the outward existence of any thing? Of this sheet of paper, for instance, as a thing in itself, separate from the phænomenon or image in my perception. I saw, that in the nature of things, such proof is impossible; and that of all modes of being, that are not objects of the senses, the existence is assumed by a logical necessity arising from the constitution of the mind itself, by the absence of all motive to doubt it, not from any absolute contradiction in the supposition of the contrary. Still, the existence of a being, the ground of all existence, was not yet the existence of a moral creator and governor. "In the position, that all reality is either contained in the necessary being as an attribute, or exists through him, as its ground, it remains undecided whether the properties of intelligence and will are to be referred to the Supreme Being in the former, or only in the latter sense; as inherent attributes, or only as consequences that have existence in other things through him. Thus, organization and motion are regarded as from God, not in God. Were the latter the truth, then, notwithstanding all the preeminence which must be assigned to the ETERNAL FIRST from the sufficiency, unity, and independence of his being, as the dread ground of the universe, his nature would yet fall far short of that which we are bound to comprehend in the idea of GOD. For without any knowledge of determining resolve of its own, it would only be a blind necessary ground of other things and other spirits; and thus would be distinguished from the FATE of certain ancient philosophers in no respect, but that of being more definitely and intelligibly described." KANT's einzig moglicher Beweisgrund: vermischte Schriften, Zweiter Band, § 102 and 103.

For a very long time, indeed, I could not reconcile personality with infinity; and my head was with Spinoza, though my whole heart remained with Paul and John. Yet there had dawned upon me, even before I had met with the Critique of the Pure Reason, a certain guiding light. If the mere intellect could make no certain discovery of a holy and intelligent first cause, it might yet supply a demonstration, that no legitimate argument could be drawn from the intellect against its truth. And what is this more than St. Paul's assertion, that by wisdom (more properly translated, by the powers of reasoning) no man ever arrived at the knowledge of God? What more than the sublimest, and, probably, the oldest book on earth, has taught us?

Silver and gold man searcheth out:

Bringeth the ore out of the earth, and darkness into light.

But where findeth he wisdom?

Where is the place of understanding?

The abyss crieth: it is not in me!

Ocean echoeth back: not in me!

Whence then cometh wisdom?
Where dwelleth understanding?

Hidden from the eyes of the living;
Kept secret from the fowls of heaven!

Hell and death answer:

We have heard the rumour thereof from afar.

GOD marketh out the road to it;

God knoweth its abiding place!

He beholdeth the ends of the earth;

He surveyeth what is beneath the heavens!

And as he weighed out the winds, and measured the sea,

And appointed laws to the rain,

And a path to the thunder,

A path to the flashes of the lightning!

I became convinced, that religion, as both the corner-stone and the key-stone of morality, must have a moral origin; so far at least, that the evidence of its doctrines could not, like the truths of abstract science, be wholly independent of the will. It were therefore to be expected, that its fundamental truth would be such as MIGHT be denied; though only by the fool, and even by the fool from the madness of the heart alone!

The question then concerning our faith in the existence of a God, not only as the ground of the universe by his essence, but as its maker and judge by his wisdom and holy will, appeared to stand thus: The sciential reason, whose objects are purely theoretical,

remains neutral, as long as its name and semblance are not usurped by the opponents of the doctrine. But it then becomes an effective ally by exposing the false show of demonstration, or by evincing the equal demonstrability of the contrary from premises equally logical. The understanding mean time suggests, the analogy of experience facilitates, the belief. Nature excites and recalls it, as by a perpetual revelation. Our feelings almost necessitate it; and the law of conscience peremptorily commands it. The arguments, that at all apply to it, are in its favour; and there is nothing against it, but its own sublimity. It could not be intellectually more evident without becoming morally less effective; without counteracting its own end, by sacrificing the life of faith to the cold mechanism of a worthless, because compulsory assent. The belief of a God and a future state (if a passive acquiescence may be flattered with the name of belief) does not indeed always beget a good heart; but a good heart so naturally begets the belief, that the very few exceptions must be regarded as strange anomalies from strange and unfortunate circumstances.

From these premises I proceeded to draw the following conclusions: First, that having once fully admitted the existence of an infinite yet self-conscious Creator, we are not allowed to ground the irrationality of any other article of faith on arguments which would equally prove that to be irrational which we had allowed to be real. Secondly, that whatever is deducible from the admission of a self-comprehending and creative spirit, may be legitimately used in proof of the possibility of any further mystery concerning the divine nature. Possibilitatem, mysteriorum, (Trinitatis, &c.,) contra insultus Infidelium et Hereticorum a contradictionibus vindico; haud quidem veritatem, quæ revelatione sola stabiliri possit; says LEIBNITZ, in a letter to his Duke. He then adds the following just and important remark: "In vain will tradition or texts of scripture be adduced in support of a doctrine, donec clava impossibilitatis et contradictionis e manibus horum Herculum extorta fuerit. For the heretic will still reply, that texts, the literal sense of which is not so much above as directly against all reason, must be understood figuratively, as Herod is a fox, &c."

