revelation we have received it, and without revela thele maxins had never been able to help us to When we find out an idea, by whole intervention we discover the connection of two others, this is a revela, tion from God to us, by the voice of reafon; for we then come to know a truth that we did not know before. When God declares any truth to us, this is a revelation to us by the voice of his fpirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge; but in neither of thefe do we receive our light or knowledge from `mas. ims; but in the one, the things themselves afford it, and we fee the truth in them by perceiving their agreement or disagreement; in the other, God him. felf affords it immediately to us, and we fee the truth of what he fays in his onerring veracity.

3. They are not of ufe to help men forward in the advancement of sciences, or new discoveries of yet unknown truths. Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired book, has demonftrated feveral propofitions, which are fo many new truths, before un known to the world, and are farther advances in mathematical knowledge; but for the difcovery of thefe, it was not the general maxims, what is, is, or, tha whole is bigger than a part, or the like, that helped him; these were not the clues that led him into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propofitions, nor was it by them that, he got the knowledge of thofe demonftrations; but by finding out intermediate ideas, that showed the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, as expreffed in the propofi tions he demonftrated. This is the great exercife and improvement of human understanding in the enlar ging of knowledge, and advancing the fciences, wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the contemplation of thefe, or the like magnified maxims, Would thofe who have this traditional admiration of these propofitions, that they think no ftep can be made in knowledge without the fupport of an axiom, no stone laid in the building of the fciences without a general maxim, but distinguish between the me-

of acquiring knowledge, and of communicating; tween the method of railing any fcience, and that of teaching it to others as far as it is advanced; they would fee that thofe general maxims were not the foundations on which the first difcoverers raised their admirable structures, nor the keys that unlocked and opened thofe fecrets of knowledge; though afterwards, when fchools were erected, and fciences had their profeffors to teach what others had found out, they often made ufe of maxims, i. e. laid down certain propofitions which were felf-evident, or to be received for true; which being fettled in the minds of their fcholars as unquestionable verities, they on occafion made ufe of, to convince them of truths in particular inftances that were not fo familiar to their minds as thofe general axioms which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully fettled in their minds; though thefe particular inftances, when well reflected on, are no lefs felf-evident to the understanding, than the general maxims brought to confirm them; and it was in thofe particular inftances that the firit difcoverer found the truth, without the help of the general maxims : And fo may any one elfe do, who with attention confiders them.

To come, therefore, to the ufe that is made of maximis,

1. They are of ufe, as has been obferved, in the ordinary methods of teaching fciences as far as they are advanced, but of little or none in advancing them - farther.

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2. They are of ufe in difputes, for the filencing of obtinate wranglers, and bringing thofe contefts to fome conclufion. Whether a need of them to that end? came not in, in the manner following, I crave leave to inquire. The Ichools having made difputation the touchitone of mens abilities, and the criterion of know ledge, adjudged victory to him that kept the field;" and he that had the last word, was concluded to have the better of the argument, if not of the caufe; but becaufe by this means there was like to be no decifion be

tween skilful combatants, whilst one never failed of a medius terminus to prove any propofition, and the other could as conftantly, without or with a distinc tion, deny the major or minors to prevent, as much as could be, the running out of difputes into an end. lefs train of fyllogifms, certain general propofitions, most of them indeed felf-evident, were introduced into the fchools, which being fuch as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general measures of truth, and ferved instead of principles (where the difputants had not laid down any other be tween them), beyond which there was no goiug, and which must not be receded from by either fide. thus thefe maxims getting the name of principles, be yond which men in difpute could not retreat, were by milake taken to be the originals and fources from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations whereon the fciences were built; because, when in their difputes they came to any of thefe, they stopped there, and went no farther, the matter was determined. But how much this is a mistake hath been already shown.

And

This method of the fchools, which have been thought the fountains of knowledge, introduced, as I fuppofe, the like use of these maxims into a great part of converfation out of the schools, to ftop the mouths of cavillers, whom any one is excufed from arguing any longer with, when they deny thefe genes ral felf-evident principles received by all reasonable men who have once thought of them; but yet their ufe herein is but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in fuch cafes, teach nothing; that is already done by the intermediate ideas made ufe of in the debate, whofe connection may be feen without the help of thofe maxims, and fo the truth is known before the maxim is produced, and the argument brought to a firft principle. Men would give off a wrong argument before it came to that, if in their difputes they propofed to themselves the finding and embracing of truth, and not a conteft for victory

e and thus maxims have their ufe to put a stop to their perverfenefs, whofe ingenuity fhould have yielded fooner; but the method of the fchools having allowed and encouraged men to oppofe and refift evident truth till they are baffled, ie. till they are reduced to contradict themselves or fome established principle, it is no wonder that they should not in civil converfation be ashamed of that which in the fchools is counted a virtue and a glory, viz. obftinately to maintain that fide of the queftion they have chofen, whether true or false, to the laft extremity, even after conviction; a strange way to attain truth and knowledge; and that which I think the rational part of mankind, not corrupted by education, could fcarce believe fhould ever be admitted amongst the lovers of truth, and ftudents of religion or nature, or introduced into the feminaries of those who are to propagate the truths of religion or philofophy amongst the ignorant and unconvinced. How much fuch a way of learning is likely to turn young mens minds from: the fincere fearch and love of truth, nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any fuch thing, or at least worth the adhering to, I fhall not now inquire. This I think, that bating thofe places which brought the peripatetic philosophy into their schools, where it continued many ages, without teaching the world any thing but the art of wrangling, these maxims were nowhere thought the foundations on which the sciences were built, nor the great helps to the ad vancement of knowledge.

What use these general Maxims have! voi As to thefe generul maxims, therefore, they are, as I have faid, of great ufe in difputes, to flop the mouths of wranglers, but not of much ufe to the difcovery of unknown truths, or to help the mind forwards in its fearch after knowledge; for who ever began to build his knowledge on this general propofition, what is, is, or, it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; and from either of thefe, as from a principle of fcience, deduced a system of useful knowledge?

Book IV. Wrong opinions often involving contradictions, one of these maxims, as a touchstone, may ferue well to show whither they lead; but yet, however fit to lay opet the abfurdity or mistake of a man's realoning er opi nion, they are of very little fe for enlightening the understanding; and it will not be found that the misd receives much help from thes in its progr is in knowledge, which would be neither lefs, nor lefs cer tain, were thefe two general propofitions never thought on. It is true, as I have faid, they fometimes ferm in argumentation to flop a wrangler's month, by now. ing the abfurdity of what he faith, and by expofing him to the fhame of contradicting what all the world knows, and he himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing to show a man that he is in an er ror, and another to put him in poffeffion of truth; and I would fain know what truths these two prope, sitions are able to teach, and by their influence make us know, which we did not know before, or could not know without them. Let us reafon from them as well as we can, they are only about identical predications, and influence, if any at all, none but fuch. Each particular propofition concerning identity of diversity is as clearly and certainly known in itself, if attended to, as either of thefe general ones; only thefe general ones, as ferving in all cafes, are therefore more incul cated and infifted on. As to other lefs general maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal propofi, tions, and teach us nothing but the refpect and impots of names one to another. The whole is equal to all in parts; what real truth, I beseech you, does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim than what the fignification of the word totum, or the whole, does of itlelf import? and he that knows that the word wholt ftands for what is made up of all its parts, knows very little lefs than that the whole is equal to all its parti: And upon the fame ground, I think that this propo fition, a bill is bigber than a valley, and feveral the like, may also pals for maxims; but yet masters of mathematics, when they would, as teachers of what