defire Ishall enter on a more particular Examination of it. The Strength of this Pamphlet, as far as it has any appearance of Reafon or Argument, feems to me to lie chiefly in the former Part of it, where he undertakes and fets himself formally to prove, that Reafon or the Intellectual Faculty could not poffibly both from its own Nature and that of Religion, be the Principle intended by God to lead us into a true Faith*. This is oddly and not very accurately expreffed. But his Meaning evidently is, that it is not the Will and Design of God that we should make use of our intellectual Faculty at all in believing, and that God never intended to lay any Evidence before our Understanding to induce us to believe, nor that our intellectual Faculty fhould at all judge of the Evidence propofed. This is what he applies himself formally to prove, and he seems to have a very good opinion of this Part of his Argument, which he thinks he has managed fo as to render the other Part of his Pamphlet needless t. His first Argument refts upon this Foundation, that Men are required in the Gospel to think all alike. And he thinks it a prepofterous Scheme, that of Unity in Opinion propofed to be effected by Reafoning. He makes the fame Suppofition in other Parts of his Book, concerning our being obliged or required to think all alike; that is, as he feems to understand it, to have exactly the fame Sentiments in all Points in Matters of Religion. But this is not what Chriftianity requires. The Paffage that hath most of an appearance this way, D is ye is that of St. Paul to the Corinthians: Now I befeech you, Brethren, by the Name of our Lord Jefus Chrift, that all speak the fame thing, and that there be no Divifions among you, but that ye be perfectly joined together in the fame Mind and in the fame Judgment. But any one that carefully examines that Paffage and the Context, will find that the Apostle's Meaning is not, that it was neceffary for them to be perfectly of the fame opinion in all fpeculative Matters, to which he hath there no reference at all, but that they should fhun thofe Factions and Contentions, that Envying and Strife, and that Party-Spirit that he heard was among them; and that they fhould be joined in Unity of Heart and Affection. In like manner, when he prays for the believing Romans, that the God of all Patience and Confolation would grant them to be like-minded one towards another, according to Chrift Jefus, that with one Mind and one Mouth they might glorify God, even the Father of our Lord Jefus Chrift ||; which is another Paffage re-. ferred to by this Writer**: his Defign is not to infift upon it as of abfolute neceffity, that there fhould be a ftrict Uniformity in Opinion; but that they should preferve an Unity of Affection, and fhould all join in glorifying God with one Heart and Mouth, which he there fuppofes they might do, notwithstanding smaller Differences. Nothing is more evident than it is from many Paffages in that Epiftle, particularly the whole XIVth Chapter, that the Apostle is very far from infinuating, that every Cor. i. 10. t1 Cor. i. 11. iii. 3. Rom. xv. every Difference of Sentiments with regard to any thing in Religion is inconfiftent with a true Chriftian Faith. For he there fuppofes the Christians to whom he writes to differ in feveral things, and exhorts them to mutual Forbearance, and not to judge or condemn one another on account of those Differences. That they that are strong ought to bear the Infirmities of the weak, i. e. of thofe that are weak in Faith; and that they should be united in Love and Charity, and in a brotherly Difpofition towards one another. And this feems to be every where the Meaning of that Phrafe, of being like-minded, and of one Mind, or the fame Mind*. This alfo is what the Apoftle intends by their keeping the Unity of the Spirit in the Bond of Peace. A noble Paffage, that breathes an admirable Strain of Charity, tho' this Gentleman feems very willing by an odd Glofs to turn it into Ridicule. What he reprefents in a gibing way as a great Abfurdity, is very true, that tho' Men cannot be all of one Opinion, they may be of one Faith; that is, one Faith in the fenfe St. Paul fpeaks of it, viz. one Faith in the great Effentials of it; and, with regard to leffer Matters, they should, as he there advises, forbear one another in Love. This forbearing one another, which is fo often urged as the Duty of Chriftians, plainly fuppoles that there is an Allowance in the Chriftian Scheme for Diverfity of Opinions in religious Mat ters. This Gentleman's firft Argument then fails him, which proceeds upon this Suppofition, that D 2 See to this purpofe Rom. xii. 16. Phil. ii. 1, 2, 3. the 1 Pet, iii. 8. + Ephef. iv. 3. P. 75. the Gospel or the Christian Faith lays Men under a neceflity of thinking all alike. It is true, there are fome main Principles, a Belief of which seems to be required of all that would pafs for the Disciples of Jefus. But this is no Argument at all, that Chriftianity is not founded on rational Conviction or Evidence. There are fome Principles neceffary to be believed in natural Religion, as well as reveal'd; and to require any Religion at all, is to require a Belief of fome Principles, because they lie at the Foundation of it. But this will come in better, in confidering the Author's next Argument; which is to this purpofe: That in the Gofpel Questions are propounded to us under the Restraints of Threats and Authority. And he thinks it abfurd and contradictory for a Man to be threatned into a rational Belief, to be talk'd to of Danger in his Decifions, to have the Rod held out with the Leffon, and to have Propofi tions tendred to his Reafon with Penalties annexed. This is what he feems to lay a particular ftrefs upon. He frequently takes notice of the Command laid upon us to believe, and the Threatnings denounced against Unbelief, as a Proof that Chriflianity is not a reafonable Religion. It is to be obferved, that in all that he faith on this head in different Parts of his Pamphlet, he is pleafed to confider Faith and Unbelief as a mere fpeculative Affent or Diffent to certain Propofitions, feparated from all moral Difpofitions and Qualifications whatsoever. Whereas any one that confiders *P. 8. fiders the Scripture with Attention, will find that this is not the Representation there made of that Faith on which fo great a stress is laid in the New Covenant; or of the Unbelief, against which fuch Penalties are denounced. They are still supposed to be of a practical Nature and Tendency, and to take in good or bad Difpofitions of the Mind, which are reckoned as included in the Faith there required, or the Unbelief there condemned. But there is one previous Question that deferves to be diftinctly confidered, because it feems to lie at the Foundation of the Author's whole Argument on this head; and that is, whether the believing any Principles whatsoever can in any case be required of any Man as a Duty? This is what' he feems to deny. He will not allow that any Man can be obliged by any Authority whatsoever to affent to any Truth at all, that is propofed to his Reafon or Understanding. And that it would be the highest Tyranny and Injuftice for God himself to require this, even with regard to thofe Truths that are of the greatest Certainty and Importance. That it is impoffible to conceive any the leaft Connexion between the Notion of Duty, and affenting rationally to any Propofition, however ftrongly supported *. This appears to me to be a strange Affertion. It is in effect to say, that no Man can be oblig'd to it as a Duty, to make a right Use of the Reason God has given him, nor can God himself require him to do so. He cannot fo much as require his reafonable Creatures to believe and acknowledge his own fupreme Dominion or Perfections, though founded P. 110. |