why a man chose the evil yesterday? And the answer, according to your theory, must be, because he chose it. Ask again, why the same man chooses the good to-day? The answer must be, because he chooses it. There is no cause, ground, or reason, of any act of choice, out of the choice itself-nothing which made it certain, or even probable, before it existed, that it ever would exist: all we are allowed to say, is, it happened to be.' But here we may ask, in our turn, whether this does not make the universe as much the sport of chance, as the Atheistic scheme?'

Again, you say, that "the power of volition must have existed in the Deity previous to volition itself." This would be true, if by the term previous, you had referred to the order of nature, instead of the order of time: but this would have spoiled your argument. To say, that God's power or capacity for volition, existed previously to all his voluntary exercises, in point of time, is the same as to deny the eternity of his moral perfections, and implies, that there was a time, when he was neither holy, just, nor good.' This seems to me to be "shocking," even if it would lead to the conclusion at which you aim, that God has given men powers, " which are of the same constitution of those by which he chooses himself," and has thus enabled them to choose and act as gods, self-determined and independent of Him, who "worketh all in all," and whom our superstitious forefathers were wont to acknowledge in their prayers, to be the First Cause and Last End of all things."

Upon your next paragraph, I shall only remark, at present, that I do not admit, that choice in God had a beginning, any more than his existence; and all "the strong and cogent reasons" you have advanced to prove that it had a beginning, so far as I can perceive, are simply your assertion, that it "must necesssarily be" so. But choice, in man, has a beginning, and must, therefore, have a cause, and a cause altogether different from the ground or reason of the Divine volitions; for whatever exists of necessity, like the Divine being and perfections, is eternal and immutable.

Whatever" difficulties" you may find in our "scheme"; I find none in the suppositions which you make; of' volitions caused by an irresistible cause'-of' dire necessity or fate compelling one, against all his powers, to have a will:' for I consider all such suppositions as absurd. Volition may be the subject of causation, but not of compulsion.

You ask, "Can man produce volition different from that which God causes him to have?" and subjoin, "He could if he would, say they." But who are "they?" I can assure you, I am not one of them. I am far from considering any one's will as constituting a part of his ability. Ability, capacity, or natural power, comprises all that is requisite, in a moral agent, to a voluntary exercise, aside from the exercise itself. I say, therefore, that no man is ever unable,

be his will what it may, to have either a holy, or a sinful volition: no one can have power to exercise the one, without having power, at the same time, to exercise the other.

What" opponents" you may have, who attempt to clear the Divine character, by saying, that he causes men to have evil volitions, because his will, which prompts him to cause them, is uncaused, self-existent, and necessary,' I know not: but this I can say, that I am not one of them. I do not believe, that the moral necessity, which is the ground of the Divine will, would clear him from blame, if his will, as exercised in causing human volitions, were not, in itself, benevolent and good. If moral necessity is not consistent with moral agency and accountability; it will follow, that there are no moral agents, and no objects of either praise or blame, in the universe. God cannot lie, or deny himself;' and all the volitions and actions of his rational creatures, were foreknowa by him, and therefore, certain from eternity.

I have not represented existence and volition, as the same, nor the ways in which they are caused, as parallel; but I said, in substance, that we might as well argue that men are self-existent, because God was not created, as that they are self-determined, because the ground of his volitions is within himself. There is no propriety in arguing from Deity to man, in either case; for man is "of yesterday," and lives and is moved' by a Cause without himself; but God is eternal, independent and incomprehensible.

Self-existence, you say, involves no action." True: and I ask if self-determination, as you represent it, involves action? Can there be action in anything besides choice or volition? But, to suppose a man's choice is caused by a previous choice or volition, you consider absurd; and so it is. A man's choice itself, to be sure, is active; but is there, according to your view, any action in that which determines his choice? If you say, Yes; then it will follow, that his choice acts before it exists, and wills itself into being!

Answers to Questions, examined.

QUEST. 1. " Why are not the passages, quoted in the creed of a Calvinist, to be understood in their plainest obvious sense?"

Your answer amounts to this, that one of those passages may be reconciled with a different sense; and therefore all the rest must be understood in a sense foreign from their obvious meaning, and in several instances repugnant to it.

QUEST. 2. "In what sense are those passages to be understood?" You answer, In the same sense in which you think the one respecting the lying spirit may be understood; i. e. when it is said in sacred scripture, that God worketh all in all—creates darkness and evil-turns the king's heart-hardened the heart of Pharaoh-turned the heart of the Egyptians to hate his people-moved David to number Israel and Judah-made the prophet and others err from his

ways-stirred up an adversary to Solomon-hardened the spirit of Sihon and made his heart obstinate-hardeneth whom he will, &c. &c. the meaning is, that God "only permits these things to be done."

QUEST. 3. "How are saints, being "voluntary machines," worthy of praise, and rewardable for their good exercises?"

Your answer, if I understand it, is, that they are not worthy, being but "voluntary machines," and 'made and kept what they are, by Divine grace;' but, in praising and rewarding them, God "manifests his approbation" of the good which he produces in them, for the purpose of evincing his love of goodness;" although, by being made and kept good by Divine grace, they are deprived of their self-determination, and laid under a moral necessity of being good; and although there could be no "moral goodness in the volitions of God himself, if they are necessary."

QUEST. 4. How is it possible for a man to cause his own choice, without choosing or willing to have it?"

To this question you answer explicitly, "It is impossible," because choice has no cause without or previous to itself: "to choose is making or causing a choice;" so that choice either has no cause, or is both the cause and effect of itself!

