as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined them. Ideas thus made up of feveral fimple ones put together, I call complex; fuch as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the univerfe; which though complicated of various fimple ideas, or complex ideas made up of fimple ones, yet are, when the mind pleafes, confidered each by itself as one entire thing, and fignified by one name.

§ 2. Made voluntarily.

In this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what fenfation or reflection furnished it with; but all this ftill confined to thofe fimple ideas which it received from those two fources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compofitions; for fimple ideas are all from things themselves, and of these the mind can have no more, nor other than what are fuggefted to it. It can have no other ideas of fenfible qualities than what come from without by the fenfes, nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a thinking fubftance, than what it finds in itfelf; but when it has once got thefe fimple ideas, it is not confined barely to obfervation, and what offers itself from without; it can, by its own power, put together thofe illeas it has, and make new complex ones, which it never received fo united.

§3. Are either Modes, Subftances, or Relations. COMPLEX ideas, however compounded and decompounded, though their number be infinite, and the variety endless, wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men; yet, I think, they may be all reduced under these three heads :

1. Modes.

2. Subftances.
3. Relations.

$ 4. Modes.

FIRST, Modes I call fuch complex ideas, which however compounded, contain not in them the fuppofition of subfifting by themselves, but are confidered as dependences on, or affections of fubftances; fuch are the ideas fig

Book IF.. nified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, &c. And if in this I use the word mode in fomewhat a different fenfe from its ordinary fignification, I beg par'don; it being unavoidable in difcourfes, differing from the ordinary received notions, either to make new words, or to use old words in fomewhat a new fignification; the latter whereof, in our prefent cafe, is perhaps the. more tolerable of the two.

§ 5. Simple and mixed Modes.

Or thefe modes, there are two forts which deferve diftinct confideration: First, There are fome which are only variations, or different combinations of the fame fimple idea, without the mixture of any other, as a dozen or fcore, which are nothing but the ideas of fo many distinct units added together; and thefe I call fimple modes, as being contained within the bounds of one. fimple idea.

Secondly, There are others compounded of fimple. ideas of feveral kinds, put together to make one complex one; v. g. beauty, confifting of a certain compofition of colour and figure, caufing delight in the beholder; theft, which being the concealed change of the poffeffion of any thing, without the confent of the pro prietor, contains, as is vifible, a combination of feveral ideas of feveral kinds; and thefe I call mixed modes. § 6. Subftances fingle or collective.

SECONDLY, The ideas of fubftances are fuch combinations or fimple ideas, as are taken to reprefent diftinct particular things fubfifting by themselves, in which the fuppofed or confufed idea of fubftance, fuch as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus, if to fubftance be joined the fimple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fufibility, we have the idea of lead; and a combination of the ideas of a certain fort of figure, with the powers of motion, thought, and reasoning, joined to fubftance, make the ordinary idea of a man. Now of fubftances alfo there are two forts of ideas, one of fingle fubftances, as they exift feparately, as of a man or a sheep; the other of feveral of thofe put together, as an army

of men, or flock of fheep: Which collective ideas of feveral fubftances thus put together, are as much each of them one fingle idea, as that of a man, or an unit.

§ 7. Relation.

THIRDLY, The laft fort of complex ideas, is that we call relation, which confifts in the confideration and comparing one idea with another, Of these several kinds we fhall treat in their order.

$8. The abftrufeft Ideas from the two Sources. Is we trace the progrefs of our minds, and with atten tion obferve how it repeats, adds together, and unites its fimple ideas received from fenfation or reflection, it will lead us farther than at firft perhaps we should have. imagined. And I believe we fhall find, if we warily obferve the originals of our notions, that even the most abflrufe ideas, how remote foever they may feem from: fenfe, or from any operation of our own minds, are yet only fuch as the understanding frames to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas, that it had either. from objects of fenfe, or from its own operations about them; fo that thofe even large and abstract ideas, are derived from fenfation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties,, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it obferves in itself about them,. may and does attain unto. This I fhall endeavour to fhow in the ideas we have of Space, time, and infinity, and fome few others, that seem the moft remote from thofe originals.

CHAP. XIII.

OF SIMPLE MODES; AND FIRST, OF THE SIMPLE MODES OF SPACE.

TH

1. Simple Modes.

HOUGH in the foregoing part I have often mentioned fimple ideas, which are truly the materials of all our knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the mind,

than as diftinguished from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amifs to take a view of fome of them again under this confideration, and examine thofe different modifications of the fame idea, which the mind either finds in things exifting, or is able to make within itself, without the help of any extrinsical object, or any foreign fuggeftion.

Thofe modifications of any one fimple idea (which, as has been faid, I call fimple modes) are as perfectly different and diftinct ideas in the mind, as those of the greateft diftance and contrariety. For the idea of tavo is as diftinct from that of one, as blueness from heat, or either of them from any number; and yet it is made up only of that fimple idea of an unit repeated; and repetitions of this kind joined together, make those distinct fimple modes, of a dozen, a grofs, a million.

2. Idea of Space.

I SHALL begin with the fimple idea of space. I have fhowed above, chap. 4. that we get the idea of space, both by our fight and touch; which, I think, is fo evident, that it would be as needless to go to prove that men perceive, by their fight, a diftance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the same body, as that they fee colours themselves; nor is it lefs obvious that they can do fo in the dark by feeling and touch.

3. Space and Extenfion.

THIS space confidered barely in length between any two beings, without confidering any thing elfe between them, is called diftance; if confidered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called capacity. The term extenfion is ufually applied to it, in what manner foever confidered.

§ 4. Immenfity.

EACH different diftance is a different modification of fpace; and each idea of any different diftance or space is a fimple mode of this idea. Men, for the ufe, and by the cuftom of meafuring, fettle in their minds the ideas of certain ftated lengths, fuch as are an inch, foot, yard, fathom, mile, diameter of the earth, &c. which are fo

many diftinct ideas made up only of space. When any. fuch stated lengths or measures of space are made familiar to mens thoughts, they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the idea of body, or any thing elfe, and frame to themselves the ideas of long, fquare, or cubic, feet, yards, or fathoms, here amongst the bodies of the univerfe, or elfe beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies; and by adding these ftill one to another, enlarge their idea of space as much as they pleafe. This power of repeating, or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of immenfity.

§ 5. Figure.

THERE is another modification of this idea, which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extenfion, or circumfcribed space, have amongst themselves. This the touch difcovers in fenfible bodies, whose extremities come within our reach; and the eye takes both from bodies and colours, whofe boundaries are within its view; where obferving how the extremities terminate either in ftraight lines, which meet at difcernible angles, or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceived, by confidering these as they relate to one another, in all parts of the extremities of any body or space, it has that idea we call figure, which affords to the mind infinite variety: For befides the vaft number of different figures that do really exift in the coherent maffes of matter, the stock that the mind has in its power, by varying the idea of fpace, and thereby making ftill new compofitions, by repeating its own ideas, and joining them as it pleafes, is perfectly inexhaustible; and fo it can multiply figures in infi

nitum.

§ 6. Figure.

FOR the mind having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly stretched out, and join it to another in the fame direction, which is to double the length of