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that Portion of religious Knowledge, which is drawn from Divine Revelation; and every Degree of fuch Knowledge I therefore confider as a Degree of Faith. By the Faith of a Chriftian, I understand that Faith which is drawn from the Chriftian Revelation in particular; always including the Belief of this general Propofition, that the Chriftian Revelation is of Divine Authority. I use the Word Knowlege, not in a philofophical, but a popular Senfe; intending only the Perception of Truth; without regard to the Degree of Certainty, or to the Means of acquiring it. But I call one Man more knowing than another, when his Knowledge either extends to a greater Number of Objects; takes them in with more Clearnefs and Precifion; or rifes to a ftronger Affurance. Agreeably to this Explication, Men differ from each other in Degrees of Faith, in Proportion as their religious Knowlege, fo far as it is derived from Divine Revelation, is more extenfive, more clear, or more certain.-Laftly, that Knowlege I call religious, which relates, either mediately, or immediately, to the Intercourfe between God and Man: I mean to the various Acts performed, or to be performed on both Sides; to God's general Dealings with Mankind, as well as to particular Difpenfations; to the various States of Mankind with respect to God, whether natural or adventitious; and to

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the various Obligations, as well as Expectations refulting from fuch States.*

KNOWLEGE is no Action. Nothing but Actions can deferve Praife or Blame. Knowlege therefore cannot immediately be the Object of either. This is equally true of religious Knowlege, as of any other Kind; and confequently must be extended to that Portion of religious Knowlege, which I comprehend under the Denomination of Faith.On the other hand, the Writers of the New Teftament, and even our Lord himself, have recommended Faith in the ftrongest Terms; and, to all Appearance, in the very fame Senfe, in which we have now defined it. We can scarce find a Page, either in the Epiftles or Gospels, which does not abound in its Praifes. It fhould feem therefore that, in this particular, the Voices of Reafon and Scripture are directly oppofite. And from this Seeming

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The learned Bifhop Pearson, after diftinguishing between Human Faith and Divine, defines the latter to be an Affent unto fomething as credible, upon the Teftimony of God. But I have thought it neceffary to be a little more determinate, with regard to the Object of Faith: First, by confining it to religious Truths; and fecondly, by extending it to all revealed Truths, of that Nature. In the former of thefe Alterations, I prefume I am juftified by the common Acceptation of the Word: and as to the latter, I need only observe, that my prefent Enquiry does not relate to the Belief of Single Propofitions, but to the whole Faith of a Chriftian. I have ufed the Word Knowlege, inftead of Affent, because the former implies the Truth of what is believed, the latter may fignify indifferently either a right, or an erroneous Judgment.

Seeming Oppofition both Reason and Scripture have fuffered extremely *. Some Perfons have thought it neceffary to relinquish Scripture, because determined to adhere to Reafon; and many more to give up Reason, that they might not be led to oppofe Scripture. In short, rational and irrational have been thought on both fides fynonymous Terms with Infidel and Believer.

To extricate ourselves from this Difficulty, it is neceflary to obferve, that the very fame Thing may in different Refpects, and on different Accounts, both deferve and not deferve Commendation. That Actions only are the proper and immediate Objects of Praife, is, in a moral Senfe, indifputably true. But nei

ther is this the only kind of Praife; nor is this Praise itself ufually confined to its immediate Objects. Whatever Qualities either moral or natural, are in any refpect truly valuable; are always esteemed praise-worthy. Not only fo, but, by an eafy and common Figure of Speech, Things may frequently become the Objects of Praife, which have in themselves no Value at all; because they may derive a Value from other Things, to which they stand nearly related. Sometimes we look upwards to the Caufes from which they proceed; fometimes downwards to the

Effects

This Oppofi ion has been much heightened by that Confafion of Faith and Credulity abovementioned.

Effects and Confequences which flow from them; fometimes as it were fideways, to an accidental Connection they may have with other Caufes, fo that the latter cannot produce fome valuable Operation, unless the former be presupposed.

SOMETHING of this may conveniently be illustrated by a very obvious Example.Should any Perfon write a Book in Praise of Learning, he would furely be thought no Enemy to Reason; especially if by Learning he meant nothing more but found and fubftantial Knowlege. And yet fuch a Person may be faid to contradict Reafon, by praising that which is no Action; and which therefore, Reason tells us, cannot be the Object of Praife. But the Reply is manifeft-Tho' Knowlege, confidered in itself, be no moral Virtue, yet is it in many refpects truly valuable: valuable, because it prefuppofes a right Conduct of the Understanding, and that Conduct involves in it the Exercise of many Virtues; valuable, because, in its own Nature, the Means of procuring very great Advantages, both to the Poffeffor and to other Men; vaJuable, as it may accidentally be made the Condition, without which other Means of promoting our Intereft would either be less effectual, or in fome Cafes entirely ineffectual.-These Things may, in fome Degree, be truly affirmed of Knowlege in general; but with Still

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ftill greater Truth of religious Knowlege, and especially that Part of it, which is the Subject of our present Inquiry.

THUS are we brought back to the Point, from whence this Illuftration took its Rife. I mean that Faith, tho' no Action, may yet, in fome Refpects, and on fome Accounts, be very properly the Object of Praife. From whence it follows, that the supposed Inconfiftency on this Head between Scripture and Reafon is much lefs manifeft, than is frequently imagined. We can by no means conclude from this general Pofition, that Faith is praised by the Writers of the New Teftament, whether thofe Writers are confiftent or inconfiftent with Right Reafon.

BUT we must not ftop here.-Tho' Faith fhould be allowed a Title to fome Kinds and Degrees of Praife; yet is it not represented, in Scripture, under falfe Colours? Is it not dreffed up in fuch Characters, to which it neither has nor can have any Pretence? In fhort, is it poffible to acquit the facred Authors, amidst the frequent Commendations they beftow upon it, from a Mifapplication in the Kind of Praife, and a Profufion in the Degree of it?—That we may be able to judge how far fuch a Vindication is practicable, our Inquiry muft be more particular, To collect all the fcattered Paffages on this Subject, and allot to each its Explication and

Defence,

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