which is refrained from producing its genuine Fruits, ought not to be honoured with the Name of Virtue.

I would willingly establish the Force of my Conclufion, before I proceed to confider more particularly those Assertions on which it is founded.-Now for the effectual Support of the Conclufion, nothing further feems to be neceffary, than to vindicate the Propriety of praising Faith, on account of an Excellence not its own: to confirm at large, what we have already afserted, that it ftands exactly upon the fame Footing with all other Good Qualities; and particularly with those fundamental Virtues, the Love of God, and our Neighbour.-To this End, it may be proper to remove a very material Objection, which will naturally occur to a thinking Man, on perufing what has been here advanced.

FOR may it not be urged, That the Infances produced are by no Means parallel to the Cafe before us? That right Affections naturally flow from right Conduct, but that no Degree of Care in our Pursuits after Knowlege, can ever be fufficient to ensure our Success? That on the contrary, an exact and fcrupulous Inquiry may, in numberless and obvious Cafes, be productive of Error, as well as Truth? and that Error itself would, in thefe Inftances, have the fame Title to the Name of Virtue, which is here pleaded in Behalf of

true

true Faith ?—It is impoffible to answer Objections of this Kind, without running into a Controverfy, which, in a great Measure, will be only verbal. But even a verbal Controverfy may, in this Cafe, be of real ufe. For, unless it be perfectly confiftent with the common Forms of Speech, to beftow the highest Commendations on Faith, for the fake of a borrowed Excellence; it may be thought that our Saviour confidered bare Affent, as a Thing in its own Nature praife-worthy. Than which a greater Abfurdity cannot be imputed to him. Let us therefore examine, with this View, what Force there is in the Objections proposed? and whether Faith have not as fair a Title to our Praife, as the other Virtues compared with it ?

THAT the Inftances produced are in all refpects parallel, is a Point I am not concerned to maintain. It is fufficient for my Purpose, that they agree in thofe Particulars, in which the courfe of my Argument requires it. I mean that religious and benevolent Affections can only be entitled to the Name of Virtues on account of a derivative Excellence. They are acquired by a Series of virtuous Actions, and are therefore esteemed and called Virtues. In this respect they agree with Faith. In another refpect they are fuppofed to differ. But that, I prefume, no way affects the Point before us. For, fup

pofing a Quality to be virtuously acquired, what avails it, whether it was the neceffary Confequence, or only the probable Refult of Right Conduct? And yet this is the fole Point of Difference, which can be alleged in the prefent Cafe.-A careful and confcientious Endeavour to obtain a found and rational Faith, tho' it naturally tends to make us wife Men, may yet, thro' a Concurrence of accidental Impediments, be altogether infufficient for that Purpofe. But how does it follow from hence, that Faith is no Virtue? Whoever attempts to draw fuch a Conclufion, must first prove that all moral Improvements, of what kind foever, are abfolutely and entirely in our own Power; than which nothing can be more falfe, or more contrary to univerfal Experience. Every Capacity, every Age, every Station in Life has peculiar Advantages and Difadvantages in this refpect: almost every Individual is separately furnished with Means and Opportunities which

others want.

BUT to put this Matter out of all doubt, I believe it will appear, to a confiderate Inquirer, that this is actually the Cafe in the Inftances alleged; and by confequence, that the Parallel holds quite thro'. I am not afraid to affirm that the Love of God and our Neighbour, in that Degree of Perfection which the Gospel recommends, are not univerfally

I

attain

attainable; are not in all Men the necellary Effects of Right Conduct. It cannot, I think, be questioned, that very many Perfons, thro' a Defect in their natural Conftitution, are not capable of Affections at all; or at least in fo cold and languishing a Degree, as can by no means come up to thofe Characters of Love, which are laid down in the New Teftament. But fetting this afide, Men's Progress in these and all other Virtues will unavoidably depend on their Progrefs in Knowlege. For, fuppofing, what the Objection allows us to fuppofe, that Sincerity is not inconfiftent either with Ignorance or Error; fuppofing that an honeft and virtuous Man fhould yet fall into great Miftakes; whether relating to the Deity, or his Fellow Creatures, or the refpective Duties he owes to both; how is it poffible he should love them as he ought ?-He who will affert the Poffibility of this, will find himself obliged to maintain, that these Evangelical Virtues were practifed in as great Perfection by the Greeks and Romans, nay, by the most ignorant and barbarous Nations, as by the Followers of Chrift himself; thofe, I mean, who make the beft ufe of the Revelation they enjoy. If he will not maintain. this, he must then impute the Deficience univerfally to no other Caufe but wrong Conduct. If this too be given up, it remains that right Conduct may, in numberless Inftances,

Thefe

fail of producing right Affections. Affections therefore are only the probable Effect of virtuous Actions; and therefore the Inftances are still parallel.-A Man fincerely virtuous may, not only in Point of Faith, but in many other Refpects, fall short of Evangelical Perfection.

IT is then no Objection to what we have been faying, that many Perfons want the Means of arriving at a true Faith: that some have not Leifure, or Capacity, to enter upon a rational Inquiry; that others, who are Masters of both, are yet frequently hindered by unavoidable Prejudices, from the Discovery of the Truth. This, I fay, can never prove that thofe who are bleffed with more favourable Opportunities, may not deferve great Praise for making a right Use of them; or that fome Part of the Credit may not be derived on the Faith itself thus acquired.

But an exact and fcrupulous Inquiry may frequently be productive of Error. And is Error too a moral Virtue ?-I answer, this is a great Mistake. An impartial Inquiry may fometimes terminate in Error; but that it is the Cause of Error, I utterly deny. If it frequently happens in our Search after Truth, that we embrace the Shadow inftead of the Substance; this Delufion is by no means to be ascribed to our Diligence in fearching: but to those Impediments, whatever they were,

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