ty of one as great as the other. For in both the propofitions, the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds; and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur, is as clear and visible to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man; and so these two propofitions are equally true, equally certain. But of what ufe is all fuch truth to us?

8. Anfwered, Real Truth is about Ideas agreeing

to things.

THOUGH what has been faid in the foregoing chapter, to distinguish real from imaginary knowledge, might fuffice here, in anfwer to this doubt, to distinguish real truth from chimerical, or (if you pleafe) barely nominal, they depending both on the fame foundation; yet it may not be amifs here again to confider, that though our words fignify nothing but our ideas, yet being defigned by them to fignify things, the truth they contain, when put into propofitions, will be only verbal, when they ftand for ideas in the mind, that have not an agreement with the reality of things. And therefore truth, as well as knowledge, may well come under the distinction of verbal and real; that being only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or difagreement of the ideas they stand for, without regarding whether our ideas are fuch as really have, or are capable of having an existence in nature. But then it is they contain real truth, when thefe figns are joined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are fuch, as we know are capable of having an existence in nature; which in fubftances we cannot know, but by knowing that fuch have exifted. § 9. Falfebood is the joining of Names otherwife

than their Ideas agree.

TRUTH is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is; Falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement or difagreement of ideas otherwife than it is; and fo far as thefe ideas, thus marked by founds, agree to their archetypes, fo far only is the truth real. The know

ledge of this truth confifts in knowing what ideas the words ftand for, and the perception of the agreement or difagreement of thofe ideas, according as it is marked by those words.

$ 10. General Propofitions to be treated of more at large.

BUT because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in reafoning about it, we make use of words and propofitions, I fhall more at large inquire, wherein the certainty of real truths, contained in propofitions, confifts, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to fhow in what fort of univerfal propofitions we are capable of being cer tain of their real truth or falfehood.

I fhall begin with general propofitions, as thofe which most employ our thoughts, and exercife our contemplation. General truths are most looked after by the mind, as thofe that moft enlarge our knowledge; and by their comprehenfiveness, fatisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and fhorten our way to knowledge.

§ 11. Moral and metaphyfical Truth.

BESIDES truth taken in the ftrict fenfe before mentioned, there are other forts of truths; as, 1. Moral truth, which is fpeaking of things according to the perfuafion of our own minds, though the propofition we speak agree not to the reality of things. 2. Metaphyfical truth, which is nothing but the real exiftence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to confist in the very beings of things, yet when confidered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit propofition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before fettled with a name to it. But thefe confiderations of truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our prefent purpofe, it may fuffice here only to have mentioned them.

TH

CERTAINTY.

§ 1. Treating of Words neceffary to knowledge. HOUGH the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names being quite laid afide, be the best and fureft way to clear and diftinct knowledge; yet through the prevailing cuftom of ufing founds for ideas, I think it is very feldom practifed. Every one may obferve how common it is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reafon within their own breafts; efpecially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of fimple ones. This makes the confideration of words and propofitions fo neceffary a part of the treatife of knowledge, that it is very hard to fpeak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.

§ 2. General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal Propofitions.

ALL the knowledge we have being only of particular or general truths, it is evident that whatever may be done in the former of thefe, the latter, which is that which with reafon is moft fought after, can never be well made known, and is very feldom apprehended, but as conceived and expreffed in words. It is not

therefore out of our way, in the examination of our knowledge, to inquire into the truth and certainty of univerfal propofitions.

§2. Certainty twofold, of Truth and of Knowledge. BUT that we may not be mifled in this cafe, by that which is the danger every where, I mean by the doubtfuluefs of terms, it is fit to observe, that certainty is twofold; certainty of truth, and certainty of knowledge. Certainty of truth is when words are fo put together in propofitions as exactly to exprefs the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they ftand for,

Book IV. as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or difagreement of ideas, as exprefled in any propofition. This we ufually call knowing, or being certain of the truth of any propofition.

4. No Propofition can be known to be true, where the Effence of each Species mentioned is not known. Now because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general propofition, unless we know the precife bounds and extent of the fpecies its terms ftand for, it is necesfary we should know the effence of each Species, which is that which conftitutes and bounds it. This in all fimple ideas and modes is not hard to do; for in thefe the real and nominal effence being the fame, or, which is all one, the abilract idea which the general term ftands for, being the fole effence and boundary that is or can be fuppofed of the fpecies, there can be no doubt how far the Species extends, or what things are comprehended under each term ; which, it is evident, are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it ftands for, and no other. But in fubftances wherein a real effence diftin&t from the nominal is fuppofed to conftitute, determine, and bound the fpecies, the extent of the general word is very uncertain; because not knowing this real ef fence, we cannot know what is or is not of that Species, and confequently what may or may not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus fpeaking of a man or gold, or any other fpecies of natural fubftances, as fuppofed conflituted by a precife real effence, which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind, whereby.it is made to be of that fpecies, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it: For man or gold taken in this sense, and used for Species of things conftituted by real effences different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker, ftand for we know not what ; and the extent of thefe fpecies, with fuch boundaries, are fo unknown and undetermined, that it is impoffible with any certainty to affirm, that all men are ra tional, or that all gold is yellow. But where the no.

Fminal effence is kept to, as the boundary of each fpecies, and men extend the application of any general term no farther than to the particular things in which the complex idea it ftands for is to be found, there they are in no danger to miflake the bounds of each Species, nor can be in doubt, on this account, whether any propofition be true or no. I have chofe to explain this uncertainty of propofitions in this fcholaftic way, and have made ufe of the terms of effences and Species, on purpofe to fhow the abfurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any other fort of realities, than barely abstract ideas with names to them. To fuppofe that the Species of things are any thing but the forting of them under general names, according as they agree to feveral abftract ideas, of which we make thofe names the figns, is to confound truth, and introduce uncertainty into all general propofitions that can be made about them. Though therefore thefe things might, to people not poffeffed with fcholaftic learning, be perhaps treated of in a better and clearer way, yet thofe wrong notions of efences or fpecies having got root in most people's Ininds, who have received any tincture from the learning which has prevailed in this part of the world, are to be discovered and removed, to make way for that ufe of words which fhould convey certainty with it.

§ 5. This more particularly concerns Subftances. THE names of fubftances then, whenever made to ftand for fpecies, which are fuppofed to be conftituted by real efences, which we know not, are not capable to convey certainty to the understanding. Of the truth of general propofitions made up of fuch terms, we cannot be fure; the reafon whereof is plain; for how can we be fure that this or that quality is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of fpeaking, nothing is gold but what partakes of an effence, which we not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and fo cannot be fure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this fenfe gold; being incurably ignorant, whether it has or has not