them out? Your philosophy is to the eyes of the mind,
what I have supposed the doctor's nostrumd to be to those of the body. It actually brought your own excellent understanding, which was by nature quick-sighted, and rendered more so by art and a subtilty of logick peculiar to yourself-it brought, I say, your very acute understanding to see nothing clearly; and enveloped all the great truths of reason and religion in mists of doubt.
Bayle. I own it did;--but your comparison is not just. I did not see well before I used my philosophick eye-water: I only supposed I saw well; but I was in an errour, with all the rest of mankind. The blindness was real, the perceptions were imaginary. I cured myself first of those false imaginations, and then I laudably endeavoured to cure other men.
Locke. A great cure indeed! and do not you think, that in return for
the service you did them, they ought to erect you a statue?
Bayle. Yes; it is good for human nature to know its own. weakness. When we arrogantly presumes on a strength we have not, we are always in great danger of hurting ourselves, or at least of deserving ridicule and contempt, by vain and idle efforts.
Locke. I agree with you, that human nature should know its own weakness; but it should also feet ts strength, and try to improve it. This was my employment as a philosopher. I endeavoured to discover the real powers of the mind, to see what it could do, and what it could not; to restrain it from efforts beyond its ability; but to teach it how to advance as far as the faculties given to it by nature, with the utmost exertion and most proper culture of them, would allow it to go. In the vast ocean of philosophy, I had the line and the plumpret always in my hands. Many of its depths I found myself unable to fathom; but, by caution in sounding, and the careful observations I made in the course of my voyage, I found out some truths of so much use to mankind, that they acknowledge me to have been their benefactor.
Bayle. Their ignorance makes them think so. Some other philosopher will come hereafter, and show those truths to be falsehoods. He will pretend to discover other truths of equal importance.
A later sage will arise, perhaps among men now barbarous an unlearned, whose sagacious discoveries will discredit the opinions of his auınır
ed predecessors. In philosophy, as in nature, all changes its form, and one thing exists by the destruction of another.
Locké. Opinions taken up without a patient investigation, depending on terms not accurately defined, and principles begged without proof, like theories to explain the phænomenal of nature, built on suppositions instead of experiments, must perpetually change and destroy one anoTher. But some opinions there are, even in matters not obvious to the common sense of mankind, which the mind has received on such rational grounds of assent, that they are as immoveable as the pillars of heaven; or (to speak philosophically) as the great laws of Nature, by which, under God, the universe is sustained. Can you seriously think, that, because the hypothesis of your countryman, Descartes, which was nothing but an ingenious, well-imagined romance, has been lately exploded, the system of Newton, which is built on experiments and geometry," the two most centain methods of discovering truth, will ever fail; or, that, because the whims of fanaticks' and the divinity of the schoolmen, cannot now be supported, the doctrines of that religion, which I, the declared enemy of all enthusiasm" and false reasoning, firmly believed and maintained, will ever he shaken?
Bayle. I you had asked Descartes," while he was in the height of his vogue, whether his system would ever be confuted by any other philosophers, as that of Aristotle had been by his, what answer do you suppose he would have returned?
Locke. Come, come, you yourself know the difference between the foundations on which the credit of those systems, and that of Newton is placed. Your skepticism is more affected than real. You founit it a shorter way to a great reputation, (the only wish of your heart,) to object, than to defend; to pull down, than to set up.And your talents were admirable for that kind of work, Then your huddling together in a Critical Dictionary, a pleasant tale, or obscene jest, and a grave argument against the Christian religion, a witty confutation of some absurd author, and an artful sophism to impeach some respectable truth, was particularly commodious to all our young smarts and smatterers in free-thinking. But what mischief have you not done to human society?-You have endeavoured, and with some degree of success, to shake those foundations, on which the whole moral world