refuse to continue in the marriage relation, and perform the duties involved in it, unless the Christian partner will consent to give up the privileges of the Gospel. This would, indeed, be a deplorable bondage; and deserving of being expressed by the strong term, which St. Paul has selected.

Several very respectable Commentators, and among them Poole, Doddridge, and Macknight, have, I am aware, supposed this bondage to consist in the obligation, under which the Christian party might be imagined to lie, to continue still unmarried. I acknowledge myself surprised at this explanation, and at the reasons, by which it is professedly supported. Dr. Macknight, after alleging, that this is the Apostle's meaning, declares, that his decision is just; because there is no reason, why the innocent party, through the fault of the guilty party, should be exposed to the danger of committing adultery.

Poole says, "Such a person hath broken the bond of marriage; and Christians are not under bondage, by the laws of God, to keep themselves unmarried, on account of the perverseness of such parties to the marriage-covenant."

To this opinion, and these reasons, I answer, that Christ has expressly forbidden the divorced wife, however innocent, to marry again; and has declared, that, if she does marry, she will be an adulteress. Certainly, the divorced wife may be, and often is, as innocent, as the deserted wife; and in the nature of the case is as probably innocent. With equal justice, then, may it be said in this case, as in the case of the deserted wife, that there is no reason, why the innocent party, through the fault of the guilty party, should be exposed to commit adultery.

Again. The divorced wife is more injured than the deserted wife. She is not only deprived of all the privileges, and blessings, lost by the deserted wife, but of many more. She is forced by violence from her husband, her children, and her home. She is turned out with disgrace; as a woman, with whom her husband could not continue to live; and usually with little provision, made for her subsistence. The wife, who is deserted, is on the contrary, almost always left in the possession of her house, her children, her character, and tolerable means of subsistence for herself and her family. She may be, and most usually is, de

serted for reasons, involving no disgrace to her. Her husband may have contracted an unwarrantable attachment for another object; indulged a spirit of roving, and adventure; disgraced himself by his previous conduct; or fled from some exposure to punishment for some crime, or from creditors, whom he cannot, or will not pay. Accordingly, deserted wives are probably as generally persons of good reputation, as others of their sex. On all these accounts, the case of the divorced wife is incomparably harder, than that of the deserted wife. Can it be possible, that Christ has rescued the deserted wife from this deepest bondage; as these writers understand it; and have left the divorced wife, amid so many more, and severer, hardships, yet equally innocent, to suffer the whole extent of this thraldom?

Mr. Poole says, the deserter hath broken the bond of Marriage, and thus released the deserted party from the laws of God concerning it; so far as they require abstinence from Marriage.

I answer: The Divorcer has broken this bond still more violently; and made the infraction more complete. Of course, he has, according to this scheme, in a higher degree made it lawful for the divorced wife to marry again. This reasoning, therefore, equally with that of Dr. Macknight, makes the decision of Christ both unwise, and unjust.

Besides, this scheme renders the precept concerning Divorce entirely fruitless. The man, who wishes to divorce his wife, is by this scheme entirely released from all the trouble and expense, and generally also from the scandal, usually attendant upon this iniquitous proceeding. He cannot, indeed, free himself from the sin of deserting his wife, and all those sins which are involved in it. But he may give his wife the opportunity of marrying, innocently, another husband. When this is done; he himself may, for aught that appears, marry innocently another wife. Thus, by undergoing an absence of three years, the time here limited for this object, he may without any peculiar scandal, and without the sin of adultery, accomplish the very object, aimed at in cases of this nature by licentious men viz. a second marriage.

St. Paul in the mean time, has in this very Chapter determined the point in question against these Commentators. Unto the

married I command, yet not I, but the Lord; Let not the wife be separated from her husband. But, even if she be separated, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband. The word, here translated separated, is the same, which is used in the 15th verse; the subject of this inquiry. Is it credible, that an inspired man should at all, or that any man of sober sense should within the compass of five sentences, give two contradictory precepts concerning any subject; especially a subject of this importance? Peculiarly it is incredible, that St. Paul, immediately after reciting a solemn command of Christ and declaring it to be his, should subjoin a contradictory command.

