same would be true of the physician; and, indeed, of every one else engaged in any of the pursuits of life. All these very well know that, should they condescend to fritter away their time and strength on the inferior, the more obscure, and less profitable, parts of their avocations, life would be spent in discussions about trifles, and in the acquisition of nothing; disputes and dissension be so multiplied, good neighbourhood, friendly feeling and co-operation, be so extensively destroyed, that, not only would poverty and ruin generally ensue, but— what is still worse-nothing but battle and warfare would any where exist. In such cases-I fear I may say with truth-the children of this world have shewn themselves generally to be much wiser than the children of light; and here I do not altogether exempt the parties concerned in the present controversy. My reasons will appear in the sequel.

SECTION II.

On the Difficulties of Scripture.

I may now venture to touch on one of the most important sentiments contained in your "Rejoinder," one which I find running through most of the writings of Dissenters of the present day, and not unfrequently urged in society as a governing principle. I must be allowed also to affirm that, on my views, it lies at the very bottom of Dissent:-that it stands on no good foundation, and is as fallacious in its character, as it is ruinous in its tendency. Religion, it is allowed on all hands, is not— and the same may be said of infidelity-without its difficulties. Men will differ in their opinions on some points connected with it. From page 30 to 34, of the "Rejoinder," you dilate greatly on this fact. You press me with, "Who is to determine this question ?"

i. e. as to which is the true form of protestantism. In page 33, you tell me that Fenelon contended for one form of christianity, John Gerhard for another, Dr. Muntinghe and Dr. Chalmers for another; and that I, as strenuously, recommend the Anglican Church as that in which all others should, for the sake of union and communion, merge. You conclude, "This is the presentation of grave and painful facts; and it introduces another question touching the eligibility of church establishments."

The inference to be deduced from all this seems to be, that, as good and great men have differed, no man, no, nor yet any body of men, ought to presume to determine what the true and proper form of protestant Christianity is. I think I cannot be mistaken in saying here that this is the inference intended to be drawn: for you also tell me (p. 32.) from Mr. Milner, that "Nothing can justify the civil magistrate in establishing a false religion. -Governors of states, if they support a false religion, have reason to expect the heavy judgments of God." "So said the excellent Mr. Milner," you add, "resting his conclusion upon the fact, that the evidences of the truth of Christianity are so full and clear, that they cannot be rejected without great wickedness of heart.".... But," you go on, "both Mr. Milner and Dr. Lee fail to tell us by what means this argument can be made to work." I cite this at length, in order to shew why I have taken the inference just mentioned to be that intended by you. Allow me now to examine this a little in detail.

In the preliminary remarks given above, I have allowed that difficulties exist in every profession and occupation of life. That of the law, for example-which consists in duly construing the statutes of the realm, in duly applying previously determined cases, and in giving

the just influence to custom,-has its difficulties. Cases innumerable arise for which no direct provision has been made; not to insist on the ambiguity of statutes, the manifest absurdity of some, and the entire disagreement and clashing together of others. Physic has its difficulties likewise. Art too has its difficulties, and science abounds with them. In these several cases too, men are found to differ in opinion; and, in some, to set up different and rival schools. This, however, generally happens in physic, the sciences, or the arts: because, perhaps, men have here to make out more by their individual exertions, than they have in the profession of the law, which presents them with some data to act upon. The law, therefore, having written documents on which to act, will afford the best parallel to our case.

Let us take this, then, and inquire how it is generally dealt with by those whose opinions are entitled to respect, and how, to use your phrase, it is made to work. Here, then, after due inquiry has been made, men do determine what the law is; and, what is still more to our purpose, their fellow-men,-professional and unprofessional,-are found willing to acquiesce in their determinations. Hence, cases innumerable have been collected and published; and these are generally appealed to as decisive on any point, to which they can be justly applied. A few on the losing side may, and do, occasionally object; but I know of no instance in which it has been affirmed, that NO man, and No body of men, can lay claim to the right of determining what the law really is. I may appeal to every lawyer, I believe, in practice-no matter how boisterous he may be in affirming that the case of true Christianity ought not to be determined, in support of the sentiment, that no man in his senses ever yet thought, or dreamt, of maintaining, either that the law of the land was undeterminable, or

ought not to be determined. My own opinion is, that should such a notion haply be broached in a court of law, it would instantly be scouted with scorn and derision, as indeed well it might: for it would virtually go to affirm, that no such thing as a court of law ought to exist; and that, instead of the government appointing judges in any such court, it ought to give up the matter altogether as desperate: leaving it, nevertheless, to every individual who might presume that he had a right to be his own judge, to determine for himself what no body else could determine for him; and, making no account either of his ignorance or inability, as to how judgment ought to be pronounced in his own case, to leave him-because no one can say how the system ought to work—to give judgment necessarily in his own favour, and thus to produce an unanimity otherwise unattainable!

Now, let me ask you, my dear Sir, What the lawyers would say to such a case as this? Would they, as many of them ignorantly and pertinaciously do of religion, tell us that all this is true; that the law indeed has its difficulties; that, as Judge A. has differed in his construction of a certain statute from Judge B., and that, as Sergeant C. has argued the point at length with Barrister D.; the whole is, therefore, undeterminable? And that all men ought to be left to the dictates of their consciences, no matter how ill informed or misguided these may be, to set up for themselves what they may like best: right or wrong having nothing to do with the matter? Did you ever hear of any thing so monstrously perverse as this? And yet Judges A. B. &c. have never told us, how the argument can be made to work!" Common sense, common prudence, seems somehow or other to have established it as a law,—as a maxim from which no man dissents, that the laws of the land are determinable,

B

and have been determined, as far as necessity shall require, although some difficulties may yet remain in certain respects, which, however, need not be made matter of debate each man thinking about them as he may like, without either prejudice to society, or harm to himself.

Here, however, I may be met by another difficulty; for there is no end to the abstract cases which an ingenious objecter may imagine :-viz. how one is to know What the important points are, so that these may be considered and determined, and the unimportant ones neglected. I answer, just as in the case above. Let it first be determined what is really wanted, what is absolutely necessary, and without which a man cannot go quietly on. Much must necessarily be borne with. I shall be justly termed a fool if I engage in a law-suit on every vexatious question that may come before me,-indeed, on any abstract question whatsoever. Prudent Council will tell a client, that he had better put up with a little than risk the loss of much: and that, in a doubtful case, the first loss is generally the best. This, I think, is what in such cases would be recommended and adopted.

To come to our case. The scriptures are the statutelaws of Christians. Their enactments consist of precepts the most obvious, easy, and simple; and these are illustrated by examples the most natural, striking, and intelligible. These, I say, are the Christian's statutes. His cases of human determination are to be found in the writings of men the most eminent in the church for their abilities, disinterestedness, and gravity, in both ancient and modern times; and Dr. Pye Smith may be named as one of these. Our common law consists of the practices and usages which have obtained in the best and earliest times; and which, in many cases, have been continued even to our own.

Now, Can any one, I want to know, shew that these