Sixthly. We maintain, then, that the facts of the case are these:-that this deputation was from the church at Antioch exclusively;-that its object was, first, to settle a point of doctrine, viz., whether believing Gentiles should be circumcised;-secondly, to decide upon a question of fact, viz., whether the certain men referred to, verse 1, had been authorised at Jerusalem, as they affirmed, to teach the necessity of circumcision. The point of doctrine could only be settled by inspired men: the question as to the fact, &c., might be determined, and was to be determined, by the church. It will be found, we trust, that this double view of the object of the deputation relieves from all difficulty.

That the church at Antioch both sought and received, from this council of Jerusalem, (if Presbyterians choose to call it so,) a decision, in reference to the point of doctrine, from the inspired men in that council, and not on the ground of its possessing higher church power, is manifest from the following considerations :

First, from the fact that none but inspired men could have given the decision.

Secondly, from all the circumstances of the case. After some discussion,-chiefly, perhaps, between the Pharisees that believed, and some of the lay members of the church, and permitted, probably, by the apostles to elicit the views and feelings of the body,-one of the inspired men arose, and pronounced an authoritative decision against the necessity of circumcision. Then Paul and Barnabas gave in their report of the miracles and wonders which God had wrought among the Gentiles by them: and, as they resumed their seat, another inspired man arose, and, after a short introduction, proceeded as follows: "Wherefore my sentence is, that we trouble not them, which from among the Gentiles are turned to God. But that we write unto them that they abstain from pollutions of idols, and from fornication, and from things strangled, and from blood," verses 19,

20; thus deciding the question at once by the Spirit of inspiration.

After the addresses of Peter and James, no vote was taken the opinion of the council (as Presbyterians call it,) was not even asked. The whole body acquiesced in the decision of these apostles as infallible, and in the propriety of sending the decree to the Gentiles.

Further those who sent this decision expressly declared that it "seemed good to the Holy Ghost" not to lay upon those to whom it went the burden of circumcision. No uninspired men, without inspired authority, would venture to adopt language of this kind. Against these statements and reasonings, it has been objected,

1st, That the church at Antioch, by sending the deputation, could not intend to terminate the dispute by the authority of inspiration, but by the higher ecclesiastical authority of the superior church court; because there were amongst them Paul and Barnabas, both inspired men, to whom they might have appealed, and whose decision would have been infallible.

The obvious reply to this objection is, that the false teachers doubtless stated that they had the authority of Peter and James, as well as the brethren at Jerusalem; so that there seemed to be a different decision, on the same point, by inspired men. On this account, it became necessary to appeal to Jerusalem. This circumstance explains the silence, on this point, of Paul and Barnabas in the council. They left it to their brethren in the apostolate to speak, that the perfect identity of opinion in that body might be more strikingly manifested. It has been objected,

2ndly, That the object of the church at Antioch cannot have been to obtain a decision upon the point from the Spirit of inspiration; because the reference was not to the apostles merely, but to the apostles and elders, the latter of whom were not inspired; and because the decree ultimately issued was from the apostles and elders, and whole church. I answer,

First, That whatever difficulty may be supposed to be involved in the fact that the apostles, in issuing the decree, associated with themselves the elders and brethren, the church at Antioch must have sought the decision of the doctrinal point from the inspired men at Jerusalem, since none but inspired men were qualified to give such a decision. I am not able to suppress my surprise at the statements of our opponents in reference to this council. They are compelled to maintain that the decree of the council did not emanate from the Spirit of inspiration; for, in that case, it would obviously afford no pretext and no model for uninspired councils in the present day. It was, they think, an uninspired church court; or, at all events, the apostles who were present did not act in their apostolical character, (what! we may say with surprise, would they venture to declare a doctrine to be an integrant part of Christianity without the Spirit of inspiration!) but came to the decision as fallible men and the decree was binding merely on the ground of its being the superior church court. Then why, we ask, did not the church at Antioch take the infallible opinion of Paul and Barnabas, whom they had amongst them, instead of seeking the fallible opinion. of this council? This was surely to take the worse for the better reason. It matters not that, in the council, there were more apostles than at Antioch, if they issued not this decree in their apostolical character. Our opponents seem to be involved in the absurdity of relying more confidently upon fallible than infallible authority. I answer, secondly, that the difficulty, if any, is common to the Presbyterians with us; and, therefore, cannot be by them pleaded against us; since, on their principles, the church, the multitude, the body of communicants, have no vote in a council: elders only possess authority, and the right of voting. I answer,

Thirdly, That there is no difficulty whatever; for either, first, when the apostles pronounced the decision by the Spirit of inspiration, and the elders and church

of course acquiesced in it, the former may have associated the latter with them to prevent even the appearance of lording it over God's heritage. It seemed, indeed, good to all that the Gentiles should not be subjected to the yoke of circumcision; but the knowledge of the justice and truth of the decree in which that important doctrine was embodied, was obtained from very different sources :-by the apostles, from the Spirit of inspiration,-by the elders and church, from the confidence they reposed in them as infallible teachers. Or,

Secondly, As the object of the deputation was, as we have said, not merely to settle a point of doctrine, but a question of fact; and as both were decided in the letters sent to the churches, the apostles may be conceived, and, indeed, must be conceived, to have settled exclusively the point of doctrine; while the elders and brethren were only united with them in settling (and they only were competent to do it,) the point of fact. Hence the language introduced into the decree: "Forasmuch as we have heard that certain which went out from us, have troubled you with words subverting your faith, saying ye must be circumcised, and keep the law; to whom we gave no such commandment," &c., verse 24.

In closing the examination of this the only passage appealed to, within my recollection at least, as affording direct support to the Presbyterian form of church government, I would record the opinion that the cases are rare indeed in which a great system has been laid upon so slender and insecure a basis: for either the council was led to the decision recorded in its decree by the Spirit of inspiration, or it was not. In the former case, it furnishes no warrant for the holding of those courts of review which exist in that denomination. In the latter case, it proves that the private members of churches, as well as elders, are entitled to sit and vote in church courts, to the entire subversion of the system. If, indeed, the preceding pages contain a correct exposition of this much-disputed passage, of which the reader

must judge for himself, the fact will prove to be, that it affords no direct support to either of the conflicting systems; and no cautious reasoner will appeal to it for that purpose. The Congregationalist, by proving that the dictum of this assembly at Jerusalem was inspired, merely carries an important post of his opponent. His own system, at least that part of it which we are now considering, yet remains to be established.

In direct confirmation, then, of the second great principle of Congregationalism, viz., that every separate congregation has the full power of government within itself, there being no higher authority on earth, no court of review which can authoritatively confirm or reverse its decisions, I appeal, first, to Matt. xviii. 15 — 17: Moreover, if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother; but if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established: and if he neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church; but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." Now the reader is requested to observe that the decision of the church is here represented as final. As the last resort, the offence is to be reported to the church; and from their sentence there is no appeal, since, if they act according to the law of Christ, it is confirmed by Christ. Whatever, by church censure, they bind upon a transgressor, is bound upon him in heaven. Whatever, by acquittal or forgiveness, they loose on earth, is loosed in heaven. Now these words supply so direct a sanction to the proceedings of Congregational churches, that many, who have not much knowledge of other denominations, will perhaps be disposed to wonder how Presbyterians, who tell nothing to the church, attempt to justify their conduct in this respect. They generally, I believe, endeavour to relieve themselves from this difficulty by stating that, as a