upon the conclusiveness of Edwards's reasoning, not by denying the soundness of the links, or the strength of the materials, but by charging his premises and principles with being hypothetical. This charge, Mr. Rogers examines with considerable ability; and as we are ourselves in some degree implicated in the opinions of the eminent writer to whom he alludes, (inasmuch as we have expressed, on a former occasion*, our general approval of the criticism contained in the essay preliminary to a recent edition of Edwards on the Will, by the Author of the Natural History of Enthusiasm,) we cannot refuse to Mr. R. an opportunity of vindicating Edwards, whatever risk we may run of leading some of our readers to question the infallibility of our opinions. They shall at least be put into a condition to judge for themselves.

There are', Mr. Rogers remarks, three distinct orders of truths: some (and they form immensely the larger class) consisting of facts derived from the senses, and which are gathered from observation and experiment; some relating to the operations of mind, and these are gained by consciousness and reflection; while others are elicited purely by processes of deductive reasoning, from a comparison of any propositions between which any mutual relations can subsist at all. Now, any man has a right to take any number of such propositions, and reason by inference from them; and if the purely ratiocinative process from such propositions be correct, the reasoning will always be, at least, hypothetically true; that is, if you admit the premises, you must also admit the conclusion. But if the premises be in fact true, the argumentation will also be in fact as well as hypothetically true. Its practical worth will therefore be measured by the actual truth of the premises. All that was requisite, therefore, to enable Edwards to give full scope to his peculiar powers, was, that he should select topics in which the propositions preliminary to reasoning should be exceedingly few, simple, and for the most part, obvious; and this, we affirm, he has generally accomplished. Thus his reasoning is seldom vitiated by any unsoundness in the premises; and as to any flaw in the logical process, let not his opponents hope for it. The movements of machinery are hardly more unerring, than the precision with whichwhen he has once laid down the propositions which constitute his premises he proceeds to unfold their relations.' p. viii.

Further on, he enters more fully into the criticisms of the "Essayist." First, he meets what has been alleged as to the inutility of Edwards's speculations; but, as this is an unimportant matter, compared with the validity of his reasonings, we shall pass it by, to notice what Mr. R. has alleged against the objections of the "Essayist ", touching the defects and the errors of the argumentation.

* See Eclectic Review, Oct. 1831, Art. I.

'But we must now proceed, as we proposed, to consider those defects in the argumentation of this great work, which the Essayist to whom we have so often referred, professes to discover. In the "Introduction" to his Essay, he sums up what he deems the principal defects of Edwards in the vague charge, a charge which we shall consider more particularly hereafter, that he "mingles purely abstract propositions-propositions strictly metaphysical, with facts belonging to the physiology of the human mind." This, the author affirms, is "fatal to the consistency of a philosophical theory;" "that the reader will be conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion that some fallacy has passed into the train of reasoning, though the linking of syllogisms seems perfect." Since these charges are of so grave a nature, since, if they really exist, these errors must run through the whole tissue of Edwards's argumentation, and reduce it to dust, one would expect that the meaning of the Essayist would have been most copiously and perspicuously explained,—that every particular instance in which such worthless materials had been wrought into the woof of argument, would have been pointed out, and the feeble character of the texture demonstrated by just breaking up, as our author could easily have done, the sophisms which Jonathan Edwards has constructed out of such incongruous premises. Yet, strange to say, he has ventured upon no such specification; he seems to think it not too great a demand upon our credulity, that we should believe on his mere assurance, and in reference to such a work as the "Inquiry," that it is possible to point out such "errors of method," as in fact vitiate nearly the whole of the reasoning!

