munion of Bishops who violate the consensus of the Church, the answer is supplied by the Council of Constantinople (Prima et Secunda) in the time of Photius; "They who separate themselves from communion with their bishop on account of any heresy condemned by the Holy Synods or Fathers, while he evidently proclaims the heresy publicly and teaches it with bare front in church, such persons, in excluding themselves from communion with their so-called bishop before Synodical cognizance, not only shall not be subject to canonical censure, but shall even be deemed worthy by the orthodox of becoming honour. For they condemn as teachers, not Bishops, but pseudo-bishops; and they do not cut up the unity of the Church by schism, but hasten to deliver her from schisms and divisions." P

And if any ancient Rite originally innocent or even laudable can be really proved to have issued in scandalous and pernicious practices, Gratian the father of the Canon Law cites with approbation the example of King Hezekiah's destroying the Brazen Serpent. "And hereby that authority is to be held great in the Church, that, if some of our predecessors have done things, which at the time might have been without blame but afterwards are turned into error and superstition, they may be destroyed by posterity without hesitation and with great authority."

6

In reply to such as would acquiesce in a dogmatic profession 'against all satisfaction of conscience,' and 'give themselves up to follow that whereby they may live and thrive by' under the protection of the secular power, judge whether there be more of atheism or of Christianity' therein. II. p. 597. See my Institutes of Canon Law, Pt. II. ch. xxv. p. 176.)

(Thornd. vol. ii. I’t.

Let it however be carefully noted, before a portion of the Church embarks on the perilous adventure of Reformation,' that the canons and customs of the Church, yea, and generally its doctrinal traditions, are remains and evidence of the conversation delivered over by the successors of our LORD to His Church. It were better to bear even unreasonable bur

Beveregii Synodicon, Tom. I.

p. 354.

28.

Gratian. Decret. Dist. lxiii. c.

thens than to risk the loss of a single truth or one Apostolic ordinance. What will you grant to the Catholic Church? If we believe it, we must grant it the power of a vice-gerent, to limit where He hath not limited expressly, and to testify His pleasure where Scripture records it not. (Thornd. vol. iv. pp. 345, 355.)

But I must guard my meaning by observing that the people of GOD, as well as "the human race and its individuals, are capable of training, and that there are epochs marked out for the progress of thought in the eternal march of Time." This remark of a gifted lady (Mme. De Staël, L'Allemagne, Pt. IV. c. ii.) has been developed by Bishop Temple (Essays and Reviews) and lives in Tennyson's line, "And the thoughts of men are widen'd by the process of the suns." (Locksley Hall.) So, when the Synod of Chalcedon apparently assumes in its definition to lock up the powers of Synods in all time by its own action, we must mind that it refers to the 'tradition of the Fathers' as its warrant.

68

Of the Exist

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

§. 1. In approaching the subject of the Being of God, a ence of God. Christian Philosopher may with Plato entertain the hope, that "having betaken himself to the vast Ocean of the Beautiful and contemplating many fair and magnificent arguments, he may also give birth to thoughts in abundant philosophy;" but it will behove him to remember with S. Hilary, that "there is need of the new feelings of a regenerate mind, that a man's own conscience may illuminate him according to the gift of heavenly origin. Conscious of having been made a partaker of the Divine Nature, let him measure it not by the laws of his own nature, but according to the magnificence of GOD's witness concerning Himself. When therefore we discourse of the things of GOD, let us concede the knowledge of Himself to GOD, and wait on His sayings with pious veneration. For He is a fitting witness to Himself Who is not known save through Himself. But if anywhere treating of the Nature and Birth of GOD we should bring forward instances of comparison, let no one think they contain absolutely in themselves the perfect reason. For comparison of earthly things to GOD there is none; but our infirm intelligence hath collected certain kinds of inferior things, seeking indications of the higher; that we may be led out of the consciousness of our sense to the opinion of a sense unwonted. Therefore every comparison should be esteemed useful to man rather than suitable to GOD."

The general argument on behalf of the existence of GOD

Plato, Symposium, §. 34, Vol.

V. p. 87, Ed. Bekker.

S. Hilar. De Trinitate, Lib. i. circa initium.

"the Maker and Preserver of all things," rendered so familiar to us in the pages of Paley's Natural Theology, is well stated by S. Gregory Nazianzen in the following terms: "Of this, (namely) that GOD is and that there is a Cause productive and conservative of all things, our sight instructs us, and the Law of Nature: the one meets its objects well established, in progress, and in motion, carried on, so to say, immoveably; the other by means of the things seen infers the Author of them. For how came this universe to subsist or to hold together, unless GOD gave being to and doth hold together all things? For he that sees a lyre beautifully fashioned with its harmony and good arrangement, and hears its music, thinks of nothing else but of the maker and the player of the lyre, and will recur to him in thought, even though he should not know him by sight: so also to us That Which makes and moves and preserves the things that are made is evident, even though It be not comprehended by thought; and he is exceedingly void of judgment who doth not willingly advance thus far and follow the demonstrations of Nature." t

The argument derived from Motion, which was a favourite theme of the Greek Philosophers," is employed by Maimonides and Aquinas; but as it is only a form of the argument from causality and is more connected with philosophy than theology, I forbear to dwell upon it."

That the existence of GOD cannot be demonstrated by natural reason but requires direct Divine Revelation is a position, attributed to Maimonides, and has been maintained by Cardinal Peter d'Ailly alone among the Schoolmen; but the contrary sentiment is universally followed by Theologians. The Being or existence of God may be demonstrated from His works in creation; but His Substance can only be inferred in general and with an incomplete and inadequate knowledge. But this knowledge however imperfect is insisted upon by S. Paul as quite sufficient practically to condemn the

Gentiles, because it partakes of the nature of the highest probability; which is universally regarded as enough for human action. "Because that which may be known of GOD is manifest to them; for GOD hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse because that, when they knew GOD, they glorified Him not as GOD, neither were thankful."

This demonstration of the existence of GOD from creation may be exhibited in three ways. First, through causality, or, as Aquinas terms it, ex ratione causa efficientis ;' for there is no circulation or interchange among efficient causes ordained per se (as distinguished from accidental causes), because efficient causes ordained per se are related to one another as cause and effect; for that which is later is always the effect of the prior and depends on it as on its cause, inasmuch as in this consists such an order, that one thing is from another effectively, and that from another, and so always. If efficient causes ordained per se were infinite, it would be necessary towards the production of any effect you please that infinite causes should concur in the act, which is impossible; that is, the human understanding acquiesces in its inability to entertain such a notion. Therefore we are forced to conceive a First Cause of infinite perfection, which we call GOD. Secondly, by the way of excellency, or, as Durandus hath it, 'per viam eminentia,' whereby from the specific perfections of creatures we infer that there is complete and sovereign perfection in the Creator. Thirdly, by the way of negation or, according to Durandus, of remotion, whereby we reject concerning GOD whatever is imperfect in the creatures. Every thing which is from another as its cause may lose its being by the withdrawal of that influence; but, having arrived at the idea of GOD as the First Cause and attributed to Him infinite perfection, it is a logical consequence we should remove from our conception of Him all possibility of defect.

Vasquez adds two further reasons.

The one drawn from