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tended to be. This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these felf-evident truths, upon their being propofed; but it is clear, that whofoever does fo, finds in himself, that he then begins to know a propofition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not because it was innate, but because the confideration of the nature of the things contained in thofe words, would not fuffer him to think otherwise, how or whenfoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is affented to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must pass for an innate principle, every well-grounded obfervation drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate; when yet it is certain, that not all, but only fagacious heads, light at first on these observations, and reduce them into general propofitions; not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular inftances. Thefe, when obferving men have made them, unobferving men, when they are propofed to them, cannot refufe their affent to.

$22. Implicitly known before propofing, fignifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or elje fignifies nothing.

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IF it be faid, the understanding hath an implicit knowledge of thefe principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing (as they muft, who will fay that they are in the understanding before they are known), it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly, unless it be this, that the mind is capable of understanding and affenting firmly to fuch propofitions. And thus all mathematical demonftrations, as well as first principles, must be received as native impreffions on the mind; which I fear they will fcarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonftrate a propofition, than affent to it when demonstrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn, were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.

§ 23. The Argument of affenting on first hearing, is upon a falfe fuppofition of no precedent teaching. THERE is, I fear, this farther weakness in the foregoing argument, which would perfuade us, that therefore thofe maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at firft bearing, because they affent to propofitions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonftration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms; under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are fuppofed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing de novo; when in truth they are taught, and do learn fomething they were ignorant of before. For first, it is evident they have learned the terms and their fignification, neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the cafe: The ideas themselves, about which the propofition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards; fo that in all propofitions that are affented to at first hearing, the terms of the propofition, their ftanding for fuch ideas, and the ideas themfelves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in fuch propofitions that is innate; for I would gladly have any one name that propofition, whofe terms or ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connection one with another; and then to propofitions made in fuch terms, whofe fignification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or difagreement we can perceive in our ideas, when put together, is expreffed, we at first hearing affent; though to other propofitions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas not fo foon or fo cafily got, we are at the fame time no way capable of aflenting. For though a child quickly affents to this propofition, that an apple is not fire, when, by familiar acquaintance, he has got the ideas of thofe two different things distinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire stand for them; yet it will

be fome years after, perhaps, before the fame child will affent to this propofition, That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; because, that though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the fignification of them being more large, comprehenfive, and abstract, than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precife meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind thofe general ideas they ftand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child affent to a propofition made up of fuch general terms; but as foon as ever he has got thofe ideas, and learned their names, he forwardly clofes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned propofitions; and with both for the fame reafon, viz. because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or difagree, according as the words ftanding for them. are affirmed or denied one of another in the propofition. But if propofitions be brought to him in words, which ftand for ideas he has not yet in his mind, to fuch propofitions, however evidently true or falfe in themfelves, he affords neither affent nor diffent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty founds any farther than they are figns of our ideas, we cannot but affent to them, as they correfpond to thofe ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the showing by what fteps and ways knowledge comes into our minds, and the grounds of feveral degrees of af fent, being the bufinefs of the following discourse, it may fuffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles.

§ 24. Not Innate, because not univerfally affented to. To conclude this argument of univerfal confent, I agree with these defenders of innate principles, that if they are innate, they must needs have univerfal affent. For that a truth fhould be innate, and yet not affented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a man to know a truth, and be ignorant of it at the fame time. But then by thefe mens own confeflion, they cannot be

innate, fince they are not affented to by those who understand not the terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of those propofitions, which, I think, is at least one half of mankind; but were the number far lefs, it would be enough to destroy univerfal affent, and thereby fhow these propofitions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.

25. Thefe Maxims not the first known. BUT that I may not be accufed, to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what paffes in their understandings, before they exprefs it, I fay next, that these two general propofitions are not the truths that first posjefs the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions, which, if they were innate, they muft needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not; there is certainly a time when children begin to think; and their words. and actions do affure us that they do fo. When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of affent, can it rationally be fuppofed they can be ignorant of thofe notions that nature has imprinted, were there any fuch? Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the impreffions from things without, and be at the fame time ignorant of thofe characters which nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and affent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which are fuppofed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reafonings? This would be to make nature to take pains to no purpose, or, at leaft, to write very ill, fince its characters could not be read by thofe eyes which faw other things very well; and thofe are very ill fuppofed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of feveral other things may be had.

The child certainly knows that the nurse that feeds it, is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid of; that the wormfeed or mustard it refuses, is not the apple or fugar it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly affured of; but will any one fay, it is by virtue of this principle, that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be, that it fo firmly affents to thefe, and other parts of its knowledge? or that the child has any notion or apprehenfion of that propofition at an age, wherein yet it is plain it knows a great many other truths? He that will fay children join thefe general abftract fpeculations with their fucking bottles and their rattles, may, perhaps with justice, be thought to have more paffion and zeal for his opinion, but lefs fincerity and truth than one of that age.

$26. And fo not Innate.

THOUGH therefore there be feveral general propofitions, that meet with conftant and ready affent, as foon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the ufe of more general and abstract ideas, and names ftanding for them, yet they not being to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to univerfal affent of intelligent perfons, and fo by no means can be fupposed innate; it being impoffible that any truth which is innate (if there were any fuch) fhould be unknown, at least to any one who knows any thing elfe; fince, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts; there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has never thought on; whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths, they must neceffarily be the first of any thought on, the first that appear there.

§ 27. Not Innate, because they appear leaft, where what is Innate fhows itself cleareft.

THAT the general maxims we are difcourfing of, are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already fufficiently proved; whereby it is evident they have not an univerfal affent, nor are general impreflions. But there is this farther argument in it against their being innate, that these characters, if they

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