The only attempt which, so far as we can find, he makes to illustrate and to substantiate his formidable charges, is in his fourth " section," (in which he considers the question of necessity as one "of the physiology of man,") and in a note or two appended to that part of his performance. We do not hesitate to say, that if the charge there adduced be a fair specimen of those other instances of defective logic, which he has concealed with such cautious mystery, the " Inquiry may still be regarded as the same irrefragable piece of reasoning which the world has always considered it. In our opinion, his attempt is a signal failure. For what is his objection to Edwards in the passages to which we refer? Why, that he has not entered sufficiently into the physiological conditions of volition in different classes of voluntary agents, or the same agents at different times; he blames him that he has not taken into account the infinite diversity of circumstances, the endlessly varying degrees and limits within which the voluntary principle may be exercised amongst different classes of voluntary agents, from the lowest animals to the highest orders of created intelligence; or in the same voluntary agents at different periods of their existence, and possessed of varying measures of knowledge and experience. With all this, the question of the moral necessity of all volitions had nothing whatever to do. It is true, indeed, that owing to the causes the Essayist has specified, the processes of volition are endlessly complicated and varied; and in order to supply Edwards's imagined deficiencies, he has illustrated his meaning with much vivacity, but with a somewhat tedious amplification, by a reference to

the processes of volition in different classes of voluntary agents. Now all this is obviously quite foreign to the subject; it has no connexion with the only aspects in which it concerned Jonathan Edwards to consider the question. Edwards's object was to consider volitions in that point in which they all resembled one another,—namely, as originating in motives of some kind or other; no matter how those motives may vary in number and complexity in different orders of voluntary agents, or in the same agents at different periods. His design did not require that he should consider the number of causes which in particular cases control volition, but whether volition is not always caused. Yet the Essayist, assuming, apparently, that Edwards ought to have done this, and that his argument is defective because it touches no inquiries of such a nature, is amusingly copious in instances of supposed similar errors in reasonings on some of the mechanical arts. In these instances, the abstract principles of mathematics are imagined to be rigorously applied to a variety of complicated problems, that can be decided only by a cautious and extensive induction of facts in several departments of science.' pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.

We are under the necessity of omitting the illustration by the Author of the "Natural History ", and Mr. Rogers's reply. The latter endeavours to shew, that Edwards has not fallen into the error alleged against him; and that he has done all, with regard to volition in general, that was required for the sake of his argument, viz., to shew that it originated in motive. Edwards reasons, that all volitions, however simple, or however complex, are not uncaused; a fact which the Essayist does not deny.

How then,' Mr. R. continues, is his logic impaired by his not entering into the physiological conditions of volition in different classes of voluntary agents? Had he attempted anything of this kind, we quite concur with the Essayist, in thinking that he would have failed; and for reasons which we have already abundantly specified in the analysis we have given of Edwards's mind. With his characteristic judgment he has, it appears to us, just confined his argument within those limits which were exactly adapted to the structure of his intellect. And to have gone further would have been not only entering upon a field for which we cannot but think he was not well qualified, but quite alien from the controversy in which he was engaged.'

The Essayist's chief objection against Edwards's reasoning is, that metaphysical propositions are mingled with physiological facts. But Mr. Rogers contends that, in itself, this implies no error, and indicates no fallacy. It is true, there may be fallacy in such a mixture of fact and reasoning; but it by no means follows as a necessary result, that there must be such fallacy. He thinks, that the Author of the Essay should have made it his business to point out the fallacies, and not have urged a grave and general charge of merely mingling metaphysical reasoning with physiological facts; which, in itself, is no act of logical

delinquency, but is done, and must be done, by every analyst of the mental phenomena.

The Essayist remarks:

"The attentive reader of Edwards will detect a confusion of another sort, less palpable indeed, but of not less fatal consequence to the consistency of a philosophical argument; and which, though sanctioned by the highest authorities, in all times, and recommended by the example of the most eminent writers, even to the present moment, must, so long as it is adhered to, hold intellectual philosophy far in the rear of the physical and mathematical sciences. For the present, it is enough just to point out the error of method alluded to, remitting the further consideration of it to a subsequent page.