These principles I held, philosophically, while, in respect of revealed religion, I remained a zealous Unitarian. I considered the idea of the Trinity a fair scholastic inference from the being of God,

as a creative intelligence; and that it was, therefore, entitled to the rank of an esoteric doctrine of natural religion. But seeing in the same no practical or moral bearing, I confined it to the schools of philosophy. The admission of the logos, as hypostasized, (i. e. neither a mere attribute or a personification,) in no respect removed my doubts concerning the incarnation and the redemption by the cross; which I could neither reconcile in reason with the impassiveness of the Divine Being, nor, in my moral feelings, with the sacred distinction between things and persons, the vicarious payment of a debt, and the vicarious expiation of guilt. A more thorough revolution in my philosophic principles, and a deeper insight into my own heart, were yet wanting. Nevertheless, I cannot doubt, that the difference of my metaphysical notions from those of Unitarians in general, contributed to my final re-conversion to the whole truth in Christ; even as, according to his own confession, the books of certain Platonic philosophers, (libri quorundam Platonicorum,) cónimenced the rescue of St. Augustine's faith from the same error, aggravated by the far darker accompaniment of the Manichæan heresy.

While my mind was thus perplexed, by a gracious Providence, for which I can never be sufficiently grateful, the generous and munificent patronage of Mr. JOSIAH, and Mr. THOMAS Wedgewood, enabled me to finish my education in Germany. Instead of troubling others with my own crude notions and juvenile compositions, I was thenceforward better employed in attempting to store my own head with the wisdom of others. I made the best use of my time and means; and there is, therefore, no period of my life on which I can look back with such unmingled satisfaction. After acquiring a tolerable sufficiency in the German language * at

*To those who design to acquire the language of a country in the country itself, it may be useful if I mention the incalculable advantage which I derived from learning all the words that could possibly be so learnt, with the objects before me, and without the intermediation of the English terms. It was a regular part of my morning studies, for the first six weeks of my residence at Ratzeburg, to accompany the good and kind old pastor with whom I lived, from the cellar to the roof, through gardens, farm yards, &c., and to call every, the minutest, thing by its German name. Advertisements, farces, jest books, and the conversation of children while I was at play with them, contributed their share to a more homelike acquaintance with the language than I could have acquired from works of polite literature alone, or even from polite society. There is a passage of hearty sound sense in Luther's German letter on interpretation, to the translation of which I shall prefix, for the sake of those who read the German, yet are not likely to have dipt often in the massive folios of this heroic reformer, the simple, sinewy, idiomatic words of the original: "Denn man muss.nicht die Buchstaben in der Lateinischen Sprache fragen wie man soll Deutsch reden; sondern man

Ratzeburg, which, with my voyage and journey thither, I have described in THE FRIEND, I proceeded through Hanover to Gottingen.

Here I regularly attended the lectures on physiology in the morning, and on natural history in the evening, under BLUMENBACH, a name as dear to every Englishman who has studied at that university, as it is venerable to men of science throughout Europe! Eichhorn's lectures on the New Testament were repeated to me from notes, by a student from Ratzeburg, a young man of sound learning and indefatigable industry; who is now, I believe, a professor of the oriental languages at Heidelberg. But my chief efforts were directed towards a grounded knowledge of the German language and literature. From professor TYCHSEN, I received as many lessons in the Gothic of Ulphilas as sufficed to make me acquainted with its grammar, and the radical words of most frequent occurrence; and with the occasional assistance of the same philosophical linguist, I read through OTTFRIED's * metrical paraphrase

muss die mutter im Hause, die Kinder auf den Gassen, den gemeinen Mann auf dem Markte, darum fragen: und denselbigen auf das Maul sehen wie sie reden, und darnach dollmetschen. So verstehen sie es denn, und merken dass man Deutsch mit ihnen redet."

TRANSLATION.

For one must not ask the letters in the Latin tongue, how one ought to speak German; but one must ask the mother in the house, the children in the lanes and alleys, the common man in the market, concerning this; yea, and look at the moves of their mouths while they are talking, and thereafter interpret. They understand you then, and mark that one talks German with them.

*This paraphrase, written about the time of Charlemagne, is by no means deficient in occasional passages of considerable poetic merit. There is a flow, and a tender enthusiasm in the following lines, (at the conclusion of Chapter V.) which even in the translation will not, I flatter myself, fail to interest the reader. Ottfried is describing the circumstances immediately following the birth of our Lord:

She gave with joy her virgin breast;
She hid it not, she bared the breast,
Which suckled that divinest babe!
Blessed, blessed were the breasts
Which the Saviour infant kiss'd;

And blessed, blessed was the mother

Who wrapp'd his limbs in swaddling clothes,

Singing placed him on her lap,

Hung o'er him with her looks of love,

And soothed him with a lulling motion.

Blessed! for she shelter'd him

From the damp and chilling air;

Blessed, blessed! for she lay

With such a babe in one blest bed,

i.