QUEST. 5. "Is a man, who is supposed to cause his own evil exercises of will, to blame for the exercises themselves, or only for "causing them by the exercise of the same kind of faculty by which the Creator causes his?"

"Reply: Let the blame in this case stand in the same relation to the faculties and the exercises, as the blame in the case of the murderer and the murder, stands in relation to them."

There is an obscurity in this reply, which, I confess, baffles my "faculties." If you mean to say, that the blame attaches to the evil exercises themselves; you give up the controversy. If you mean that the blame attaches to "the faculties" which constitute the capacity for evil exercises; then your reply amounts to this, that the man is not to blame either for the exercises themselves, or for causing them, but only for the faculties which his Creator has given him, and which render him capable of evil, as well as good; in other words, he is to blame for being a moral agent.

But if, as I have been taught to believe, the blame, in case of murder, belongs to the evil intention of the murderer, or to his malice prepense; then the blame of evil exercises will attach to the exercises themselves, without the least consideration of either their cause, or consequences.

In your next communication, I hope you will feel it incumbent upon you, to supply the deficiency in your answers to the first and second questions to show that your answer to the third question is consistent with itself, and with your own scheme-that your answer to the

fourth question is "according to the use of language”—and, finally, to tell what you mean by your laconic reply to the fifth and last question. EDITOR.

FOR THE HOPKINSIAN MAGAZINE.

A FURTHER DIFFICULTY PROPOSED. Mr. Editor-Allow me to express to you my thanks for the kind attention you were pleased to bestow on the "Difficulty proposed" by me, in your number for January, and for the advance made in your remarks towards a solution of it. Doubtless it must be solved in one of the four ways you have mentioned. But with yourself, and me, and your readers generally, the first two of the methods proposed will be out of the question. We are restricted therefore to the third and fourth. I should agree with you in preferring the fourth, viz. "that God wills and sincerely and ardently desires the repentance and salvation of every soul of man, simply considered; while, at the same time, he does not desire the repentance and salvation of the whole human race, all things considered;" were it not for a remaining difficulty, which I now take the liberty to propose, soliciting, as before, that either by yourself, or some of your wise and experienced correspondents, I may be assisted in solving it.

The difficulty still existing respects the sincerity of the Divine Being, in the offers and invitations of the gospel. Perhaps I can best state it in the form of an allegory. 'Mentor is a wise and affectionate father, whose children are married and settled from him at the distance of several miles, but for whom he retains all the fondness of parental love. They are on a visit to his house, have tarried as long as they consistently can, and are preparing to return. Mentor is pained in prospect of their return, and ardently wishes, in itself considered, that they would tarry another day. Still, he is acquainted with their affairs at home, is satisfied that it is best for them to return immediately; and, on the whole, prefers and desires that they should. With these views, and in this state of mind, will it be right for Mentor to invite, entreat and urge his children to tarry with him another day? Can he do it with propriety, or with full sincerity? And if his children hear him uttering such invitations and entreaties, will they not think him departing from his usual wisdom and firmness of character, and approaching the period of his dotage?'

The application of the parable is obvious. "God sincerely and ardently desires the salvation of every soul of man, simply considered;" as Mentor desires the prolonged visit of his children. But God knows perfectly all the circumstances of the case; knows it is best on the whole that all mankind should not be saved; and in this view "does not desire the repentance and salvation" of all. Can

he then, in these circumstances, with propriety or sincerity, offer salvation to all, and invite all to accept of it, and urge it upon all in the impressive language and manner of the gospel? "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all ye ends of the earth." "Turn ye, turn ye, for why will

ye die?"

In attempting to remove the difficulty now suggested, I need not ask yourself, or your correspondents, to be candid and perspicuousthis is to be expected, of course; but I will venture to ask that the considerations suggested be made as palpable as they well can be, that the force of them may be apprehended by minds not accustomed to abstract speculations.

CLERICUS.

[Though Clericus has presented "a further difficulty" in a manner quite "palpable;" yet we think it may be removed, without any very "abstract speculations," by some of our "wise and experienced correspondents." We solicit their aid; as, at present, we have not time to attend to the subject.EDIT.]

EFFECTS OF THE UNIVERSAL DOCTRINE.
[From an unpublished Discourse.]

"It completely destroys the penalty of the divine law. If endless punishment is not true, sin is not an infinite evil. This opens the flood-gates, to every species of licentiousness, in principle and practice.

It lowers our views of the Saviour. He is not a Divine Person. We of necessity become Unitarians; as they are of necessity, Universalians. Sin is considered an error, or a calamity, rather than a crime. If it deserves any punishment, it is merely disciplinary; and that for a limited time, from which the subject shall be discharged, on the principle of justice.

If he suffers the penalty of the Divine law, there is no grace in his liberation-he derives no benefit from the Saviour. He is not saved by grace. How then can such sing, "Worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and honour, and glory, and blessing, for thou hast redeemed us out of every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people, by thine own blood?"

To disbelieve endless punishment, destroys the solemnity of oaths and obligations. What is there, aside from the idea of endless punishment, to make a man conscientiously, and truly feel, the scriptural solemnity, and obligation of an oath? Hence arises the depravity of the morals of society, and danger to every portion of the community, and the removal of all moral restraint.

We need not wonder, then, why it happens, that almost all the most immoral, intemperate, profligate, vicious, and abandoned wretches on earth, embrace these liberal, diabolical sentiments.”