"It is that of mingling purely abstract propositions-propositions strictly metaphysical, with facts belonging to the physiology of the human mind. Even the reader who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be perpetu ally conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, and will at length condense itself into the form of a protest against certain conclusions, notwithstanding their apparently necessary connexion with the premises,'

Upon this, Mr. Rogers offers the following strictures :

That we may know what value our author attaches to these "abstractions," and what value those reasonings must have which are founded on them in reference to a question of fact, like this of the freedom of the will, the Essayist gives us to understand, that they stand parallel with "the abstractions of "that mathematics; pure it may be said of both, that the human mind masters them, comprehends and perceives their properties and relations, and feels that the materials of its cogitation all lie within its grasp, are opposed to its inspection, and need not be gathered from observation." "These abstractions," he tells us, may be made "to pass through the process of syllogistic reasoning,"—as though all other propositions, of any nature whatsoever, that are capable of being made to yield logical inferences from their comparison with one another, were not capable of being made to pass through that process too; or as though the structure of the syllogism depended on the kind of propositions which constitute the premises, instead of the connexion between the premises and the conclusion.

Now if Edwards has employed such abstractions as our Essayist here mentions, we should be glad if he would particularize them. It is incredible how much trouble may be saved by a little specification. This, however, he has not even attempted; he has not given us a single instance of those "abstractions," of which the author predicates so close an analogy to the definitions of pure mathematics. The simple fact is, there were none to give.

In truth, if Edwards had employed any such "abstractions" as those the Essayist describes, (just as one might employ any conceiv

able propositions on any subject for the mere purpose of logical illation, modestly assuming that those preliminary "abstractions are to be taken for granted,) he would have done a very absurd thing: however consecutive his argumentation might be, it would have been utterly worthless, because purely hypothetical; depending upon a concession of the premises, and those, too, "abstractions. So far from its being true, as the Essayist appears to imagine, that the treatise on the "Will" would have been more complete, more philosophically consistent," if such abstractions, instead of being "mingled with facts belonging to the physiology of the human mind," had been adhered to throughout, they would have crumbled the whole stupendous structure of argumentation into dust.

'Abstractions, in this sense, Edwards never uses. The words "abstract truths may be taken in two senses. They may mean, propositions purely hypothetical, or propositions which, though they would be true if the universe were annihilated, and are, therefore, called abstract, are not the less applicable on that account (but rather the more so) to actual existence. Thus, for example, when Edwards maintains the proposition, that every "effect must have a cause," he maintains what we suppose our Essayist would call an abstract proposition: it is so, because as soon as the mind has once comprehended the ideas of cause and effect, it perceives that it would be a contradiction to imagine such a proposition untrue, and that it would not be the less true were the universe annihilated. But this universality of application does not render the principle inapplicable to the universe as it is actually constituted, but rather the reverse.

Thus, abstractions of this nature may be employed in questions of fact, and in conjunction with propositions asserting facts belonging to the physiology of the human mind, without any sort of impropriety; and for this simple reason, that they are employed not as purely hypothetical propositions, but for the very purpose of being applied, and because they are applicable, to actual existences. It is just so, in the case of that abstract truth to which we just now referred.

For precisely the same reasons, the abstractions of mathematics are capable of application to actual existence, and enter so largely into the reasonings of the mixed sciences.

The abstract propositions which Edwards brings forward, are so far from being merely hypothetically true, that they are actually true, and indeed are only called abstract propositions because it is supposed to imply a contradiction that they should be untrue.

We may illustrate this by a reference to Edwards's great maxim, that every "effect must have a cause." This is supposed to be true as a matter of fact; and to be rendered available to his purpose, only because it is such. If only admitted to be hypothetically true, all the demonstrations founded upon it, being hypothetical too, would to any practical purpose be worthless. But so far from this, it is only affirmed to be an abstract proposition at all, because, in distinction from ordinary matters of fact, it would be a contradiction to suppose the contrary. If the universe were annihilated, it would still be true, that every effect, whether actually existent or possible, must presuppose a cause. But it is for the express purpose of applying it to