they were educated, feem rather to be prejudiced against it, and to be ready to difcard it for that reafon; and who, as this Author advises *, explode under the name of Prejudice all the Effect of their Education.

Another of his Arguments to prove that the Chriftian Faith is not a rational one, is drawn from the Nature of Examination and Enquiry. The Strain of his Reasoning is to this purpofe; that Reason requires us to examine before we believe, whereas the Faith required in the Gofpel is abfolutely inconfiftent with a fair Examination. He obferves, that there is not one fingle Argument from

¢¢

Reason, why a Man fhould not return of course "to Neutrality, the firft Moment he begins to "think for himself. That nothing is more evi"dent, than that to examine fairly, we muft

come unprejudiced and indifferent to the Exami"nation. Examination in the very Term implies a Sufpenfe of Conviction; and therefore if Religion admits at all of Examination, it must neceffarily admit likewise of (at least a temporary) "Difbelief. The rational Chriftian, whoever he "be, muft of courfe have originally fet out a Scep"tick-and that a Man may, nay muft, dif"believe a while for Information's fake-." And yet all Doubting and Difbelief is what the Gospel condemns. The Author had faid the fame thing before, and he returns to it in feveral Parts of his Pamphlet.

But the whole of his Reasoning here proceeds upon a wrong Foundation, viz. that all Examina

tion

*P. 9.

+ P. 12, 13. 1 P. 5, 6.

tion neceffarily fuppofes a perfect Neutrality or Indifferency of Mind, and a temporary Disbelief. It is manifeft, that in examining into the Truth of Facts, it is not neceffary that we have an abfolute Doubt of thofe Facts, or be perfectly neutral and indifferent about them, before we enter on a particular Examination. It is very ufual to examine into Facts that we were pretty fure of in general before, and yet this may not hinder the Examination and Enquiry from being juft and exact. And the fame may also hold, with regard to Doctrines and Principles. It is not at all neceffary to a fair Examination of Principles, that a Man be perfectly neutral and indifferent to them when he begins the Enquiry, or that he fhould actually disbelieve them. In many cafes this would be unreasonable, in fome fcarce poffible, except the Things he enquires or examines into are Things which he never heard of before. For if he enquires, e. g. into Doctrines or Principles in which he had been carefully educated and inftructed, and when instructed had Reasons given him, which appeared to him good and fufficient; it would be abfurd to fuppofe that he should not be influenced by thofe Reasons, till he faw caufe to alter his Sentiments. For it would be as irrational to disbelieve the Principles in which a Man was educated, for no other Reason, but because he was educated in them; as it would be, to believe them merely for that Reafon. When a Man has reafon to believe a Thing, and no fufficient Reason that he yet knows of to the contrary, it would be unreasonable entirely to fufpend his

Affent

T

Affent to it, merely because it is poffible to be falfe, tho' he has no reason to think it fo.

A Man may enter upon an Enquiry with a Belief that what he enquires into is true, or at least very probable, for the Reasons which have been given him; but yet with a Refolution to examine more closely, and fearch more narrowly into the Validity of those Reasons and Evidences. And it is fufficient to a fair Examination, that he applies himself to it with a Mind honeftly prepared and disposed to receive and fubmit to whatever Evidence fhall arife in the Courfe of the Examination or Enquiry. This is all the Neutrality, if this Gentleman will call it fo, that is neceffary to a fair Enquiry, viz. a Difpofition or Refolution to embrace Truth, on which fide foever it fhall upon a careful Search appear; and this Neutrality may be where a Man at present thinks he has much more reason to believe, than the contrary. All the Doubt that is ftrictly and abfolutely neceffary to a fair Examination is, that it is poffible what he enquires into may be otherwise than he at prefent apprehends it. But a Man may believe a thing poffible to be falfe, and yet have great reafon to believe it true. And it may well happen, that in the Courfe of his Examination, he may fee ftill greater Reason to believe and be affured of what he thought at first only probable. In which cafe, the Examination may be carried on very fairly, i. e. with a Mind open to Conviction and Evidence, without entertaining any confiderable Doubt, or ever once feeing caufe abfolutely to fufpend the Affent concerning it. Thus, e.g. if a Man has been carefully edu

cated

cated in the Belief of a God, and of a Providence, and the moral Differences of Things, and at the fame time has been inftructed in the Reafons upon which these Principles are founded, it is not neceffary to a fair Examination into thofe Principles, that he fhould be perfectly indifferent with regard to them, or fhould difbelieve them; he may very confiftently carry on an Examination and Enquiry, without having his Belief of them fhocked either in the Beginning or whole Progrefs of it, because as he goes on in the Examination, the Evidence may rife fuller to his view, and his Convictions may grow ftronger. And I doubt not this hath alfo been the cafe of many excellent Persons of great Abilities and Probity, and of free Judgments, who have examined the Evidences for Christianity. They have come to the Examination with a good Opinion of it at firft, but yet with a Refolution impartially to confider and follow the Evidence that should arife; and the more they examined, the more they found reafon to believe it; and therefore were never obliged during their Examination abfolutely to fufpend their Affent to it, or to refufe to govern their Practice by its Precepts.

There is no need therefore to suppose with this Writer, that all the Time of Examination and Enquiry must be an infidel Interim, as he calls it*, or to talk of the Danger of Death's coming upon us whilst we are carrying on this Enquiry, and of our lacking Faith the neceffary Paffport, &c. For a Perfon may fairly carry on the Enquiry, and yet neither during all that time difbelieve the Prin

P. 177

ciples,

ciples, nor neglect the Practice of the Duties of Christianity; yea, may ftill have his Faith more ftrengthned as he goes on, and his Refolutions more established for a Chriftian Practice.

We may fee by this, how juft this Gentleman's Infinuations are, as if all Enquiries and Difquif tions into the Truth and Authentickness of Revelation were Practices utterly inconfiftent with the Pretenfions of fuch as call themselves Chriftians, or expect any Benefit from the Gospel-Covenant, to which they are always prefumed Parties *. For fuppofing God hath given us a Revelation, which he knows is attended with fufficient Evidence to fatisfy a reasonable and well-difpofed Mind, he very confiftently require us both to examine and to believe it; because he knows a firm Belief of it will be the Effect of a fair Examination, if it be not our own faults. His Defign may be in effect this: Examine fairly and carefully, and you will fee fuch Evidences of its Truth and Excellency, as will make your Belief and Obedience a reasonable Service.

may

Nor can I fee but a Parent who takes great care and pains in training up his Child to juft and worthy Sentiments of Religion and Virtue, may very confiftently bid him examine and enquire when he grows up, without defiring him to difbelieve what he has taught him. There would be nothing abfurd in his addreffing him thus: I have endeavoured to inftruct you in the Reafonablenefs of the Principles of Religion, as far as I was able to do it; and now you are come to a Capa