attempted to do, has been, clearly and broadly to lay down the great and important doctrines relating to man's salvation; to recommend and uphold the scriptural form of church government:—which is no more than what is professed to have been done among all Dissenters, although it differs, and justly, from them in many particulars; and then to leave it to individuals to think as they may choose on matters indifferent, and of minor importance. You will tell me, no doubt, as you have in your "Rejoinder," that the things which it considers indifferent, you consider as important. This I allow; but I contend, It is for you to shew by reasons grounded on scripture,—not to go on asserting that these are your convictions, your conscientious opinions, and so on,—that these so named indifferent things are in themselves things important. I say, it is your duty to shew this: and I also say, it is what you have not yet done, nor attempted to do. It is altogether frivolous to talk about convictions, conscience, and the like, unless you can shew that these convictions are grounded on the declarations of God's word, and that this conscience has the scriptures, either expressly, or by way of genuine implication, for its basis. I have already called upon you to determine, in this way, the limits to which conscience and reason ought to go, but you have declined to do so; for the best of reasons no doubt. You seem also to think-in strict conformity indeed with the principles noticed above-that the better way is, to leave these things altogether to the choice of individuals; and in this you certainly are happy. You certainly have hit upon an expedient by no means new, but well calculated to give all the liberty to the subject that he can 4 Page 19, of my last. possibly wish for. I intreat you, nevertheless, to consider, whether this sort of liberty would not much. more correctly be termed libertinism? Whether it is not the very best means for opening the flood-gates of iniquity; and, while it promises the most specious liberty, is not likely to make men the servants of sin. I must confess it grieves me most deeply, to hear it daily asserted to hear it brought forward in parliament as a maxim-that it is not for us to consider the right or the wrong of any form of religion abstractedly, but only to ask what the majority calls for, as if the truths of religion were to be determined as votes are in popular assemblies, or, as if the resources of a Christian state-if any indeed are to be afforded-were to be supplied in accordance with the creed of the many, be that what it may. In conformity with this I suppose it was, if I may judge from what I find in your "Rejoinder," that the question of statistics was introduced in your "Reply.”5 It was to shew, you tell me, that a majority of religious persons in Great Britain was taught on the voluntary system. Still, I repeat it, I do not see what this had, or has now, to do with our question. Unless indeed I am to take it for granted, that what a majority may think or do on this question, is to be assumed as scriptural, and, therefore, as what ought to be universally adopted without any further inquiry. But to this proposition, I cannot with the bible in my hands, and full fifty 5 Pages 45, 46, sec. ed. 11, 12, &c. "More than one half," you say, "are Dissenters." I find, however, from an abstract of the Report of the Education Commissioners, that the Dissenters have in England and Wales 7,172 schools; while there are just 11,352 in connection with the Established Church. How will my friend account for this? He will not argue, I am sure, that this criterion cannot be admitted; nor will he allow that the fact is to be taken as decisive of any question of abstract truth on our side. years of experience in the world, assent. I must add, it gives me real pain to find such a law of iniquity as this-advocated some years ago, indeed, by the ingenious but mistaken Paley-now familiarly advanced in our parliamentary debates, and elsewhere, as a governing principle; and appealed to as decisive on this question, by my very respected and learned friend Dr. Pye Smith. What, think you, would have been said by the prophets under the law, if it had been publicly proposed and maintained that, as the institution of tithes, offerings, &c. had failed to make the majority of the nation religious, and because popular majorities now fearlessly denounced the system as "obsolete;" it became the duty of the legislature to abolish the whole; pull down the temple; sell the materials; and then convert the property so got together, to some other more apparently convenient purpose? Do you imagine they would have taken the ground of Dr. Paley, and after him of every infidel in the empire? Is it not infinitely more likely that they would have desecrated the principle with all the terms of reprobation, and all the energy and force of which they were masters? I now affirm, The case is just the same, where religion positively requires, as it does, THAT to be done now, which it then peremptorily commanded: and also, that every project of a different sort, tending to release a nation, as such, from these its obligations, or, which is the same thing, to divert its resources, be they of what kind they may, into any other apparently more popular channel; is to set up, and act upon, principles altogether opposed to the dictates and spirit of holy writ: the consequence of which must eventually be universal national infidelity. This, I will say, is the most appalling feature of the present day; principle is openly set at nought, and we are instructed to substitute for it the idol expediency; that is, to teach men to do that which is right in their own eyes; and, when the multitude has been fully gorged with this alluring bait, to cry out, Let the majority have it Down with the rest, even to the ground! It may be said, with justice perhaps, by statesmen, that they cannot but legislate to the taste and feelings of the majority; and that, if they attempt to do otherwise, the majority will eventually force them. I answer, It is one thing to do that which cannot be avoided; and another to argue that what is so forced, is necessarily right. For I am at liberty to imagine-what indeed is frequently found to exist-cases in which multitudes have called for measures ruinous to themselves, and to the states in which they lived,-cases in which statesmen were compelled to legislate accordingly; but in which no one will say either the demand, or the legislation, was right or good. But, whatever statesmen may be forced to do, or whatever they may foolishly say, it does not hence follow that either you, my dear friend, or I, should, in order to be popular, either say or teach that which is obviously wrong, or, which is not warranted by our statute-law, the word of truth. If we stand alone, as Elijah thought he did, or as our Lord apparently did, and, if our persons and sentiments should, like theirs, be despised and rejected; we may with God's good help prevail in the end: we may succeed in teaching men better things by endeavouring to establish better principles. Public men surely ought to be the last to give in to error in principle: they ought never to forget how far their opinions will influence those of the public, and how much their efforts usually conspire to fix in the minds of others the principles which will eventually regulate legislation, whether these be good or bad. What ever, I say, statesmen, journalists, dictators, &c. may say or do, our course is clear. It is to set at nought all false and deceptive doctrines; and fearlessly to recommend those which have truth for their origin, and righteousness for their end. Having shewn then that the position, affirming the scriptures to be so far undeterminable that no man, or body of men, can safely recommend an established religion, is false and untenable; that if applied to the statute and common law of the land,—things infinitely more involved and obscure than our revelation is—would be scouted as little short of madness, even by the very persons who are in many cases the most forward to propound it: we may now proceed, the more effectually to meet those specious cases of conscience so frequently adduced in favour of Dissent,-to consider what the scriptures say on this question. And here I must be excused if I venture a little out of the beaten track of expositors taking it as I do for granted that it was a principle of the Reformation,-to which protestants look back with much thankfulness, not to be deterred from the further investigation of truth by the sound of commanding names; but, to the best of their power, to investigate and further to elucidate its saving declarations. SECTION III. On Scriptural Cases of Conscience. Let us now see how one of our sacred legislators has proceeded, in other words, how our argument has worked with him; for, if he has provided us with a text, and a clear case or two in point, we can, by a just and fair analogy, determine how we too ought to proceed in all similar ones. Now, in 1 Cor. vi. 12, we have this Ꭰ |