Book IV matter; but it depends upon collection and obfervi tion, by which he is to make his complex idea call

man.

$ 17.

SECONDLY, another that hath gone farther in framing and collecting the idea he calls man, and to the ou ward fhape adds laughter and rational difcourfe, m demonftrate that infants and changelings are no me, by this maxim, it is impoffible for the fame thing to b and not to be and I have difcourfed with very ratios al men, who have actually denied that they are men. $ 18.

THIRDLY, perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls man, only out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language and reafon, and leaves out the fhape wholly. This man is able to de monftrate, that a man may have no hands, but be quadrupes, neither of those being included in his ides of man; and in whatever body or shape he found Speech and reafon joined, that was a man; because having a clear knowledge of fuch a complex idea, it is certain that what is, is.

§ 19. Little Ufe of thefe Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and diftinct Ideas.

So that, if rightly confidered, I think we may fay, that where our ideas are determined in our minds and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those fettled determinations, there is littl need or no ufe at all of these maxims, to prove the agreement or difagreement of any of them. He that cannot difcern the truth or falfehood of fuch prope fitions, without the help of thefe and the like maxims, will not be helped by thefe maxims to do it; fince he cannot be fuppofed to know the truth of these maxims themselves without proof, if he cannot know the truth of others without proof, which are as felf-evident as thefe. Upon this ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will fuppofe it does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and cer

97 tainty; and he that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his affent to this propofition, that two. are equal to trvo, will also have need of a proof to make him admit, that what is is. He that needs a probation to convince him, that two are not three, that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle, &c. or any other two determined diftinct ideas are not one and the fame, will need alfo a demonstration to convince him that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be,

and not to be.

§ 20. Their Ufe dangerous where our Ideas are con

fufed.

AND as these maxims are of little ufe, where we have : determined ideas, so they are, as I have showed, of dangerous ufe, where our ideas are not determined, and where we use words that are not annexed to determined ideas, but such as are of a loose and wandering tignification, fometimes ftanding for one, and fometimes for another idea; from which follows miftake and error, which these maxims (brought as proofs to establish propofitions, wherein the terms ftand for undetermined ideas) do by their authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.

§1. Some Propofitions bring no Increase to our know

WE

ledge.

HETHER the maxims treated of in the fore going chapter, be of that use to real knowledge, as is generally fuppofed, I leave to be confidered. This I think may confidently be affirmed, that there are univerfal propofitions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understandings, bring no increase to our knowledge. Such are,

$2. As firft, Identical Propofitions. FIRST, All purely identical propofitions. These obvioufly, and at first blush, appear to contain no inftrucVOL. III. E

tion in them; for when we affirm the faid term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether fuch a propofition be either made by or propofed to us. Indeed that moft general one, what is is, may ferve fometimes to show a man the abfurdity he is guilty of, when by circumlocution, or equivocal terms, he would in particular inftances deny the fame thing of itself; because nobody will fo openly bid defiance to common fense, as to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words; or if he does, á man is excufed if he breaks off any farther difcourfe with him. But yet I think I may fay, that neither that received maxim, nor any other identical propofition, teaches us any thing; and though in fuch kind of propofitions, this great and magnified maxim, boafted to be the foundation of demonstration, may be, and often is made ufe of to confirm them, yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, that the fame word may with great certainty be affirmed of itfelf, without any doubt of the truth of any fuch propofition, and let me add alfo, without any real knowledge.

FOR at this rate, any very ignorant perfon who can but make a propofition, and knows what he means when he fays, ay or no, may make a million of propofitions, of whofe truths he may be infalliby certain,' and yet not know one thing in the world thereby; v. g. what is a foul is a foul; or a foul is a fout; a Spirit is a fpirit; a feitiche is a feitiche, &c. Thefe all being equivalent to this propofition, viz. what is is, i. e. what hath exiflence hath existence; or, who hath a foul hath a foul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like a monkey fhifting his oyiter from one hand to the other; and had he had but words, might, no doubt, have faid, oyster in right hand is fubject, and oyster in left hand is predicate; and fo might have made a felf-evident propofition of oyster, i. e. offer is oyfter; and yet, with all this,

99 not have been one whit the wifer or more knowing: and that way of handling the matter would much at once have fatisfied the monkey's hunger, or a man's understanding; and they two would have improved in knowledge and bulk together.

I know there are fome, who because identical propofitions are felf-evident, fhow a great concern for them, and think they do great fervice to philofophy by crying them up, as if in them was contained all knowledge, and the understanding were led into all truth by them only. I grant, as forwardly as any one, that they are all true and felf-evident. I grant, farther, that the foundation of all our knowledge lies in the faculty we have of perceiving the fame idea to be the fame, and of difcerning it from those that are different, as I have fhown in the foregoing chapter. But how that vindicates the making ufe of identical propofitions, for the improvement of knowledge, from the imputation of trifling, I do not fee. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleafes, that the will is the will, or lay what ftrefs on it he thinks fit, of what ufe is this, and an infinite the like propofitions, for the enlarging our knowledge? Let a man abound as much as the plenty of words which he has will permit him in fuch propofitions as thefe; a law is a law, and obligation is obligation; right is right, and wrong is wrong will thefe and the like ever help him to an acquaintance with ethics? or inftruct him or others in the knowledge of morality? Those who know not, nor perhaps ever will know, what is right and what is wrong, nor the measures of them, can with as much affurance make, and infallibly know the truth of thefe and all fuch propofitions, as he that is beft instructed in morality can do. But what advance do fuch propofitions give in the knowledge of any thing neceffary or useful for their conduct?

:

He would be thought to do little lefs than trifle, who, for the enlightening the understanding in any part of knowledge, fhould be bufy with identical propofitions, and infift on fuch maxims as thefe: fuba

flance is fubflance, and body is body; a vacuum is a vacuum, and a vortex is a vortex; a centaur is a cen taur, and a chimera is a chimera, &c.; for these and all fuch are equally true, equally certain, and equally felf-evident; but yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made ufe of as principles of inftruction, and ftrefs laid on them, as helps to knowledge; fince they teach nothing but what every one, who is capa ble of difcourfe, knows without being told, viz. that the fame term is the fame term, and the fame idea the fame idea. And upon this account it was that I formerly did, and do ftill think, the offering and incul cating fuch propofitions, in order to give the underftanding any new light or inlet into the knowledge of things, no better than trifling.

Inftruction lies in fomething very different; and he that would enlarge his own, or another's mind, to truths he does not yet know, muft find out intermediate ideas, and then lay them in fuch order one by another, that the understanding may fee the agreement or difagreement of thofe in queftion. Propofitions that do this are inftructire; but they are far from fuch as affirm the fame term of itself; which is no way to advance one's felf or others in any fort of know. ledge. It no more helps to that, than it would help any one in his learning to read, to have fuch propofitions as these inculcated to him, an A is an A, and a B is a B; which a man may know as well as any schoolmafter, and yet never be able to read a word as long as he lives. Nor do thefe, or any fuch identical propofitions, help him one jot forward in the fkill of reading, let him make what use of them he can.

If thofe who blame my calling them trifling propo fitions, had but read, and been at the pains to underftand what I had above writ in very plain English, they could not but have feen that by identical propofitions, I mean only fuch wherein the fame term importing the fame idea, is aflirmed of itfelf; which I take to be the proper fignification of identical propofitions; and concerning all fuch, I think I may continue fafely