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Subject out, whereof the Predicate is not faid. According to the former Sense of Universality it is not neceffary that in every concluding Syllogisın one Proposition be universal. But ac cording to tlie latter Sense of Universality(which indeed is the most proper Sense of it) it is certainly necessary. And I dare challenge any Man to shew me one Instance of a concluding Syllogism that has not one Propofition universal in the latter Sense. For even a fingular Proposition is thus universal, since being indivisible, it can have nothing said of it, but what is said of it wholly and universally, radóns, as, Aristotle expresses it. The Author may fee a further Account of this in Dr. Wallis his Thesis de Propositione fingulari, at the latter end of his Inftitutio Logica.
These, Sir, are the most considerable Parsages that at once reading I thought liable to Reflection in this work, which, notwithstanding these few Erratas, I think to be a very extraordinary Performance, and worthy of the most publick Honour and Respect. And tha I do not approve of every particular thing in this Book, yet I must fay that the Author is just such a kind of Writer as I like, one that has thought much, and well, and who freely writes what he thinks. I hate your Common-place Men of all the Writers in the World, who tho' they happen sometimes to say things that are in themfelves not only true, but considerable, yet they never write in any Train or Order of Think
ing, which is one of the greatest Beauties of Compofition.
But this Gentleman is a Writer of a very different Genius and Complexion of Soul, and whose Character I cannot easily give, but must leave it either to the Description of some finer Pen, or to the silent Admiration of Pofterity. Only one Feature of his Disposition I am concern'd to point out, which is, that he seems to be a Person of so great Ingenuity and Candor, and of a Spirit so truly Philosophical, that I have thence great and fair Inducements to belive that he will not be offended with that Freedom I have used in these Reflections, which were not intended for the lessening his Fame, but solely for the promoting of Truth and right Thinking
AND this will justifie that part of the Refleations, where agreeing with the Author in the Proposition intended to be proved, I lay open the Insufficiency of his Proofs. For to say that a thing is false for such Reasons, when 'tis not false for such Reasons, though it be absolutely false, is as great an Injury to Truth, as to say a thing is false when 'tis not false. A false Inference is as much as an Untruth, as a false Conclufion; and accordingly he that might reflect upon the Conclusion if false, may with as much reason reflect upon a wrong way of inferring it, tho' the Conclusion it self be true. Which I mention with respect to the former Part about Innate Principles, where though I agree
with the Author in the thing denied, yet I think his Reasons are not cogent.
AFTER all, notwithstanding my dissenting from this Author in so many things, I am perhaps as great an Admirer of him as any of his most sworn Followers, and would not part with his Book for half a Vatican. But every Writer has his Alloy, and I exempt not any Writings of my own from the like Defects : of which perhaps, Sir, I have been convincing you all this while. But that shall not trouble me, if at the same time I may be able to convince you of my
Readiness to serve you at any rate, as it highly becomes,
Tour Obliged and
A Brief Consideration of the REMARKS made -upon
the foregoing REFLECTIONS by the Gentlemen of the ATHENIAN Society, in the Supplement to the Third Volume, &c.
HE Gentlemen of this new Society T
undertake two things, to Report, and to Judge of the Contents of the most
considerable Books that are Printed in England; which I acknowledge to be a very useful and laudable Undertaking, if performed Skilfully and Faithfully, with Judgment and Integrity. But whether they have thus acquitted themselves in reference to the foregoing Reflections, the Liberty they have taken with the Author, will I think warrant him to Examin.
SUPPLEMENT, Pag. 2. Paragraph 1. It will be sufficient to observe that Mr. Norris is a Cartesian, and as it seems, of those of the Cartefians that are of Father Malebranche's Opinion. This occasions that being full of these Thoughts, he seems not always to have well comprehended his meaning whom he Criticises upon. Why the being a Cartesian, and according to the way of M. Malebranche, should make me less apt to comprehend Mr. Lock's Book, I cannot divine. Were the thing it self never so true, yet I think the Reason here given of it, is as odd as may be. But 'twill be time enough to seek out for the
Reason of my misunderstanding Mr. Lock's Book, when it is better proved than at present, that I have done so. But as to that, if Mr. Lock himself had told me fo, his bare Authority without any
Reason would have obliged me to suspect my Apprehension, and to think once again, it being a Deference owing to every Author to suppose that he best understands his own Meaning. But from you, Gentlemen, who stand upon the same Level with me, I expect Reason, and to be shewn where and how I have mistaken him. For the present I am rather apt to think that I have comprehended Mr. Lock’s Sense well enough, but that you understand neither Me, nor Mr. Lock.
PARAGR. 2. He upbraideth Mr. Lock of attempting to treat of Ideas, without defining what he understood by this Word. Here is a falte Report. I did not censure Mr. Lock for undertaking to difcourse of Ideas, without premising a Definition, of the Name or Word, (for that I grant he has done) but for offering to account for their Origination, without giving a Definition, or any Account of the thing. My Words are, But sure by all the Laws of Method in the World, he ought first to have Defined what he meant by Ideas, and to have acquainted us with their Nature, before he proceeded to account for their Origination. And again, This therefore ought to have been his first and indeed main Business, to bave given us an account of the Nature of Ideas : And yet this is not only
, neg lccted in its proper Place, but wholly omitted and