contingency. The former is applied to events that have happened; the latter to future events. When we fay a thing has happened by chance, we furely do not mean that chance was the caufe; for no perfon ever imagined that chance is a thing that can act, and by acting produce events: only mean, that we are ignorant of the caufe, and that, for ought we fee, it might have happened or not happened, or have happened differently. Aiming at a bird, I fhoot by chance a favourite fpaniel: the meaning is not, that chance killed the dog, but that as to me the dog's death was accidental. With respect to contingency, future events that are variable and the cause unknown, are faid to be contingent, changes of the weather, for example, whether it will be froft or thaw tomorrow, whether fair or foul. In a word, chance and contingency applied to events, mean not that fuch events happen without any cause, but only that we are ignorant of the caufe.

It appears to me, that there is no fuch thing in human nature as a sense that any thing happens without a cause: such a fenfe would be grofsly delufive. It is

indeed true, that our fenfe of a caufe is not always equally distinct: with respect to an event that happens regularly, fuch as fummer, winter, rifing or fetting of the fun, we have a diftinct fenfe of a caufe: our fenfe is lefs diftinct with respect to events lefs regular, fuch as alterations of the weather; and extremely indiftinct with refpect to events that feldom happen, and that happen without any known cause. But with respect to

no event whatever does our sense of a caufe vanish altogether, and give place to a sense of things happening without a cause.

Chance and contingency thus explained, fuggeft not any perception or notion repugnant to the doctrine of univerfal neceffity; for my ignorance of a caufe, does not, even in my own apprehenfion, exclude a cause. Defcending to particulars, I take the example mentioned in the text, namely, the uncertainty of the time of my death. Knowing that my life depends in some measure on myself, I ufe all means to preferve it, by proper food, exercise, and care to prevent accidents. Nor is there any delufion here. I am moved to

ufe

use these means by the defire. I have to live thefe means accordingly prove effectual to carry on my prefent existence to the appointed period; and in that view are fo many links in the great chain of caufes and effects. A burning coal falling from the grate upon the floor, wakes me from a found fleep. I ftart up to extinguish the fire. The motive is irrefiftible: nor have 1 re fon to refift, were it in my power; for I confider the extinction of the fire by my hand, to be one of the means chofen by Providence for prolonging my life to its destined period.

Were there a chain of caufes and effects eftablished entirely independent on me, and were my life in no measure under my own power, it would indeed be fruitless for me to act; and the abfurdity of knowingly acti g in vain, would be a prevailing motive for remaining at rest. Upon that fuppofition, the ignava ratio of Chryfippus might take place; cui fi pareamus, nihil omnino agamus in vita *. But I act neceffarily when influenced by motives; and I have no reason to forbear, confider* "The indolent principle; which if we were to follow, we should do nothing in life."

ing that my actions, by producing their intended effects, contribute to carry on the great chain.

PART II.

Progrefs of Morality.

Aving unfolded the principles of mo

HA

rality, the next step is, to trace out its gradual progrefs, from its infancy among favages to its maturity among polifhed nations. The hiftory of opinions concerning the foundation of morality, falls not within my plan; and I am glad to be relieved from an article that is executed in perfection by more able hands (a).

An animal is brought forth with every one of its external members; and completes its growth, not by production of any new member, but by addition of matter to those originally formed. The fame holds with refpect to internal members ;

(a) Dr Cudworth and Dr Smith.

the

the fenfes, for example, inftincts, powers and faculties, principles and propenfities: thefe are coeval with the individual, and are gradually unfolded, fome early, fome late. The external fenfes, being neceffary for felf-prefervation, foon arrive at maturity. Some internal fenfes, of order for example, of propriety, of dignity, of grace, being of no ufe during infancy, are not only flow in their progrefs toward maturity, but require much culture. Among favages they are fcarce perceptible.

The moral fenfe, in its progrefs, differs from those laft mentioned; being frequently discovered, even in childhood. It is however flow of growth, and seldom arrives at perfection without culture and experience.

The moral fenfe not only ripens gradually with the other internal fenfes mentioned, but from them acquires force and additional authority: a favage makes no difficulty to kill an enemy in cold blood: bloody fcenes are familiar to him, and his moral fenfe is not fufficiently vigorous to give him compunction. The action appears in a different light to a perfon of deHicate feelings; and accordingly, the moral

fenfe