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and ardent Concern for propagating important Truth and Duty, not by Methods of Perfecution and Violence, which the Gofpel never recommends, but by Persuasion and Argument, and all Methods confiftent with Juftice and Charity; this is what Reason cannot but approve. And the bare Poffibility of a Man's being mistaken, will never be in reafon fufficient to render him indifferent about what he apprehends upon the most impartial Confideration to be true, and of great confequence to the Caufe of Religion and Virtue. In such a case, if he hath any love to Truth, or any concern for the Honour of the Deity, or for the Good of Mankind; that is, if he be a Man really of good Dif pofitions, he cannot but be defirous to spread the Knowledge of fuch Truths by all fair and just Methods that are in his power.

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As this Gentleman, the better to answer his End, has thought fit to represent the Zeal required in the Gofpel as a Zeal without Knowledge, an irrational Fervour, fo to prove that a rational Faith cannot produce that Perfeverance which is the Duty of Chriftians, he reprefents this Perfeverance to be an obftinate Refolution to difclaim all farther Trial, and shut their Eyes against all Evidence that might be offered, tho' never fo ftrong; and in effect to be, what he had before represented it, a blind and foolish Obftinacy to a prefent Notion. But if by Perfeverance, be understood a steady and conftant. Adherence to what a Man is upon good grounds perfuaded is Truth and Duty, fo as not to fuffer himself to be turned from it by worldly Bribes or Threatnings, or to be fhaken by the Arts of fubtil

Seducers;

Seducers; this is a Temper of Mind becoming a wife and good Man, and is what right Reason approves. That a Man ought not for any worldly Confiderations to renounce and deny what he is convinced in his own Confcience is true and right, is a Duty that natural Religion prescribes; and it is also highly reasonable, that when a Man has once got his Mind well-established in the main Principles of Religion upon good and folid grounds, he should not fuffer himself to be easily turned afide by every Wind of Doctrine. It is thought very reasonable in other cafes to proceed upon things well proved, to lay them down as Principles, and not to be for ever difputing them over again. Where a Thing is once confirmed by Arguments fufficient in their kind, the greatest Masters of Reafon have acknowledged that we ought not to be fhaken from it by Objections, tho' we may perhaps find it hard to answer them. And the contrary Conduct cannot properly be called an Openness to Conviction, but an Unfteadiness and Volatility of Mind, which is not the Effect of Reason, but is really a Disease, and a very pernicious one; and which, where it prevails, hinders a Man from being ever fettled in any Principles at all. This indeed feems to be what this Gentleman intends. The Strain of his arguing, p. 25, 26, 27. is to this purpose, that a Man can never come to a fatisfying Certainty or Affurance of Truth in any point whatfoever, because he is not infallible, and may possibly be mistaken; and because it is not impoffible but fome new Evidence may fucceed, and he may hereafter fee Things in a different light; and that there

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fore a rational Faith muft always be precarious, and fubject to change. But this way of reafoning is very fallacious. A Man may be fufficiently certain of a Truth, to lay a juft Foundation for a Satisfaction of Mind, and for a fuitable Course of Action, when upon the most impartial Confideration it appears to him founded upon folid Arguments, tho' at the fame time he knows he is not infallible. And it is very abfurd, to pretend that no Man can ever be sure of what he is convinced by Reason and Argument is true, because there is a bare remote Poffibility that fome time or other he may alter his Judgment concerning it. I fee no other tendency in all this, but to unfettle Perfons from all Principles whatsoever, and to keep them in an eternal Fluctuation and Uncertainty; which is what neither Reafon prefcribes, nor the Author of our Beings ever intended.

In matters of Practice relating to the Affairs of this Life, it would be abfurd to the laft degree, to fay that a Man must never act nor come to a determinate Refolution, till he is abfolutely fure it could not poffibly be otherwife. And it would be equally abfurd, to advance this as a Principle in Matters of Faith and Religion, on which the Practice of Holiness and Virtue and our Preparations for a future World fo much depend; and the Confequences of neglecting a proper prefent Practice upon bare remote Surmifes and Poffibilities, would be in this cafe infinitely more pernicious.

The laft Part of his Argument, and what he moft largely infifts upon, is, that a rational Faith, i. e. a Faith founded on rational Conviction and

Evidence,

Evidence, can never have force enough to engage us to mortify our most beloved Affections and Appetites, much lefs to engage us to fuffer Martyrdom for the Truth, if called to it. He declaims upon this Subject with a great deal of Rhetorick, from p. 30. to p. 35. He paints the Difficulty of fubduing the Paffions, and of a virtuous Life, in the strongest Colours; and in fuch a manner, that one would be apt to think he felt in himself what he described, and that his own Inclinations and Appetites were much too strong for his Reason.

The Strefs of his Argument lies here, that the utmoft Certainty and Evidence that Faith can attain to in a rational way, is a moral Certainty and Evidence, and that this can never be fufficient to the Purposes of Religion. He is ready to grant all the moral Certainty in the Proofs of Religion that you can reasonably defire; and farther, that this is indeed the highest degree of rational Evidence, that the Nature of the Subject can poffibly admit of. He fuppofes it to have all the most favourable Circumftances, that the fevereft Malice of an exceptious Critick can demand*. One would think thefe were pretty large Conceffions; but at the fame time, and almost in the fame breath, in which he feems to allow fuch a degree of Certainty to that moral Evidence, he reprefents it as after all an Uncertainty, a doubtful Account; that it is fill but human Teftimony in its nature, ever liable to Error, as depending only on fallible Authors. That it cannot produce a thorough Conviction; and its true Amount in a time of Trial is, that it is nothing

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more than the precarious Conjecture of a fallible Judge, upon the traditional Teftimony of a fallible Witness. He has more to the fame purpose, pag. 52, 53. where he seems willing to carry it fo far, as not to allow that any Man can be fure of any thing, but what he himself fees with his own Eyes.

It is very eafy to declaim, in a plaufible manner, on the Weakness and Infufficiency of moral Evidence, and the Fallibility of hiftorical human Teftimony; and this feems to be a darling Commonplace with thefe Gentlemen. But it is all mere Harangue, and only fit to impofe upon those that will fuffer themselves to be carried away with Sounds; fince it cannot be denied, that this kind of Evidence may be, and often is fo circumstanced, that the Man would fcarce be looked upon to be in his Senfes, that should seriously deny or doubt of it. It is but by moral Evidence, and the Testimony of fallible Men, capable of deceiving and being deceived, that I know there is fuch a Place as Paris or Rome; for I never faw either of thofe Cities; and yet I can no more reasonably doubt of it, than if I myself had been there. It is by moral Evidence that we have all our Laws, the Records of our own or any other Nation, and that we enjoy the Benefit of the Knowledge and Experience of former Ages, and have any Affurance of paft Facts; and yet is there any Man of common Sense, that does not as certainly believe many fuch Facts that were done in former Ages, as he believes any Event that happened of late Years, and within his own Memory? It is manifeft, that the Author of

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