To me it appears equally incredible, that an Apostle should designate the situation, in which Christ had placed an innocently divorced woman, innocently I mean, on her part, by the word dedλra; and thus style it the deepest bondage. It is, I think, impossible, that the Spirit of God should call any state, produced by obedience to the commands of Christ, by the name of bondage; and still more evidently impossible, that he should denote it by a name, expressing the most suffering and disgraceful bondage. How can such an appellation consist with that phraseology, in which the whole situation of Christians is by the same Spirit styled the glorious liberty of the Sons of God? If the deserted wife is brought under this bondage, by being denied the liberty of marrying again; the divorced wife is, by the same denial, brought under this bondage in a still more distressing degree. Yet to this situation she is reduced by the express command of Christ.

Finally. St. Paul himself has clearly shown, that this was not his meaning, by the words, immediately following the passage in question. But God hath called us to peace. For how knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? Or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife? Surely the second marriage, contended for, cannot ordinarily be the means of the peace here mentioned: that is, peace or concord between the divorced pair. Much more is it improbable, that a husband, or a wife, should by means of second marriages become instruments of salvation to each other. This desirable event may be fairly hoped for, if they continue unmarried, from their future VOL. IV.

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reconciliation to each other; but cannot be even remotely hoped for from their divorce, and their consequent final sepa

ration.

Should it be said, that the case of the deserted wife is a hard one: I acknowledge it. The sins, both of ourselves and others, create none but hard casts. That of the divorced wife is still harder. The reason, why this law is established, is undoubtedly found in the immense importance of the Marriage Institution. It is incomparably better, that individuals should suffer, than that an Institution, which is the basis of all human good, should be shaken, or endangered,

I have dwelt thus minutely on this abused passage, because it is the strong hold of those, with whom I am contending. If they cannot find support for their opinions here; they can find it no where. That they cannot find it here has, I trust, been shown beyond a reasonable doubt.

What the Scriptures teach us concerning the subject of divorce, is abundantly established by Reason. This I shall attempt to evince in the following Observations.

It is acknowledged by the Advocates for this system, that the Scriptures do indeed forbid a divorce for any other reason, beside Incontinence, or something equivalent. The things, which they consider as equivalent, are Obstinate Desertion, Gross Personal Abuse, Incompatibility of Temper, Confirmed Madness, &c. I do not intend, that they are all agreed with respect to this class of things; but that some or other of these they actually propose as reasons for divorce equivalent to Incontinence.

Concerning this subject I observe,

1. That there is no such thing, as an Equivalent in this case. No crime, no injury, affects the happiness of wedlock, or wounds so deeply every domestic interest, None so entirely terminates every enjoyment, and every hope, as the Crime, mentioned by our Saviour. As this is sufficiently evident from the preceding discourse; it would be useless to spend time in considering it any farther. I shall only observe, therefore, that Incontinence not only destroys connubial happiness, and hopes; but annihilates, so far as it extends, the very Institution, from which they spring.

2. What is at least equally important, the Scriptures have no where mentioned any thing as an equivalent.

It must, I think, be admitted without a question, that, if the Divine Lawgiver had intended, that any thing should be considered, in the case in hand, as an equivalent to Incontinence, He certainly, would have expressly mentioned it. Certainly, He must, at least, be supposed to have hinted it, or alluded to it, in some manner or other. But this He has not done. Unanswerably, then, it was no part of his intentions. It cannot, therefore, be assumed as such by us. We are here, as well as in other cases, bound absolutely to see, that we add not to his words, lest he reprove us, and we be found liars. I know of no pretence, that there is any thing of this nature found in the Scriptures, except the desertion, mentioned in the passage, which has been so long the theme of discussion: and this, it is believed, has been clearly shown to have not even the remotest reference to the subject now under consideration. But,

3. It is urged, that the evils, involved in the things, here mentioned as equivalents, are intolerable; and demand relief from human jurisprudence.

To this I answer,

In the first place, That, although these evils were much greater than they are in fact; and I acknowledge them to be very great; yet, if God has not thought proper to allow us, and still more if He has forbidden us, to escape from them in the manner proposed, they must be alleged in vain as arguments for Divorce.

The Government of his creatures belongs only to God: and nothing but impiety can induce us to interfere with either the modes, or the principles, of his administration. If He has permitted Divorce on either of these grounds; it is lawful. If He has not; however numerous, or great, may be the evils which we suffer, they will not contribute at all towards rendering it lawful.

Secondly. All these evils may be relieved more perfectly, than by Divorce; and as perfectly, as human Governments can relieve them, by the Separation a mensa et thoro.

In this process, the parties, though not released from the bonds of Marriage, are separated from each other so far, that the